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Abstract 
This thesis offers new insights into the relationship between epistemic engagement and the 
personality domain of Openness to Experience. In seeking to better understand this 
relationship, the unique influence of the lower order aspects of Openness and Intellect on 
engagement was evaluated. Particularly, the proposal that Openness and Intellect represent 
individual differences in engagement with diverging information is tested—Openness with 
sensory and perceptual, and Intellect with abstract and semantic. Additionally, a process-
based understanding for the differences between the aspects in the context of engagement 
with information was sought. Such an understanding can shift Openness/Intellect beyond a 
descriptive construct, and provide explanations for relationships between the domain and 
epistemic engagement. Four studies evaluated whether Openness and Intellect were 
differentially related to interest in various informational stimuli—quotations (study 1), visual 
art (study 2, 3 and 4), philosophy and science (study 4). Throughout the studies, Openness 
was the consistent predictor of interest in all stimuli. The influence of Openness on 
engagement was also consistently qualified by appraisal-emotion contingencies. 
Particularly, Openness was associated with stronger novelty-interest relationships 
suggesting a reactivity to novel and complex situations. The implications of this finding for 
the previously observed relationships between Openness, Cognitive Abilities, and 
Educational outcomes are discussed. The lack of associations between engagement and 
Intellect is, in part, explained by the measurement of the construct being misaligned with its 
conceptualisation. Overall, these findings suggest that a clear engagement distinction 
between Openness and Intellect in terms of stimulus type is premature. Instead, Openness 
seems to currently represent the affective engagement aspect of the domain, while Intellect 
is related to greater understanding, but not interest.  
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“When the determinants of interests are more completely understood, the 
psychologist will have obtained keys to many of the hither-to unsolved riddles of 
personality.” 
– Berdie, 1944, p. 138 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
If you have ever marveled at human achievement as a species, chances are you were 
in awe of the consequences of a personality domain labelled Openness/Intellect. 
Openness/Intellect is arguably the most uniquely human personality domain. This is not to 
say that non-human animals do not exhibit Openness/Intellect—some do, in the form of 
curiosity for novel environments (Gosling & John, 1999)—but rather, Openness/Intellect 
manifests in behaviours that are not found in non-human animals. For example, 
Openness/Intellect is the best personality predictor of the creation and appreciation of all 
forms of art, creativity in general, knowledge acquisition, cognitive ability, political 
affiliations, values, investigative and artistic interests, and many other uniquely human 
deeds and attitudes (Feist, 1998; Gerber, Huber, Doherty, & Dowling, 2011; Kaufman et al., 
2014; Larson, Rottinghaus, & Borgen, 2002; McCrae, 1996; Mccrae & Sutin, 2009; Rawlings, 
2003; von Stumm & Ackerman, 2013; Ziegler, Danay, Heene, Asendorpf, & Bühner, 2012).   
One of the most researched and consistent relationships associated with 
Openness/Intellect is engagement with information. Openness/Intellect is proposed to play 
a crucial role in the development of vocational, leisure and academic interests, and the 
development of general knowledge and cognitive abilities (Ackerman, 1996; Howard, 1976; 
Larson et al., 2002; Ziegler et al., 2012). These associations—like many other associations 
between personality traits and life outcomes—suffer from a relative lack of explanatory 
mechanisms. One focus of this thesis is to discover the processes by which 
Openness/Intellect manifests in engagement with different kinds of information. In 
particular, I aim to uncover how the subsidiary parts of Openness/Intellect uniquely 
manifest engagement and its processes. That is, I am integrating a descriptive individual 
differences perspective with a socio-cognitive approach in order to develop a dynamic 
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understanding of how traits manifest in emotional experiences in response to information 
(Fleeson & Jayawickreme, 2015; Kuppens & Tong, 2010). In the paragraphs below, I outline 
why such an endeavour is important to our understanding of personality, and then describe 
the theory underpinning these questions. 
Trait taxonomies—such as the Big 5—have largely focussed on describing meaningful 
dimensions of individual differences, such as the domain of Openness/Intellect. Traits are 
constructs that, by themselves, can only describe the meaningful ways in which someone’s 
behaviour is consistent over time, but not why it is consistent, and not how traits contribute 
to such consistency (Hampson, 2012). The social-cognitive perspective focuses on the 
observation that moment-to-moment behaviour is highly variable (Mischel & Shoda, 1995; 
Mischel, Shoda, & Mendoza-Denton, 2002), and therefore places a greater emphasis on 
social-cognitive situational explanations of behaviour. Therefore the trait approach aims to 
describe consistency in behaviour over time, and the social-cognitive approach aims to 
explain moment-to-moment variability in behaviour. Both of these approaches to 
personality have considerable empirical support for their seemingly contrary positions.  
Several theoretical positions have taken meaningful steps towards integrating the 
two approaches (e.g. Fleeson & Jayawickreme, 2015; Kuppens & Tong, 2010). Research 
based on these approaches suggests that moment-to-moment states are highly variable, yet 
there is remarkable consistency in the averages, peaks, and distributions of such states (e.g. 
Baird, Le, & Lucas, 2006; Fleeson, 2001). Therefore, while traditionally opposed, the trait 
and social-cognitive approaches to personality can be seen as operating at different levels of 
analysis, and can be used together in a complementary way. Such a merger of the two 
approaches would facilitate explanations for the way traits manifest in behavioural 
outcomes. Whole Trait Theory outlines a blueprint for such an integration (Fleeson & 
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Jayawickreme, 2015). It suggests the study of the relationships between traits and 
information processing mechanisms associated with variability in moment-to-moment 
behaviour. This thesis looks at such relationships—between states and social-cognitive 
processes associated with engagement with information, and the two aspects of the 
personality domain of Openness/Intellect. An important background to this is the history of 
how the aspects model was developed, and how it is currently conceptualised.   
Openness/Intellect is the most contentious personality domain in the Big Five trait 
taxonomy and has a shaky and controversial past.  Historic disagreements surround its label, 
nature, cultural equivalence, measurement methods, and existence. Debates on these 
issues have led to new insights regarding the domain, and recent structural and theoretical 
developments have helped to clarify some previous disagreements. One of the most 
enduring and contentious issues—the historic Openness versus Intellect debate (De Raad & 
Van Heck, 1994; Goldberg, 1994; Johnson, 1994; McCrae, 1990, 1994; Saucier, 1992, 1994; 
Trapnell, 1994)—has seemingly been resolved by separating the domain into two related 
yet distinct aspects labelled Openness and Intellect (DeYoung, Quilty, & Peterson, 2007). 
This arguably brought about an exciting time for Openness/Intellect researchers as the work 
turned away from label and structural debates, towards a much needed understanding of 
the mechanisms underlying the domain and its aspects. Thus, the second broad aim of this 
thesis is to clarify the Openness versus Intellect distinction in the context of engagement 
with information and the processes that facilitate engagement.  
In order to properly introduce this subject the sections that follow will: 
(1) provide a short history of the Openness/Intellect domain and detail the 
disagreements and resolution surrounding the nature and structure of the 
domain;  
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(2) review the literature on the distinction between Openness and Intellect and 
report on the current theory of the distinction;  
(3) review literature on the engagement construct for this thesis: the emotion of 
interest;  
(4) demonstrate the overlap between interest and the domain of 
Openness/Intellect and propose interest as the state of the open-minded;  
(5) describe the appraisal account of individual differences in emotions that 
incorporates the trait and process approach;  
(6) describe a social-cognitive model that will be tested throughout the empirical 
part of this thesis.  
Openness/Intellect: Discovery, disagreements, and definitions  
The Big Five personality framework, and subsequently the Openness/Intellect 
domain, was empirically derived via the lexical hypothesis positing that socially relevant 
individual differences descriptors are encoded in language (Norman, 1963). Allport and 
Odbert  (1936) collated an extensive list of language descriptors, that were later refined and 
factored by Cattell (1945) to develop his 16 factor personality structure. Efforts to replicate 
Cattell’s structure proved difficult, and five factor solutions eventually dominated the field. 
The initial discovery of the Openness/Intellect domain is attributed to Fiske (1949) who 
found five factors of which the fifth was labelled Inquiring intellect and described as the trait 
of the true and curious scientist. The five-factor structure was replicated by Tupes and 
Christal (1961), who labelled the domain Culture. The differences in labels—culture and 
inquiring intellect—in the early studies was a sign of things to come as debates regarding 
the label, nature, measurement, and existence of Openness/Intellect have followed the 
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domain like a bad smell, eventually prompting Goldberg to label the disagreements a 
“scientific embarrassment” (Goldberg, 1993, p. 27).  
Openness versus Intellect: The great debate 
Disagreements regarding the label for, and indeed essence of, Openness/Intellect, 
revolved around two conceptualisations of the domain that are now represented within the 
compound label. Goldberg’s (1981) work, following the lexical tradition, led to the Intellect 
label, while Costa and McCrae (1976) chose the label of Openness to Experience. The 
measurement of Openness to experience was extended beyond the lexical tradition by 
measuring the construct via questionnaire—based on Coan's (1972) already existing 
measure—instead of adjectives. The development of Intellect, as a construct, never strayed 
from the lexical tradition of construct measurement, while Openness to Experience was 
developed and grew from already existing constructs that were conceived independently of 
the Big Five. Costa and McCrae drew from the constructs of openness to feelings (Rogers, 
1961), absorption (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974), regression in the service of the ego 
(Fitzgerald, 1966), creativity (MacKinnon, 1960), and openness to experience (Coan, 1972). 
By casting a wide net and assessing Openness to Experience via questionnaires, Costa and 
McCrae claimed to broaden the construct beyond lexically discovered adjective scales 
(Robert R McCrae, 1994). This claim proved to be rather contentious with researchers from 
both sides—Intellect and Openness to Experience—campaigning for their label, 
conceptualisation and measurement of the construct.   
McCrae (1990) argued that the lexical hypothesis may be too rigid to exclusively rely 
on for theories of personality. Based on Hofstee's (1990) criticism of the lexical tradition, 
McCrae suggested that lexically based models of personality are laced with ambiguity and 
misunderstanding of adjective meanings, and translation issues. He proposed that while the 
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lexicon has been a valuable tool for the discovery of personality structure, it cannot offer 
the definitive or final word on personality constructs. Further, McCrae argued that 
Openness to Experience is not adequately represented with single word adjectives. For 
example, the adjective artistic could refer to a person that is sensitive to aesthetic 
experiences, or it could also indicate an ability-like description of someone that is good at 
creating art. McCrae argued that the English language does not have adequate adjectives to 
describe sensitivity—as opposed to ability—to aesthetic experiences as well as the facets of 
feelings, and fantasy.  
This challenge was taken up by Saucier (1992) who proposed and factored a list of 
adjectives that he believed represented feelings, fantasy and aesthetics. These adjectives 
were found to relate to Intellect and factored according to the facets they were supposed to 
measure. Saucier therefore suggested that the distinction between Openness to Experience 
and Intellect was “much ado about nothing” (p. 385) and that the lexical and questionnaire 
measurements were a lot more convergent than McCrae (1990) suggested.  
Evaluating the adjectives chosen by Saucier to represent the aesthetics facet 
(imaginative, musical, poetic, unimaginative) does suggest, albeit at face value, that the 
Openness to aesthetics construct is broader. In my opinion, the adjectives proposed by 
Saucier assess creative ability, rather than openness to aesthetic experiences. It appears 
that Saucier’s measure would differentiate the creative from the non-creative, but would do 
little to identify the aesthetically engaged individual. For example, if a person greatly enjoys 
music and poetry, but lacks the ability to play an instrument or write a poem, such 
adjectives do not capture their openness. The same criticism can be directed at the 
adjectives reflecting intelligence that are present in lexical measures of Intellect. The 
Openness to ideas facet—the facet from the Costa and McCrae model that has the greatest 
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empirical and theoretical overlap with Intellect—assesses engagement with ideas, not the 
ability of the individual. It appears, therefore, that the measurement of Openness to 
Experience is broader than the measurement of Intellect, not only in the facets it includes, 
but also in the way it assesses the construct. Thus, through its reliance on the lexicon, 
Intellect fails to capture the motivational elements of Openness to Experience; instead it 
primarily assesses a self-reported ability construct. 
Trapnell (1994) pointed out some flaws with Saucier's (1992) analysis of the data—
the inclusion of three overlapping adjectives artificially inflated the correlations between 
the new scales and the intellect scale. However, Saucier (1994) subsequently showed that 
these relationships, when said adjectives were removed, remained high. Trapnell also 
pointed out that the openness to fantasy scale created by Saucier had higher correlations 
with Neuroticism than with Intellect. A similar point was also raised by McCrae (1994) with 
regards to the adjective ‘sensitive’, which can be interpreted as an openness to feelings 
adjective, but can also be interpreted as part of Neuroticism. This point highlights an issue 
inherent in lexical models of personality, where different interpretations of adjectives can 
lead to misunderstanding and misrepresentation of constructs.  
McCrae (1994) also questioned the construct validity of Intellect due to the inclusion 
of items assessing self-reported intelligence. Some of the items within the scale are 
adjectives like intelligent, clever, bright, which do seem to assess ability rather than 
personality. This may not be a problem in itself as some have suggested that intelligence 
should be part of personality models (e. g. DeYoung, 2015). However, as McCrae (1994) and 
Trapnell (1994) pointed out, the self-assessed ability items tend to load on the 
Conscientiousness domain, at times as much as on Openness/Intellect. This association is 
problematic as Conscientiousness is not associated with intelligence (Ackerman & 
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Heggestad, 1997; S. von Stumm, Hell, & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2011), therefore the self-
assessed ability part of Intellect does not necessarily reflect ability.  
John Johnson, (1994) contributed to the Openness versus Intellect debate with a 
nuanced analysis that focused on identifying facets that shared the least amount of variance 
with other domains. He took advantage of the Abridged Big 5 Circumflex (AB5C) model that 
maps adjectives based on their secondary loading on domains other than those that the 
adjective assesses (W. K. Hofstee, de Raad, & Goldberg, 1992). For example, the Intellect 
measure of the Openness/Intellect domain is classified as a blend of Openness/Intellect and 
Conscientiousness, reflecting the overlap discussed above. Johnson demonstrated that the 
factor-pure facets—those showing the least overlap with other domains—from the 
Openness to Experience measure were the openness to ideas and aesthetics facets. These 
NEO facets also have the highest overlap with the Intellect construct as was pointed out by 
Saucier (1994), and corresponded to his conclusions that Openness to Experience and 
Intellect measurements reflect two peripheral aspects of the broad domain most clearly 
defined by imagination. Johnson concluded that the two factor pure facets—ideas and 
aesthetics—reflect interests and engagement with different types of situations: interest in 
truth versus beauty.  
The debates regarding the nature and label of Openness/Intellect quieted down for a 
while, with research seemingly preferring the questionnaire conceptualisation of the 
domain (John, Naumann, & Soto, 2008). More than a decade after the somewhat feisty 
debate, a new measure of Openness/Intellect was developed (DeYoung et al., 2007) that 
drew upon genetic evidence suggesting two aspects to every Big Five domain (Jang, Livesley, 
Angleitner, Riemann, & Vernon, 2002). The Big Five Aspect Scales split the domain (and each 
of the other personality domains) into two distinct yet related aspects—Openness and 
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Intellect (DeYoung et al., 2007). Openness was primarily associated with the NEO facets of 
aesthetics, feelings and fantasy, and Intellect with AB5C facets of quickness and intellect and 
the NEO facet of ideas. At this stage, DeYoung seemingly resolved an age-old debate 
regarding the nature and label of factor V by appeasing both sides and suggesting that it is 
Openness and Intellect. Since the proposal of this new level of the personality hierarchy 
(Figure 1.1, aspects) research has gone into understanding how the aspects of Openness 
and Intellect differ from each other.   
 
Figure 1.1. Hierarchical model of personality based on the Big Five.  
Openness and Intellect: Together yet apart  
 While Openness and Intellect are part of the same domain, their overlap is small 
enough (r between .3-.6) to suggest the possibility of differential correlates and 
mechanisms. Since the conception of the Openness and Intellect scales, several studies have 
shown differential relationships between the aspects and a number of diverse psychological 
variables including cognitive abilities, creativity, and affective phenomena. Thus, a story 
regarding the differences between Openness and Intellect has started to emerge. 
The most researched correlates of the aspects of Openness and Intellect are those 
with cognitive abilities. Openness and Intellect were double dissociated in terms of their 
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relationships with working memory and implicit learning ability (Kaufman et al., 2010). 
Intellect was associated with greater working memory capacity, while Openness was related 
to the ability to non-consciously detect complex patterns of information. Nusbaum and 
Silvia (2011) found that Intellect, but not Openness, was related to fluid intelligence. This 
finding has been replicated (Deyoung, Grazioplene, & Peterson, 2012) and extended to 
include verbal and nonverbal intelligence relationships (Deyoung, Quilty, Peterson, & Gray, 
2014). At the bivariate level, Openness and Intellect were associated with greater general 
intelligence (g), and while both are found to relate to verbal intelligence, only intellect was 
associated with nonverbal intelligence (Deyoung et al., 2014). When modelled concurrently, 
both aspects predicted unique variance in verbal intelligence, but only Intellect was 
associated with g and nonverbal intelligence. These findings were consistent across a 
student and adult sample. Relationships between the Openness/Intellect aspects and 
intelligence suggested that Openness and Intellect both explain unique variance in verbal 
intelligence, but differential relationships to non-verbal intelligence, and implicit learning 
abilities.  
Openness/Intellect is the best personality predictor of creative abilities and outputs 
(Feist, 1998), and the aspects of Openness and Intellect have been observed to have 
differential associations with creativity. Nusbaum and Silvia (2011) found Openness, but not 
Intellect, was related to artistic creative output. Extending this finding to scientific creativity, 
two studies have reported a double dissociation, with Intellect predicting scientific creative 
output and Openness relating to creative achievements in the arts (Kaufman, 2013; 
Kaufman et al., 2014). The larger of these studies tested the relationships across four 
samples and controlled for intelligence (Kaufman et al., 2014). In two out of four samples, 
the relationship between Intellect and scientific creativity was explained by its overlap with 
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intelligence. These findings may suggest that scientific creativity may be a function of 
intelligence and the shared variance between Intellect and intelligence, rather than Intellect 
alone.  
Apart from ability and creativity, Openness and Intellect are differentially related to 
the propensity to experience powerful aesthetic emotions, life meaning-making, impulsivity, 
absorption, fantasy proneness, conscientiousness, and subclinical delusional ideation. 
Openness was related to a greater propensity to experience powerful aesthetic emotions, 
particularly, chills and absorption, while Intellect was negatively associated with 
experiencing chills (Silvia & Nusbaum, 2011). This finding is reflective of the differences 
between Openness to Experience and Intellect constructs discussed by Trapnell (1994), and 
dismissed by  Goldberg  (1994). Trapnell (1994) posited that “the hearts of open people are 
as open as their minds” (p. 288) suggesting an emotional component of Openness to 
Experience. Goldberg (1994) dismissed this as belonging to the domains of Extraversion and 
Agreeableness.  Importantly, the relationship between Openness and powerful aesthetic 
states were observed after controlling for the other Big Five domains (Silvia & Nusbaum, 
2011), suggesting an emotional component that is independent from Extraversion and 
Agreeableness.  
One study found a positive relationship between Openness, but not Intellect, and 
positive schizotypy variables (Menon et al., 2013). This was supported by  a simplex model 
where positive schizotypy was closer to Openness facets than to Intellect facets (Deyoung et 
al., 2012). These findings suggest that Openness, but not Intellect, reflect a tendency 
towards positive elements of schizotypy related to the detection of patterns where there 
are none. Interestingly, Openness has been linked to non-conscious detections of patterns. 
Perhaps, the extreme of Openness is where this ability becomes maladaptive.  
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  Openness and Intellect have been shown to differentially relate to two meaning-of-
life orientations (Lavigne, Hofman, Ring, Ryder, & Woodward, 2012). Openness was a much 
stronger predictor of the learning for the sake of learning life orientation, however Intellect 
was also significantly associated with the scale. Additionally, Intellect was related to learning 
out of responsibility, while Openness was not. This last differential relationship may be 
reflective of the differential relationships that Openness and Intellect have with 
Conscientiousness. Conscientiousness was the best predictor of learning out of 
responsibility, but does not predict learning orientations. Likewise, Openness is unrelated to 
Conscientiousness, while Intellect shares a significant amount of variance with the 
Industriousness aspect of Conscientiousness (e.g. DeYoung et al., 2007).   
Openness and Intellect also diverge in association with political orientations. 
Openness was found to be associated with two different measures of liberalism, and 
republican voters were found to be lower on Openness than liberal voters, while intellect 
did not play a role in these relationships (J. B. Hirsh, DeYoung, Xiaowen Xu, & Peterson, 
2010). Finally, in an analysis of self-narrative writing, Openness was associated with use of 
perceptual words dealing with visual and auditory perception, while intellect was not 
related to any words consistent with the domain (Jacob B. Hirsh & Peterson, 2009).   
Taking these differential relationships together, a picture of a person high on only 
one of these aspects emerges.  The open person would possess good verbal knowledge, be 
observant of complex patterns—without necessary conscious knowledge of them, be left-
leaning politically, be involved in the creation of artistic and fantastical things, would get 
emotional about sunsets and sunrises, would cry during films, and would experience chills 
and goosebumps in response to music. They would be a little odd, enjoy learning for the 
sake of learning, and be slightly impulsive and disorganised.  
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The person high on Intellect, but lacking in Openness would be clever. They would be 
good at storing information in memory and solving complex puzzles, and they would also 
possess an impressive vocabulary. They would be a creator, but not of the arts; knowledge 
would be their domain. They would be quite organised and not let emotions get the better 
of them. Even though the Openness/Intellect aspects are usually correlated, the overlap in 
them is not so great as to suggest that such people could not exist.  
Based on item content and some of these differential associations—primarily 
cognitive abilities and creativity—DeYoung proposed that Openness and Intellect are linked 
by cognitive exploration, but diverge based on the type of processes and abilities that 
facilitate such exploration (DeYoung, 2015). Openness is proposed to explain individual 
differences in engagement with perceptual and sensory information, while Intellect is 
reflective of engagement with abstract and semantic information. These definitions are 
reminiscent of Johnson's (1994) distinction of the aspects as interests in truth versus beauty, 
and his proposal that Openness and Intellect reflect engagement in different types of 
situations that involve information. For example, Intellect would be hypothesised to explain 
variation in engagement with abstract stimuli such as scientific discoveries, and Openness 
with the visual arts. While hypothesised, these differential engagement associations have 
not previously been tested. The following section will review literature on an engagement 
state associated with information seeking and engagement: the emotion of interest.  
The emotion of Interest as engagement with information  
Interest is an emotional and motivational state that facilitates exploration, 
engagement, and learning (Silvia, 2005b, 2008b). The placement of interest in the emotional 
sphere of psychology was contentious in the past when strict lines were drawn between 
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emotion and cognition. Interest was considered too ‘cognitive’ to be included in Ekman’s list 
of basic emotions (Ellsworth, 2003). The illusionary lines between emotions and cognitions 
have since dissipated as cognitive and emotional brain systems seem to be so intertwined 
that any separation seems implausible: “cognitive-emotional behaviours have their basis in 
dynamic coalitions of networks of brain areas, none of which should be conceptualized as 
specifically affective or cognitive” (Pessoa, 2008, p. 148).  
Interestingly, Phoebe Ellsworth—a research assistant at the time of Ekman’s cross-
cultural basic emotions research—expressed regret regarding the omission of interest from 
Ekman’s list of basic emotions: “…even by the strictest standards of the strictest categorical 
emotion theorists, interest qualifies” (Ellsworth, 2003, p. 84). Therefore, interest in the 
question of whether interest is an emotion has largely dissipated as evidence for its 
membership in the emotion club has grown and developed. Interest has a known appraisal 
structure (Silvia, 2005b), adaptive functions (Izard & Ackerman, 2000; Izard, 2009), facial 
expressions (Reeve, 1993), and physiological underpinnings (Gruber, Gelman, & Ranganath, 
2014; Kang et al., 2009).  
The function of emotions is broadly considered as the primary motivational system 
for behaviour (Izard & Ackerman, 2000). Izard (2009) included interest as one of his basic 
emotions, and attributed a vital function to the emotion. He posited that interest is the 
most ubiquitous emotion: “interest is continually present in the normal mind under normal 
conditions, and it is the central motivation for engagement in creative and constructive 
endeavours and for the sense of well-being” (Izard, 2009, p. 4). Similarly, Fredrickson (1998) 
suggested that all learned information may one day have a benefit and therefore any gain in 
knowledge can protect against future encounters with unpredicted and novel situations. 
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Therefore, the function of interest is proposed to be that of engagement and to motivate 
acquisition of information that may one day prove useful. 
From state to trait: Interest and Openness/Intellect   
Generally, the link between traits and states is important and powerful. Fleeson 
suggested that states are crucial in explaining trait differences, proposing that traits reflect 
the propensity to experience trait-relevant states (Fleeson & Jayawickreme, 2015; Fleeson, 
2004). For example, those higher in Extraversion will tend to experience extraverted states 
more frequently. Similarly, Izard and Ackerman (2000) discussed the role of emotional 
states in personality traits and stated that “individual differences in emotion activation 
thresholds and in the frequency and intensity with which particular emotions are 
experienced and expressed are major determinants of specific traits and broad dimensions 
of personality” (p. 262).  
The overlap between states and traits has been empirically demonstrated. While 
there is major variation in hour-to-hour and day-to-day states, there is remarkable 
consistency in states averaged over a longer period of time (2-3 weeks) with correlations 
rarely—if ever—seen in psychological research (0.8-0.9; Baird et al., 2006; Epstein, 1979; 
Fleeson, 2001).  Fleeson’s seminal work into state-trait relationships highlighted the 
importance of studying states in trait psychology. However, in studying only the overlap 
between traits and states, such research does not provide much information on the 
processes associated with traits. In evaluating such relationships, Fleeson measured states 
using adjectives related to the various personality domains (Fleeson, Gallagher, Edu, & 
Gallagher, 2009; Fleeson, 2001). For example, Openness/Intellect states were measured by 
asking participants to report to what extent they are acting intelligent, philosophical, 
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inquisitive, creative, uninquisitive, bright, artistic, unreflective, and imaginative. Such 
explanations are somewhat unsatisfying as they are circular (Boag, 2011), in that they 
explain the influence of Openness/Intellect on behaviour as open people are open because 
they are open more often. Within this thesis I diverge from assessing states in a way that 
overlaps with the measurement of the trait itself by evaluating the influence of 
Openness/Intellect on a state relevant, but not overlapping with trait measures.   
Empirically, both interest and Openness/Intellect are associated with learning and 
engagement with information—albeit at different levels of analysis: momentary states, and 
trait. Interest predicts attention, motivation, and better learning outcomes (see Hidi, 2006; 
Renninger, Hidi, & Krapp, 2014; Silvia, 2006 for reviews). Similarly, Openness/Intellect has 
been implicated in years spent on education (Goldberg, Sweeney, Merenda, & Hughes, 
1998), better educational outcomes (Poropat, 2009, 2014), and greater general knowledge 
(e.g. Ackerman, Bowen, Beier, & Kanfer, 2001; Chamorro-Premuzic, Furnham, & Ackerman, 
2006; von Stumm, Hell, & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2011). There is also direct evidence of the 
relationship between Openness/Intellect and the emotion of interest. This relationship has 
been observed in response to art, poetry, music, and celestial images (Silvia, Fayn, 
Nusbaum, & Beaty, 2015; Silvia, Henson, & Templin, 2009; Silvia, 2008a). The overlap 
between interest and Openness/Intellect therefore exists both by direct association, and in 
terms of the variables they covary with.  
There is a rather remarkable concordance in the proposed functions of 
Openness/Intellect and interest. As previously discussed, interest is thought to facilitate the 
motivation for gathering of information that may be useful to future adaptive functioning 
(Fredrickson, 1998; Izard & Ackerman, 2000). The function of Openness/Intellect has 
recently been suggested to be that of cognitive exploration and engagement with 
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information (DeYoung, 2015). A biological mechanism for the function of Openness/Intellect 
as a tendency to approach information has also been proposed (DeYoung, 2013). Based on 
the finding that salience coding neurons are sensitive to the value of information (Bromberg-
Martin & Hikosaka, 2009), DeYoung suggested that Openness/Intellect should be related to 
the salience coding dopaminergic system. The salience coding system “appears to 
potentiate exploration in response to the incentive value of the possibility of gaining 
information—that is, it drives curiosity or desire for information” (DeYoung, 2013, p. 4). 
While DeYoung stopped short of proposing a single state that is associated with the salience 
coding system, one of the states that he mentioned as a possibility is the state of curiosity—
a state synonymous with interest (Silvia, 2006). In line with DeYoung’s hypothesis, the state 
of interest is associated with activation of the dopaminergic system (Gruber et al., 2014; 
Kang et al., 2009) strengthening the argument for interest being the state of cognitive 
exploration and therefore one that should be associated with Openness/Intellect.  
It may seem strange to equate the function of an emotional state and a personality 
domain, yet it is reasonable given the evidence of strong relationships between traits and 
states—since traits reflect the density distributions of states (Fleeson & Jayawickreme, 
2015). Stated as a state-trait explanation: If the function of Openness/Intellect is cognitive 
exploration and engagement with information, we would expect open people to have a 
greater propensity to experience states that reflect cognitive exploration and engagement 
with information—the state of interest.   
The proposal that interest is the Openness/Intellect state is not radical. 
Openness/Intellect shares conceptual, functional and empirical overlap with the emotion of 
interest. Indeed, vocational and leisure interests associated with information have strong 
relationships with Openness/Intellect (Barrick, Mount, & Gupta, 2003; Larson et al., 2002). It 
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is no wonder that when 10 judges, with a detailed understanding of the Big Five, rated a 
large number of participants (N=280) on the most prototypical descriptors of each Big Five 
domain, the term “wide interests” had the highest loading for the Openness/Intellect 
domain (John et al., 2008). Therefore the domain of Openness/Intellect describes the 
interested, particularly in information.  The distinction between Openness and Intellect 
suggests that the aspects should be associated with interest in different types of 
informational stimuli (perceptual versus abstract). To date, no studies have researched the 
unique relationships between Openness and Intellect, and the emotion of interest. The next 
section reviews the literature on the antecedents of interest. With the goal of 
understanding why open people are more interested I will discuss, and eventually 
empirically evaluate, the processes that lead to experiencing interest.  
From social-cognitive processes to states to traits 
The research linking states to traits is convincing, as is the overlap between the state 
of interest and Openness/Intellect. The next step in bridging the gap between descriptive 
and explanatory models of traits calls for investigation of the social-cognitive mechanisms 
associated with trait relevant states as outlined by Whole Trait Theory (Fleeson & 
Jayawickreme, 2015). According to Whole Trait Theory, social-cognitive mechanisms can be 
defined as “information processing mechanisms that are connected to affect and motivation 
and that have to do with interpreting changing situations and events” (Fleeson & 
Jayawickreme, 2015, p 84). There is a theory with a large body of literature on such 
mechanisms—the appraisal theory of emotions.  
Appraisal accounts of emotions posit that (1) the way that a situation is appraised 
(both consciously and unconsciously) cause emotional experiences; (2) individuals appraise 
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their situations based on their own concerns, goal and abilities; (3) combinations of 
particular appraisal outcomes are associated with particular emotions (Scherer, Schorr, & 
Johnstone, 2001; Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003). Thus, the appraisal approach to emotions 
suggests that, rather than being driven only by situational properties, emotions are felt 
based on how people appraise a situation.  The overlap between the definition of social-
cognitive mechanisms and appraisals is clear, and appraisals have been integrated into 
social-cognitive models of personality (Cervone, 2005; Kuppens & Tong, 2010). One of the 
central goals, and indeed virtues, of appraisal theories is that they are able to account for 
individual differences in emotional experiences in response to the same event (e. g. Siemer, 
Mauss, & Gross, 2007).   
Kuppens and Tong (2010) suggested that since appraisals are by definition 
subjective—a function of the individuals’ goals, beliefs, motivations, and abilities—they 
should relate to variables that are associated with individual differences in beliefs, 
motivations and abilities. Personality traits are good candidates for such variables as they 
describe such differences. Two sources of individual differences are proposed by the 
appraisal account of individual differences in emotional experiences (Kuppens & Tong, 
2010). First, people differ in the way they appraise situations—appraisal strength; second, 
people differ in appraisal-emotion contingencies. This theoretical framework has the goal of 
explaining why individuals differ in emotional experiences, and therefore, why some 
individuals are prone to experience trait relevant affect in response to trait relevant 
situations (Kuppens, 2009). Recent empirical tests of this model highlight its utility for 
providing social-cognitive explanations of trait manifestations.  
Differences in appraisal strength have been observed in accordance with differences 
in personality traits (e. g. Kuppens, Van Mechelen, Smits, De Boeck, & Ceulemans, 2007; 
   21 
 
 
Silvia, 2008a; Tong et al., 2006). That is, personality traits are associated with consistencies 
in appraisals of situations. For example, in an experience sampling study, police officers 
higher in neuroticism appraised situations as less pleasant, less controllable, and less certain 
in outcome. Conversely, those higher on conscientiousness had the opposite relationships 
to the same appraisals (Tong et al., 2006). These findings suggested that neuroticism and 
conscientiousness are associated with opposing emotional processes, which may explain 
why the domains are negatively related to each other (Costa & McCrae, 1992). 
Individual differences in appraisal-emotion contingencies—the extent to which 
appraisals produce emotions—have also been observed (e.g. Kuppens, Van Mechelen, & 
Rijmen, 2008; Kuppens et al., 2007; Nezlek, Vansteelandt, Van Mechelen, & Kuppens, 2008; 
Silvia et al., 2009; Tong, 2010). For example, the relationship between appraisals associated 
with anger (e.g. unfairness of a situation) and the emotion of anger, vary according to trait 
anger (i.e., the same appraisal strength may result in different intensity of emotion). As 
another example, Tong (2010) demonstrated that neuroticism moderated appraisal-
emotion relationships to the extent that people low on neuroticism did not exhibit the 
predicted appraisal-emotion relationships, suggesting a mechanism for differences in 
emotionality associated with different standing on neuroticism. Thus, these appraisal based 
findings suggest that those higher in neuroticism are sensitive to particular appraisals.  
The examples described above highlight the explanatory power of the appraisal 
approach to explaining individual difference in emotional experience. I propose this to be a 
valuable approach for progress towards providing explanations and mechanisms for 
descriptive personality traits. Given my goal of developing a process based understanding of 
the relationship between engagement with information and the aspects of 
Openness/Intellect, I next review the appraisal structure of the emotion of interest, 
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followed by a review of research that has tested the appraisal based individual differences 
in the experience of interest.  
The appraisal structure of interest  
The processes associated with interest historically stem from the work of Daniel 
Berlyne (1960). Berlyne was interested in the phenomenon of humans spending a 
substantial portion of their time engaging with situations and objects that are not inherently 
beneficial, but may lead to advantageous outcomes in the future (Berlyne, 1966). He 
suggested a set of collative variables—novelty, complexity, uncertainty, and conflict—play a 
major role in eliciting such curiosity and exploration (Berlyne, 1960). Berlyne labelled these 
variables collative because they depend on comparison or collation of stimulus elements. 
The work of Berlyne demonstrated that collative variables did indeed elicit interest and 
exploration, but the task of differentiating them from each other proved rather difficult as 
they generally formed a single factor (Evans & Day, 1971). This factor came to be one of the 
appraisal processes that predicts interest—novelty/complexity.   
Paul Silvia built on Berlyne’s work by developing an appraisal structure of the 
interest emotion (Silvia, 2005a, 2005b, 2008c). Silvia’s research suggested that interest had 
a relatively simple appraisal structure with just two appraisals. The novelty appraisal is in 
concordance with Berlyne’s collative variables, and facilitates attention to possibly 
important changes in the environment (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003). An issue that was left 
largely unresolved in Berlyne’s work was the inverted U-shaped relationship between 
interest and novelty—interest increases with increased novelty/complexity, but eventually 
declines at high levels of novelty/complexity. The resolution to this issue came in the form 
of the second appraisal associated with interest: coping potential, which estimates our 
capacity to cope with a given situation (Lazarus, 1993). In the case of interest, this appraisal 
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represents the self-perceived ability to understand an event. As events increase in novelty, 
eventually the novelty becomes incomprehensible, which leads to the state of confusion 
(Silvia & Berg, 2011; Silvia, 2009).   
Cross-sectional and experimental evidence supports the appraisal structure of 
interest. Appraisals of novelty and understanding predicted interest in art, film, and poetry 
(Silvia & Berg, 2011; Silvia, 2005a, 2008a; Turner & Silvia, 2006). Further, experimentally 
manipulating the comprehensibility of a poem led to greater reported interest, and complex 
polygons were preferred to simple polygons (Silvia, 2005b). This suggests a causal 
relationship between the novelty and understanding appraisals, and interest. Thus, the 
appraisal structure of interest can be used as the social-cognitive variables that explain 
within-person and between situation variability in engagement with information. By 
evaluating the relationships between traits and appraisal strength and appraisal-emotion 
contingencies, insights into the mechanisms underlying personality traits may become 
apparent (Kuppens & Tong, 2010). I next review research on individual differences in the 
appraisals of interest.  
Individual differences in interest appraisal processes 
Traits related to Openness/Intellect have been found to relate to differences in both 
appraisal strength and appraisal-emotion contingencies for the emotion of interest. Silvia 
(2008) found that trait curiosity was associated a greater tendency to appraise poetry as 
more understandable—appraisal strength. This appraisal tendency mediated the 
relationship between curiosity and interest suggesting that curious people feel more 
interest because of a greater appraised ability to understand. Curiosity was measured as a 
latent variable in the study that included two assessments of curiosity and an assessment of 
the broad domain of Openness/Intellect, therefore conflating the possible unique influence 
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of Openness and Intellect in the appraisal processes. While an Openness/Intellect measure 
was part of the latent variable used to define curiosity, the relationship between 
Openness/Intellect and curiosity is not perfect. There are many measures of curiosity that 
appear to measure the same construct (Mussel, 2010). The Openness/Intellect facet that 
was shown to be synonymous with curiosity measures is Openness to Ideas—a facet 
conceptually and empirically related to Intellect (DeYoung et al., 2007; DeYoung, 2015; 
Kaufman et al., 2010). Therefore, Silvia’s appraisal strength result may be a function of 
Intellect rather than Openness.  
Another study found evidence for possible appraisal-emotion contingencies 
associated with Openness/Intellect (Silvia et al., 2009). The study cluster-analysed appraisal-
interest relationships in response to visual art, and found two between-person clusters that 
differed in their within person appraisal-interest contingencies. For one cluster, Interest was 
primarily driven by understanding and to a smaller extent by novelty, while the other 
clusters’ interest was mostly driven by novelty and to a small extent by understanding. 
Openness/Intellect was associated with membership in the cluster where interest was 
particularly driven by novelty and to a lesser extent by understanding. This finding suggests 
that Openness/Intellect may moderate the interest-appraisal relationship so that those 
scoring higher on the domain are going to be more sensitive to novelty and less reliant on 
understanding in their experience of interest. However, this study did not include separate 
measurements for Intellect and Openness leaving the unique role of these aspects 
unexplored. Additionally, the stimuli used in the study were images and therefore are more 
likely to illicit perceptual, rather than epistemic curiosity.  
 In summary, there is some evidence that the relationship between 
Openness/Intellect and interest could be explained by appraisal strength and appraisal-
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interest processes. Rather than simply observing a relationship between Openness/Intellect 
and interest, this approach allows for process-based explanations for why this relationship 
might persist. So far, research has used stimuli that could be broadly categorised as 
aesthetic. Thus, while initial findings are promising, there are some questions that remain 
unanswered. Do Openness and Intellect play distinct roles in the appraisal-interest 
relationships? Does the influence of Openness and Intellect vary according to different kinds 
of information? DeYoung distinguished between two types of engagement with Openness 
reflecting perceptual engagement and Intellect reflecting abstract engagement. It follows 
that the influence of the aspects on explaining individual differences in appraisal-interest 
relationships should vary according to the type of information. 
Social-Cognitive model of Openness/Intellect and engagement with information 
Based on empirical and theoretical work, Openness/Intellect describes people that 
experience greater engagement with information. The broad goal of this thesis is to get an 
understanding of the social-cognitive processes that facilitate and maintain this relationship. 
Above, I discussed the separation of the broad domain into the aspects of Openness and 
Intellect. The aspects have been proposed to describe people that differ in the type of 
information that elicits engagement. Openness describes differences in engagement with 
perceptual and sensory information, and Intellect describes differences in engagement with 
abstract and semantic information. While such differences between the aspects are implied, 
they have never been directly assessed.  
The engagement state that shares theoretical and empirical overlap with 
Openness/Intellect was proposed to be the emotion of interest, and the social-cognitive 
processes associated with interest are the appraisals of novelty and understanding. Initial 
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evidence for the influence of Openness/Intellect on interest through appraisal processes 
points to the utility of appraisals in explaining the Openness/Intellect-interest relationship, 
yet our current understanding is incomplete. The unique influence of Openness versus 
Intellect remains unexplored, and the informational stimuli remain largely aesthetic.  
Figure 1.2 represents a model that will be tested throughout the empirical parts of 
this thesis. This model is based on the model presented in the appraisal account of 
individual differences in emotional experience (Kuppens & Tong, 2010). The [1] pathway 
represents the theoretical and empirical relationship between the Openness/Intellect and 
interest in informational stimuli. This is the pathway that the model aims to explain, and 
therefore moves towards an understanding of the mechanisms that explain this 
relationship. Pathway [2] represents the appraisal structure of interest. Pathways [3] and [4] 
represent social-cognitive parts of the model.  Pathway [3] represents the relationship 
between traits and individual differences in appraisal strengths. Pathway [4] represents the 
relationship between traits and appraisal-interest contingencies. Pathway [5] represents the 
relationship between traits and individual differences in interest that are not accounted for 
by pathways [2] and [3].   
This model was used to foster tests of whether social-cognitive variables (appraisals) 
are able to explain the relationship between interest, and the Openness and Intellect 
aspects. The empirical studies within this thesis attempted to gain a dynamic understanding 
of the differences between Openness and Intellect in terms of engagement with 
informational stimuli. The first study evaluated these relationships in response to 
quotations. Quotations, while semantic, are also aesthetic and therefore Openness and 
Intellect may both play a role in interest in response to them. The second and third studies 
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Figure 1.2. Social-Cognitive model of Openness/Intellect and engagement with Information. 
 
evaluated these relationships in response to art, extended the emotions studied to interest, 
pleasure, and confusion, and evaluated the influence of a possible confound variable—art 
expertise. Finally, the last study evaluated the influence of Openness and Intellect in 
response to art, science and philosophy, directly testing the distinction between Openness 
and Intellect and the interests and processes that they are proposed to reflect. 
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Chapter 2: Interest in truth versus beauty: Intellect and Openness reflect different 
pathways towards Interest 
Publication: 
 Fayn, K., Tiliopoulos, N., & MacCann, C. (2015). Interest in truth versus beauty: Intellect and 
Openness reflect different pathways towards interest. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 81, 47-52. 
 
Abstract 
Openness and Intellect have been proposed as different pathways towards cognitive 
exploration, yet this distinction remains untested with respect to the exploratory emotion of 
interest. In this study we examined multi-level appraisal processes to determine whether 
Openness and Intellect differ in their effects on interest. University undergraduates (N = 99) 
rated their interest in seven literary quotations, and appraised the quotations for their 
novelty and understanding. Both Openness and Intellect predicted greater interest, but via 
different pathways. In between-person analyses, understanding mediated the 
Intellect/interest but not the Openness/interest relationship (i.e., high-Intellect people are 
more interested through greater understanding). In within-person analyses, Openness (but 
not Intellect) significantly moderated the understanding/interest relationship. High-
Openness people experienced greater interest in difficult to understand quotations. Results 
highlight the need to examine within-person effects and to consider the lower-level 
elements of personality. These findings distinguish Openness and Intellect in terms of 
pathways towards interest and provide a dynamic understanding of the differences 
between them. 
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Introduction 
There is a developing consensus that personality is best understood not just in terms 
of differences between people, but also as differences in within-person processes 
(Hampson, 2012). Studying within-person processes using multi-level analyses is an 
increasingly popular paradigm for personality research, as it integrates process and 
structural models of personality. Using this within-person paradigm, Silvia (2005) proposed a 
within-person appraisal structure for the emotional state of interest, involving appraisals of 
Novelty (judgments of complexity and unfamiliarity) and Understanding (judgments of 
coping potential). The personality domain of Openness/Intellect and one of its facets (trait 
curiosity) are involved in the appraisal processes leading to interest (Silvia, 2008; Silvia, 
Henson, & Templin, 2009). However, such effects have only been considered for the broad 
domain and a single facet, without considering that different elements of 
Openness/Intellect can show different and even opposite effects (e.g., Ziegler, Danay, 
Scholmerich, & Buhner, 2010). In the current study, we separately consider the effects of 
both Intellect and Openness aspects of Openness/Intellect (DeYoung, Quilty, & Peterson, 
2007) on the within-person appraisal processes underlying interest. While openness and 
intellect have been distinguished in their associations with cognitive and creative abilities 
they are also theorised to reflect different pathways towards cognitive exploration 
(DeYoung, in press). Openness reflects individual differences in exploration through 
perceptual or sensory information. In contrast, Intellect reflects individual differences in 
exploration of abstract information. However, these two different exploratory pathways 
have never been directly tested. In the paragraphs below, we outline the theoretical models 
of within-person appraisals and personality assessed, as well as our reasons for examining 
the separate aspects of Openness/Intellect. 
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The appraisal processes underlying interest 
Interest is an exploratory emotion that facilitates arousal, promotes attention, is 
associated with learning and exploring, and is felt in response to situations and stimuli that 
require thinking and understanding (Silvia, 2010). Interest has an empirically demonstrated 
appraisal structure, depending on two appraisals: Novelty and Understanding (Silvia, 2005). 
The novelty appraisal facilitates attention to possibly important changes in the environment, 
and the understanding appraisal estimates our capacity to cope with a given situation 
(Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003). This appraisal structure has been replicated for poetry, film, 
and visual art, indicating stability across different types of stimuli (Silvia, 2005; Silvia & Berg, 
2011; Silvia, Henson, & Templin, 2009).  
The appraisal approach to emotions contends that appraisal processes are subjective 
evaluations of situations that rely on a person’s needs, preferences, goals, and abilities 
(Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003), and should therefore be associated with individual differences 
in personality. Kuppens and Tong (2010) proposed two types of individual differences within 
the appraisal-emotion system: (a) appraisal strength, and (b) appraisal-emotion 
relationships. Appraisal strength refers to a between-person tendency to, for example, 
appraise situations as more understandable and therefore experience greater overall 
interest. In this scenario understanding is a mediating variable that explains why some 
people experience interest in more situations. Differences in appraisal-emotion 
relationships refer to within-person contingencies. For example people may differ in the 
importance of understanding in their experience of interest. In this scenario personality acts 
as a moderator of understanding-interest relationships. 
In a study of interest in visual art and poetry, Silvia (2008) found that personality 
predicted differences in appraisal strength but not differences in appraisal/emotion 
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relationships. Specifically, individual differences in trait curiosity (a facet of 
Openness/Intellect) predicted stronger appraisals of understanding (but not a stronger 
understanding/interest relationship). In fact, appraised understanding mediated the 
relationship between personality and interest. In the current study, we test this mediation 
for the domain of Openness/Intellect rather than its narrow facet of curiosity. We 
hypothesise that understanding will also mediate the relationship between 
Openness/Intellect and interest.  
A further study found that differences in both trait curiosity and the 
Openness/Intellect domain predicted different appraisal-emotion relationships (Silvia, 
Henson, & Templin, 2009). Openness/Intellect predicted membership in a cluster where 
interest was best predicted by novelty and less so by understanding, as opposed to a cluster 
where interest was best predicted by understanding and less so by novelty. We therefore 
hypothesised that Openness/Intellect would predict differences in appraisal-emotion 
relationships.  
The inconsistency between the two previous studies is whether personality predicts 
appraisal-emotion processes (one study found such a relationship, the other did not). These 
differing results may be due to the different levels of analysis of personality (i.e., the specific 
personality facet of curiosity and the broad domain of Openness/Intellect). We propose that 
separately examining the two major aspects of Openness/Intellect can clarify their effects 
on the appraisal processes underlying interest. We will thus examine the effects of Intellect 
and Openness aspects on both appraisal strength and appraisal-emotion relationships. 
The nature of the Openness domain: differentiating Openness and Intellect aspects 
The Openness/Intellect domain is associated with individual differences in 
quintessentially human outcomes such as creativity, engagement with the arts, higher 
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cognitive functioning, vocational interests, values and political affiliations. Yet 
Openness/Intellect remains arguably the most controversial domain in Big Five models. 
Openness/Intellect has been plagued by heterogeneity and disagreements regarding its 
nature and therefore label. Additionally, a dynamic understanding of the domain remains 
out of reach, as research has primarily focused on the structure and predictive validity of the 
domain, at the cost of a process based approach. 
The current study addresses both these concerns by clarifying the suggested 
relationship between Openness/Intellect and cognitive exploration (DeYoung, in press). 
Studying situational processes alongside dispositional variables has long been advocated 
(Cronbach, 1957, Underwood, 1975), but rarely followed. Recent findings suggest that this is 
a powerful approach (see Kuppens and Tong [2010] for a review) that can address our 
central research questions: (1) How do Openness and Intellect relate to cognitive 
exploration? and (2) can Openness and Intellect be distinguished as different pathways to 
cognitive exploration?  
Disagreements regarding the structure and nature of the Openness/Intellect domain 
led Goldberg (1993) to call it a “scientific embarrassment” (p.27). Different methods of 
measurement traditions underlying structural studies eventually converged on two 
conceptualisations of the domain. Questionnaire based research labelled the domain as 
Openness to Experience (McCrae & Costa, 1994), while adjective based research argued for 
Intellect (Peabody & Goldberg, 1989). Saucier suggested that both conceptualisations were 
important aspects of the domain (1994). Finally, Johnson (1994) poetically described the 
two conceptualisations as “interest in truth” (Intellect) versus “interest in beauty” 
(Openness).  
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Recent psychometric evidence suggests two distinct yet related aspects of the 
Openness/Intellect domain: Openness and Intellect (DeYoung et al., 2007). DeYoung et al. 
(2007) proposed that Openness and Intellect aspects constitute a new level of personality 
located between the broad domain Openness/Intellect and the narrow facets. Intellect is 
conceptually similar to the Openness to Ideas facet, reflecting perceived intelligence and 
intellectual engagement (DeYoung, in press). Mussell (2010) found strong empirical 
evidence that the facets of curiosity and openness to ideas were virtually identical, 
suggesting that the effects of curiosity on the appraisal structure of interest should also 
generalize to the Intellect aspect of personality. We therefore hypothesised that the 
mediating role of understanding in the Openness/Intellect-Interest relationship would be 
particularly a function of intellect due to its proximity to curiosity measures. Openness is 
represented by the Openness to Aesthetics, Feelings, and Fantasy, reflecting engagement 
with sensation and perception, fantasy and artistic creativity (DeYoung, et al., 2007). 
Openness and Intellect have different associations with cognitive and creative 
abilities, and with scientific and artistic creativity. Openness relates to greater crystallised 
intelligence, implicit learning and artistic creativity whereas Intellect relates to both fluid 
and crystallised intelligence and to scientific creativity (Kaufman, 2009, 2010; Nusbaum & 
Silvia, 2011). Such differences support the idea that Openness and Intellect are distinct 
constructs, but do not speak to the proposed distinction in terms of cognitive exploration. 
DeYoung (in press) suggests that openness reflects individual differences in exploration 
through perceptual or sensory information, and that intellect reflects individual differences 
in exploration of abstract information. The main goal of the current research is to test these 
two different exploratory pathways.  
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The present research 
The current research looked to explore: (1) the relationships between 
Openness/Intellect and the states and appraisal processes of Interest, and (2) the utility and 
validity of separating Openness and Intellect by studying their relationships with Interest 
and its associated appraisals in response to quotations. We chose quotations due to their 
general popularity as engaging short thoughts and ideas.  
Based on the literature reviewed above, we have three hypotheses. First, we 
hypothesise that the three personality variables (Openness/Intellect, Openness and 
Intellect) will predict: (a) greater appraisals of understanding, and (b) greater interest in 
quotations. Second, we hypothesised the Intellect-interest relationship will be mediated by 
understanding appraisals, replicating previous results for the related construct of curiosity 
(Silvia, 2008). Third, we hypothesised that the within-person appraisal emotion relationships 
(novelty-interest and understanding-interest) will be moderated by the three personality 
variables (Openness/Intellect, Openness and Intellect).  
 
Method 
Participants  
Participants were 101 first-year students, participating in the study for course credit 
(77% female; sample age range = 17 to 42 years; M=19.41 years, SD=3.48 years). All 
participants were pre-screened for English proficiency in order to ensure comprehension of 
instructions and stimuli. Two participants did not complete ratings of quotations due to 
computer difficulties and were excluded from further analyses making the final sample 99. 
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Measures 
Big Five Aspect Scale (BFAS; DeYoung et al., 2007). This 100-item rating scale 
contains 10 items for each aspect of personality, including Openness (“I enjoy the beauty of 
nature”) and Intellect (“I like to solve complex problems”). Each item was rated on a 7-point 
Likert scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree. 
Quotations with Appraisal and Interest Ratings. Each participant provided ratings 
for the same 7 quotations selected quasi-randomly from the Oxford Dictionary of 
Quotations (Ratcliffe, 2010). Each item was rated on a 7-point semantic differential scale. 
Two items assessed interest (interesting-uninteresting, engaging-boring), two assessed 
novelty appraisals (simple-complex, common-unusual) and three assessed understanding 
potential (easy to understand-hard to understand, comprehensible-incomprehensible, 
coherent-incoherent). Items were drawn from previous research on the appraisal structure 
of Interest (e.g. Silvia, 2005; Silvia et al., 2009). 
Procedure 
The study was conducted on computers over two one-hour sessions. In the first 
session, participants completed the personality scales, as well as other personality and 
intelligence measures not relevant to the current study. In the second session (separated by 
at least one hour from the first session), participants viewed and rated quotations. 
Participants also rated images in this session, but these were not used in the current study 
(the images were displayed after all the quotations were viewed and rated and thus had no 
effect on the current study). The protocol for this study was approved by the human 
research ethics committee of the first author’s institution. 
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Analysis 
Path analysis was used to test whether the personality-interest relationship was 
mediated by understanding appraisals. The significance of the indirect effect was assessed 
using a bootstrapping procedure with unbiased estimators as is suggested by Hayes (2009).
  The models generated 5000 thousand bootstrapped resamples and the bias 
corrected and adjusted confidence intervals. A confidence interval that does not include 
zero indicates a significant indirect effect (Hayes, 2009). 
Two multi-level slope-and-intercept models were conducted to test whether 
personality moderates the within person appraisal-interest relationships (see regression 
equations for Model 3 and 4 below). At Level 1, both models tested whether a person’s 
mean level of Understanding and Novelty predicted their mean level of Interest in response 
to seven quotations. At Level 2, differences between people on Openness/Intellect (Model 
3) or Openness and Intellect (Model 4) predict between-person differences in: (a) people’s 
mean level of interest; (b) the novelty/interest slope (i.e., the extent to which novelty 
predicts interest for each person); and (c) the understanding/interest slope (i.e., the extent 
to which understanding predicts interest for each person).The appraisals at the within-
person level were person centred around each person’s mean. Multilevel models were 
conducted in Mplus 7 using maximum-likelihood estimation.  
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Model 3 
Within-Person   
  𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗(𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔) + 𝛽1𝑗 (𝑁𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑦)+ 𝑟𝑖𝑗 
Between-People          
  𝛽0𝑗 = 𝛾00 + 𝛾01(Openness/Intellectj) + 𝑢0𝑗 
      𝛽1𝑗 = 𝛾10 + 𝛾11(Openness/Intellectj) + 𝑢1𝑗 
  𝛽2𝑗 = 𝛾20 + 𝛾21(Openness/Intellectj) + 𝑢2𝑗 
 
Model 4 
Within-Person   
  𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗(𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔) + 𝛽1𝑗 (𝑁𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑦) + 𝑟𝑖𝑗 
Between-People          
  𝛽0𝑗 = 𝛾00 + 𝛾01(Opennessj) + 𝛾02(Intellectj)  + 𝑢0𝑗 
      𝛽1𝑗 = 𝛾10 + 𝛾11(Opennessj) + 𝛾12(Intellectj) + 𝑢1𝑗 
  𝛽2𝑗 = 𝛾20 + 𝛾21(Opennessj) + 𝛾22(Intellectj) + 𝑢2𝑗 
 
 
Results 
Descriptive statistics and bivariate relations 
Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics and correlations for all measures. A medium-
sized positive correlation between the Openness and Intellect aspects was observed, 
suggesting that these are parts of the same personality domain. Openness/Intellect, 
Openness, and Intellect all predicted aggregated Interest and understanding appraisals, but 
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were not related to Novelty appraisals. Greater Interest was associated with greater 
understanding, consistent with previous research (Silvia, 2005). Contrary to previous 
findings, Interest did not significantly predict Novelty appraisals at the between-person 
level. The average within-person correlations of the interest, understanding, and novelty 
items are also displayed in the table. While the interest and understanding correlations 
were high, the novelty correlation was a little low, but acceptable as a two item measure.  
 
Table 2.1.  
Pearson’s correlations of personality variables with aggregated interest and appraisals. 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1.Openness/Intellect 69.59 11.41 (.84) .83** .81** .37** .10 .37** 
2.Intellect 34.58 6.04  (.82) .34** .29** .05 .39** 
3.Openness 38.87 5.74   (.79) .32** .12 .21* 
4. Interest+  5.58 0.73    [.87] .04 .37** 
5. Novelty+  4.00 0.83     [.61] -.42** 
6. Understanding+ 5.35 0.64           [.79]  
Note: * p<.05;**p<.01; N=99; + indicates a between-person aggregate variable across all 
seven quotations; Cronbach’s reliabilities for personality variables are presented on main 
diagonal in round brackets and  average within-person correlations for interest and 
appraisal variables are presented on main diagonal in square brackets; 
Between-person analysis: Do appraisals mediate the personality/interest 
relationship? 
Novelty appraisals were not included in the model as they did not meet the pre-
conditions for mediation, being unrelated to both interest and to all three personality 
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variables (Frazier, Tix, & Barron, 2004). Two path models were conducted: (a) Model 1 
included Openness/Intellect; (b) Model 2 included both Openness and Intellect as 
independent variables. 
Model 1. Openness/Intellect significantly predicted both understanding and interest. 
Understanding significantly predicted interest (Figure 2.1). The indirect effect of 
Openness/Intellect on Interest was significant (point estimate =.072; 95% C.I.: .014 to .164). 
 
Figure 2.1. A mediation model of understanding on the relation between Openness/Intellect 
and Interest. **p<.01;***p<.001 
 
Model 2. Openness significantly predicted interest, but did not significantly predict 
understanding (Figure 2.2). Intellect significantly predicted understanding, which in turn 
predicted interest. The indirect effect of Intellect on interest was significant (point estimate 
=.076; 95% C.I.: .019 to .177) but the indirect effect of Openness on interest was not (point 
estimate =.018; 95% C.I.: -.023 to .085). That is, Openness directly predicted interest 
whereas Intellect predicted interest indirectly though appraised understanding. Results 
support hypothesis 2 (the effect for Intellect replicates a previous finding for trait curiosity; 
Silvia, 2008). 
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Figure 2.2. A mediation model of understanding on the relation between Openness and 
Intellect, and Interest.*p<.05;**p<.01;***p<.001 
Within-person analysis: Does Personality Moderate Appraisal/Interest 
Relationships? 
Multilevel modelling allows for testing of within-person contingencies in 
appraisal/interest relationships. That is, are the appraisals of novelty and understanding 
equally meaningful for all people or do they vary according to personality? An unconditional 
model showed that a substantial amount of variance in interest was at the between-person 
level (ICC = .24).  
Level 1: Understanding and Novelty appraisals predict interest. Within-person 
appraisals of Understanding and Novelty predicted interest in both Model 3 and Model 4, 
replicating previous research (Silvia, 2008). Higher interest ratings were predicted by greater 
understanding, (Model 3: γ10=.354, SE=.049, p<.001; Model 4: γ10=.359, SE=.049, p<.001), 
and Novelty (Model 3: γ20=.295, SE=.051, p<.001; Model 4: γ20=.299, SE=.051, p<.001).  
The proportional variance statistic (PRV) was calculated to estimate the local effect 
size of the variables included in the analyses (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002). The two 
appraisals explained 29% of the within-person variance in interest.  
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Level 2, Model 3: Openness/Intellect predicts slopes and intercepts. 
Openness/Intellect significantly predicted within-person intercepts for interest (γ01=.273, 
SE=.066, p<.001), and also moderated the within-person understanding/interest 
relationship (γ11=-.146, SE=.045, p=.001). That is, higher Openness/Intellect predicted a 
smaller relationship between understanding and interest. Openness/Intellect did not 
moderate the Novelty/Interest relationship. Openness/Intellect explained 18% of the 
between-person variance in the intercepts and 33% of the variance in the slopes.  
Level 2, Model 4: Openness and Intellect predicts slopes and intercepts. Both 
aspects of personality predicted the intercept for Interest (Openness: γ01=.177, SE=.076, 
p<.05; Intellect: γ02=.154, SE=.067, p<.05). That is, both Openness and Intellect predict 
greater levels of interest. Openness also moderated the within-person relationship between 
understanding and interest (γ11=-.133, SE=.044, p=.002), but Intellect did not. That is, higher 
Openness predicted a smaller relationship between understanding and interest. Neither 
Openness nor Intellect moderated the Novelty/Interest relationship. Openness and Intellect 
explained 19% of the between-person variance in the intercepts and 39% of the variance in 
the slopes. 
Taken together, these results suggest that those higher on Openness/Intellect rely 
less on understanding in their experience of interest and that this effect is driven by 
Openness as opposed to Intellect. Importantly, these within-person findings illuminate the 
Openness-interest relationship and provide a dynamic understanding of why open people 
are more interested.  
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Discussion 
In general, results support the major goal of our research, which was to clarify the 
different effects of Openness and Intellect personality aspects on the appraisal processes 
underlying interest. All three personality variables (Openness, Intellect, and 
Openness/Intellect) predicted greater appraised understanding and greater interest in 
quotations, but showed no relationship with Novelty appraisals, supporting our first 
hypothesis. Although Openness and Intellect showed similar magnitude of correlations to 
both appraisals and to interest, a mediation analysis demonstrated that Openness directly 
predicted greater interest in quotations whereas Intellect showed only an indirect 
relationship, supporting our second hypothesis. This result is evidence of the distinction 
between Openness and Intellect as they affect the process of Interest in qualitatively 
different ways. Within-person analyses provided further evidence that Openness and 
Intellect are distinct: The combination of larger intercepts and smaller understanding-
interest relationships suggests that those higher on Openness/Intellect were more 
interested in difficult to understand quotations compared to those lower on 
Openness/Intellect. The separation of the domain into its aspects demonstrated that this 
finding was particularly associated with Openness rather than Intellect.   These results 
provided support for our third hypothesis. 
Our results demonstrate the necessity of examining personality in a nuanced 
fashion, going beyond (a) the broad domain level of personality; (b) zero-order correlations 
of personality with criteria; and (c) between-person analyses. Although relationships of 
Openness and Intellect with appraisals and interest were indistinguishable at the level of 
zero-order correlations, mediation analyses suggested an indirect path for Intellect but not 
Openness, and multi-level analyses suggested within-person contingencies operate for 
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Openness but not Intellect. The majority of personality research considers personality in 
terms of between-person differences at the broad domain level, despite evidence that 
within-person effects can be markedly different to between-person effects and that 
personality can have markedly different effects across different facets or aspects (e.g., 
Beckmann, Wood, & Minbashian, 2010; Ziegler et al., 2010). It is rare for personality 
research to decompose the broad domains into their elements or to consider within-person 
effects (see Kuppens & Tong, 2010; Hampson, 2012 for reviews of exceptions). It is 
exceedingly rare to do both. The current study illustrates that effects can be hidden unless 
all levels are considered.  
Openness, Intellect and interest-appraisal relationships 
While some appraisal theories contend that appraisals determine the emotions 
people feel, others adopt a probabilistic approach where people may vary in appraisal 
strength and in appraisal/emotion relationships (Scherer, 2001). Research supports the 
latter, and personality facets predict differences in appraisals and in emotion-appraisal 
relationships (Kuppens & Tong, 2012). Such process based findings have provided a dynamic 
understanding of how personality manifests in behaviour. The current research has 
provided such an understanding of the Intellect and Openness aspects.  
Intellect 
The role of Intellect can be described simply as those higher in intellect are likely to 
appraise situations as more understandable and therefore more interesting than someone 
with a lower aspect standing. This replicates previous findings with trait curiosity (Silvia, 
2008), providing further evidence for the similarity of the two constructs (Mussel, 2010).  
Furthermore, if appraised understanding and objective understanding are closely 
related, ability variables may explain the Intellect-Interest relationship. Silvia (2005) has 
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demonstrated that manipulating actual understanding affects appraised understanding, 
suggesting a direct and strong asymmetric relationship between the two constructs. Indeed, 
this has been previously suggested as an explanation for the observed fluid Intelligence-
Interest relationship (Silvia & Sanders, 2010). Since Intellect is related to general, fluid, and 
crystallised intelligence (DeYoung, Quilty, Peterson, & Gray, 2014), we propose that ability 
constructs are capable of partially explaining the variance in Interest that is currently 
attributed to Intellect. The issue of incremental validity is of relevance here therefore future 
research should evaluate whether Intellect contributes uniquely to Interest over and above 
cognitive abilities.  
Openness 
The unique influence of openness on the interest-understanding relationship is 
similar to a previous finding where Openness/Intellect predicted a greater reactivity to 
novelty and a lesser reliance on understanding (Silvia, et al., 2009). These findings were 
interpreted as greater reactivity to novelty—an explanation consistent with theories 
regarding the Openness/Intellect domain—rather than a lesser reliance on understanding.  
In our study, Openness was associated with a lesser reliance on understanding, but 
not a greater reactivity to novelty. One challenge in finding consistent results within the 
emotion of interest may be the relationship between novelty and understanding appraisals. 
As stimuli are appraised as more novel, they are also appraised as less understandable. That 
is reflected by a consistent relationship between the two appraisals in our and other studies 
(e. g. Silvia, 2008). Logically, it would follow that if Openness moderates the interest-
understanding relationship, it should also be moderating the interest-novelty relationship 
because more novel stimuli would illicit interest due to the lesser negative reaction to not 
understanding. This novelty-understanding relationship may vary between different types of 
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stimuli, thus possibly explaining the differences in our results and is, therefore, an important 
question for future research. 
This special relationship with understanding qualifies a particularly strong 
association between Openness/Intellect and appreciation of abstract art, which, by 
definition, is more difficult to understand (e.g. Feist & Brady, 2004; Furnham & Walker, 
2001). Our study suggests that Openness as opposed to Intellect may be particularly 
responsible for such preferences. Due of a lower reliance on understanding, those high in 
Openness have a particular disposition to enjoy the abstract. Further, McManus and 
Furnham (2006) found that Openness/Intellect was negatively related to aesthetic attitudes 
such as: “one has to understand the emotions of the artist in order to appreciate the work, 
that the meaning behind art has to be obvious for it to have value, and that one needs to 
understand the background information of a piece of art to appreciate it properly” (p. 566). 
This attitude towards art might be extended to literary art that has its own element of 
aesthetics. Our study supports this finding through within-person processes and suggests 
that it is Openness and not Intellect that is driving these differences in attitudes. 
 
Implications for the Openness/Intellect domain 
While the previous section focused of what the current findings say about processes 
associated with Openness and Intellect, the current section discusses what these findings 
mean for the Openness/Intellect model of the domain. Support is provided for the utility in 
evaluating Openness and Intellect as separate, yet related aspects of the personality 
domain. DeYoung (in press) suggested that what binds Openness and Intellect is cognitive 
exploration, and that they reflect different processes by which cognitive exploration takes 
place. Intellect reflects exploration through reasoning, while Openness reveals exploration 
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through sensation and perception. In our study, Openness and Intellect were indeed bound 
by states of exploration, in their similar associations with overall Interest. Further, Intellect 
reflected exploration through reasoning—a greater appraised ability to understand—which 
lead to greater Interest.  
The roles of perceptual and sensational processes were not evaluated, but Openness 
explained variance unaccounted for by appraisal processes at the between-person level, and 
a lesser reliance on understanding through within-person findings. These results suggest an 
emotional reactivity associated with Openness, supported by previously found associations 
with greater tendencies to experience powerful emotions of chills and absorption, for which 
Intellect was a negative and non-significant predictor respectively (Silvia & Nusbaum, 2011).  
Conclusion 
Goldberg (1993) boldly labelled Openness/Intellect a scientific embarrassment. 
Twenty years on, we are seeing a far greater understanding of the differences and 
similarities between the constructs of Openness and Intellect, and strong evidence 
suggesting that they are separate yet related aspects of a broader domain. We acknowledge 
the correlational, cross-sectional, nature of our study, and our student sample as limitations 
for our findings. However, we firmly believe we have taken a step towards disembarrassing 
this domain by demonstrating in this study a further differentiation between these two 
aspects through their dissimilar pathways to cognitive exploration concerning the emotion 
of interest. It is fitting that Johnson’s (1994) elegant analysis and poetic distinction 20 years 
ago still rings true today: Interest in truth versus interest in beauty.  
` 
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Abstract 
There is a stable relationship between the Openness/Intellect domain of personality 
and aesthetic engagement. However, neither of these are simple constructs and while the 
relationship exists, process based evidence explaining the relationship is still lacking. This 
research sought to clarify the relationship by evaluating the influence of the Openness and 
Intellect aspects on several different aesthetic emotions. Two studies looked at the 
between- and within-person differences in arousal and the emotions of interest, pleasure 
and confusion in response to visual art. The results suggest that Openness, as opposed to 
Intellect, was predictive of greater arousal, interest and pleasure, while both aspects 
explained less confusion. Differences in Openness were associated with within-person 
emotion appraisal contingencies, particularly greater novelty-interest and novelty-pleasure 
relationships. Those higher in Openness were particularly influenced by novelty in artworks. 
For pleasure this relationship suggested a different qualitative structure of appraisals. The 
appraisal of novelty is part of the experience of pleasure for those high in Openness, but not 
those low in Openness. This research supports the utility of studying Openness and Intellect 
as separate aspects of the broad domain and clarifies the relationship between Openness 
and aesthetic states in terms of within-person appraisal processes. 
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Introduction 
“It is art that makes life, makes interest, makes importance... and I know of no substitute 
whatever for the force and beauty of its process.” 
 
-Henry James 
 
Making and appreciating art is a quintessentially human behaviour, but not everyone 
would agree with the sentiment expressed by Henry James above. Divergent opinions about 
the importance of art and experiences with art make the study of individual differences a 
crucial part of aesthetic science—after all, it is said that beauty is in the eye of the beholder. 
However, in psychological aesthetics there are still gaps in what is known about both the 
beauty and the beholder. Psychological aesthetics has primarily focused on one aspect of 
the aesthetic experience in the form of liking, pleasure and preference. Aesthetics 
associations with personality—primarily Openness/Intellect—have focused almost 
exclusively on individual differences in liking different types of art. Further, little work has 
gone into understanding the processes underlying the relationship between aesthetics and 
Openness/Intellect. This is problematic because the nature of the personality/art 
appreciation relationship could seem circular, given that personality items directly mention 
aesthetic engagement when measuring Openness/Intellect. 
 
In the current study, we extend previous research investigating the relationship 
between Openness/Intellect and aesthetic appreciation in three ways. First, we model the 
appraisal processes underlying the emotions of interest, pleasure, and confusion. This 
extends previous research by considering three distinct emotions rather than pleasure only. 
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Second, we test whether the aspects of Openness and Intellect differentially predict these 
three emotional states. This extends previous research by considering the two different 
aspects of Openness/Intellect, rather than the broad domain only. Third, we test whether 
the aspects of Openness and Intellect differentially predict within-person appraisal 
processes underlying these three emotional states. This extends previous research by 
considering within-person processes, rather than between-person associations only. By 
integrating these various elements we intended to answer the question: Why are those 
higher in Openness/Intellect more aesthetically engaged? 
Aesthetic People 
Openness/Intellect is the personality domain of the aesthetically sensitive, according 
to many areas of research. It is the best predictor of positive aesthetic attitudes and 
participation in aesthetic activities such as visiting museums, reading literature, and creating 
art (McManus and Furnham, 2006). Previous findings have demonstrated 
Openness/Intellect to be the best personality predictor of artistic creativity (Feist, 1998; 
Silvia et al., 2009b) and vocational interests related to the arts (Barrick et al., 2003). Most 
importantly, Openness/Intellect is a consistent predictor of aesthetic appreciation, which 
has been shown to be highly variable (Vessel and Rubin, 2010). Several studies indicate that 
Openness/Intellect is associated with liking a broad range of artistic types including abstract, 
representational, pop, renaissance, cubism, Japanese, and unpleasant art (Furnham and 
Walker, 2001; Rawlings, 2003; Chamorro-Premuzic et al., 2009, 2010). Openness/Intellect 
therefore is a domain of personality that explains individual differences in creating, seeking, 
and appreciating art. 
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Openness/Intellect is an unusually heterogeneous personality domain, and recent 
work suggests that it can be represented with two major aspects: Openness and Intellect 
(DeYoung et al., 2007, 2012; Woo et al., 2014). Johnson (1994) poetically described 
Openness as interest in beauty and Intellect as interest in truth, suggesting that they are 
both information-seeking traits diverging in the types of situations that elicit interest. 
Intellect is associated with fluid and crystallized intelligence and with scientific 
creativity, while Openness is associated with artistic creativity, implicit learning ability, and 
crystallized intelligence (Kaufman et al., 2010; Nusbaum and Silvia, 2011; Kaufman, 2013). 
DeYoung (2014) distinguishes the aspects on the basis of different styles of cognitive 
exploration, with Openness reflecting individual differences in exploration through 
perceptual or sensory information, and Intellect reflecting individual differences in learning 
and exploration of abstract information. Johnson’s (1994) and DeYoung’s (2014) distinctions 
suggest that Openness, as opposed to Intellect, is the aspect primarily associated with 
appreciation of visual art. Further distinctions based on emotional experiences have also 
emerged. Silvia and Nusbaum (2011) showed that Openness, and not Intellect, is associated 
with unusual aesthetic experiences such as chills, feeling touched, and absorption, 
suggesting differences between the aspects in the propensity to experience states that have 
been linked to broad definitions of aesthetic experiences. Given the distinction between 
Openness and Intellect we aimed to test their differential roles in aesthetic experiences. 
Aesthetic Emotions 
Nearly all research on the link between personality and aesthetic appreciation, like 
aesthetics research more generally, has focused on how much participants liked or disliked 
an artwork (e.g., Furnham and Walker, 2001; Rawlings, 2003; Chamorro-Premuzic et al., 
2009). Since the pioneering work of Berlyne (1971), most models of aesthetics concern 
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themselves with states of pleasure, liking, or preference. Silvia (2009) argued that, while 
important, such evaluations do not take into account the breadth of emotions felt in 
response to art. A similar trend exists within the research in the emerging field of 
neuroaesthetics, which has almost exclusively focused on the evaluation of something as 
pleasing or beautiful (Fayn & Silvia, 2015). Such a reductionist approach runs the risk of 
missing meaningful individual differences in aesthetic experiences and in understanding the 
ways in which personality traits manifest in such experiences. Emotions felt in response to 
aesthetic objects—categorized within this paper as aesthetic emotions—are varied and 
include interest, confusion, pleasure, anger, and even disgust (Silvia, 2012). The term 
aesthetic emotions is not used to suggest a separate group of emotions only felt in response 
to aesthetic objects. Rather, it is used to group the states that have been observed to occur 
in response to aesthetic objects. 
The distinction between liking versus disliking something may be a valid indicator of 
pleasure, but it does not represent the depth and complexity of aesthetic emotions. A group 
of emotions frequently felt in response to art, yet distinct from pleasure, are the knowledge 
emotions. The knowledge emotions—interest, awe, beauty, confusion, and surprise—
associated with beliefs about thoughts and knowledge, they stem from epistemic goals, and 
arise from metacognitive processes (Silvia, 2010, 2012). Several emotional states may fit this 
categorization, and all are distinct from pleasure. The emotion of interest has been 
distinguished from pleasure on the basis of cognitive appraisal processes—interest is 
positively associated with complex stimuli, but pleasure is negatively related to complexity 
(Turner and Silvia, 2006). Two other states that are distinct from pleasure and involve 
epistemic goals are awe and beauty. The emotion of awe is felt as one tries to 
accommodate vast novelty, the success of which leads to a powerful emotional state (Shiota 
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et al., 2007). Awe can be and is frequently experienced as a negative and fear-like state 
when accommodation is unsuccessful. Beauty is defined as “the exhilarating feeling that 
something complex, perhaps to the point of being profound, might yield an understanding” 
(Armstrong and Detweiler-Bedell, 2008, p. 312). Beauty is distinguished from the pleasant 
on the basis of effort: pleasure is associated with fluent processing (Reber, 2012), but 
beauty relies on effortful processing that drives arousal and results in an exhilarating 
experience. Therefore, several aesthetic states are distinguished from simple pleasure. All 
are elicited by complex and novel situations where understanding is required but is 
effortful. Pleasure, on the other hand, is facilitated by ease of understanding. 
From the individual differences perspective, two studies have distinguished pleasure 
and other aesthetic experiences through factor analysis techniques. Eysenck (1941) 
attempted to explain the presence of two factors in aesthetic preference. The first factor 
was easily attributable to valance, while the second was generally associated with 
preferences for the abstract. A core feature of abstract art is novelty and complexity, 
suggesting interest driven rather than pleasure driven preferences. More recently, Marković 
(2010) found that two factors describe aesthetic appreciation. These factors were labeled 
affective tone and aesthetic experiences. Descriptors “lovely” and “charming” loaded 
highest on affective tone, while aesthetic experience was associated with adjectives such as 
“exceptional” and “profound.” Thus, converging evidence and theory suggest that some 
aesthetic experiences are distinct from mild positive states of pleasure and that at the core 
of these states is the resolution of novelty and complexity, rather than fluent processing 
associated with pleasure. 
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Aesthetic states, like other emotions, are generated by appraisal process patterns 
(Ellsworth and Scherer, 2003). Interest occurs when a stimulus is appraised as novel yet 
understandable (Silvia, 2005). Novelty orientates and highjacks our attention, while the 
resolution of the novelty toward understanding leads to the positive experience of interest. 
This appraisal structure has been supported in response to art, poetry, and film (Silvia, 2005, 
2008; Silvia et al., 2009a; Silvia and Berg, 2011). Pleasure and confusion are also predicted 
by the same appraisals but in different ways. Confusion is associated with appraisals of 
novelty and lack of understanding (Silvia, 2010). Pleasure is elicited by appraised 
understanding and negatively related to novelty (Turner and Silvia, 2006). The appraisal 
approach is therefore particularly useful in distinguishing differing aesthetic emotions and 
studying the underlying processes that facilitate them. 
Between aesthetic emotions and aesthetic people 
Appraisal theories of emotions have been used to further understanding of 
processes that underlie personality traits associated with emotional experiences. There are 
two ways in which personality is involved in the appraisal-emotion system: (1) appraisal 
strength—the tendency to appraise situations in a particular way—varies as a function of 
personality; and (2) appraisal-emotion relationships vary as a function of personality 
(Kuppens, 2009; Kuppens and Tong, 2010). 
Openness/Intellect has been implicated in both of the aforementioned ways. 
Curiosity—a trait associated with Openness/Intellect (Mussel, 2010)—is associated with 
greater appraised understanding, which fully mediates the curiosity-interest relationship 
(Silvia, 2008). That is, curious people feel greater interest because they are better able to 
understand epistemic situations, which in turn predicts greater interest. This finding is 
consistent with the theoretical framework proposed by Mussel (2013) for Intellect traits. 
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Within this framework, Intellect traits are associated with processes of seeking and 
conquering intellectually stimulating events, which map onto interest and understanding. 
Further, within the experience of interest, novelty and understanding have been 
found to form two clusters with Openness/Intellect predicting membership in only one 
(Silvia et al., 2009a). Openness/Intellect was associated with the cluster in which novelty 
was a much stronger predictor of interest while understanding was less important, 
compared to the other cluster. This suggests that Openness/Intellect may moderate the 
interest-appraisal relationships predisposing those higher on Openness/Intellect to be more 
sensitive to novelty and less sensitive to understanding appraisals. One study has looked at 
the unique influence of the Openness and Intellect aspects on the processes and appraisal 
structure of interest in response to quotations. Openness was related to greater interest 
overall and a lessened reliance on understanding, while Intellect related to greater 
understanding (Fayn et al., 2015). This suggests that Openness and Intellect may relate to 
interest in different ways and that appraisal processes are useful for explaining these 
differences. 
The influence of Openness/Intellect on the appraisal structure of pleasure and 
confusion, and the distinct influence of Openness and Intellect on the appraisal structure of 
interest, have not previously been tested. Taken together, previous findings indicate that 
appraisals can explain the mechanisms that underlie Openness/Intellect and its relationship 
with interest. Therefore, we aimed to evaluate the underlying processes associated with the 
Openness and Intellect aspects in order to understand whether those higher in either aspect 
are more aesthetically engaged and how the aspects manifest differently in aesthetic 
experiences. 
 
   72 
 
 
The present research 
In summary, positive aesthetic experience is broader than liking and may be divided 
into two families of experiences: pleasure and the knowledge emotions. Openness/Intellect 
may influence both these states and the processes that underlie these traits. Therefore, we 
moved away from the predominant practice of evaluating liking artworks, in lieu of 
measuring distinct emotional states that have previously been implicated in the aesthetic 
experience. Additionally, by studying variability in appraisal-emotion relationships across 
multiple stimuli we were able to evaluate the way personality manifests in aesthetic 
experiences. Thus, the aims of the current research are to explore the relationship between 
Openness/Intellect and aesthetic appreciation by: (1) extending the states studied within 
personality-aesthetics relationships to pleasure, interest, and confusion; (2) evaluating the 
unique influences of the Openness and Intellect aspects; and (3) testing whether the 
Openness and Intellect aspects moderate the within-person appraisal processes that 
underlie these aesthetic emotional states. 
Study 1 evaluated the differential influence of Openness and Intellect on different 
aesthetic states in response to visual art. In Study 2 we tested whether the appraisal 
processes associated with interest, pleasure and confusion can explain the relationships 
between Openness/Intellect and aesthetic appreciation, and whether the Openness and 
Intellect influence appraisal processes. 
Study 1 
The purpose of this study was to test whether Openness and Intellect differentially 
predict states of interest, pleasure, and arousal. Based on past work on Openness and 
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Intellect, we predicted that Openness would be a stronger predictor of aesthetic experience 
than Intellect. 
Method 
Ethics Statement 
This study was approved by the Human Ethics Committee of the University of 
Sydney. Written consent was obtained from all the participants before the experiment 
according to the established guidelines of the committee. 
Participants 
A total of 53 psychology students (74% female) participated in the study for course 
credit. Participants were aged between 17 and 42 years (M = 19.15 years, SD = 3.01 years). 
All participants were proficient in English ensuring comprehension of instructions. 
Procedure 
The study was conducted on computers over two 1-h sessions to minimize the 
influence of a long session of psychometric assessments on aesthetic appreciation. In the 
first session participants completed the Openness and Intellect scales, as well as other 
individual difference measures not relevant to the current study. In the second session—at 
least 1 h apart from the first—participants reported their thoughts and feelings in response 
to seven color images taken from published art books. The images were all in color and 
could broadly be described as modern art, comprising of both abstract and representational 
examples. The artists were: Dorosheva, Kadel, Kiefer, Magritte, Moki, Pollock, and Ryden. 
Measures 
Openness and Intellect 
Openness and Intellect were assessed using the Big Five Aspect Scales (DeYoung et 
al., 2007). Each scale included 10 Likert style items on a five-point Likert scale (1 = strongly 
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disagree, 5 = strongly agree) such as “I enjoy the beauty of nature” (Openness) and “I like to 
solve complex problems” (Intellect). The Openness scale is made up of items that reflect the 
Openness to Aesthetics, Feelings and Fantasy scales, while Intellect items include self-
reported ability and Openness to Ideas items. The scale yields a full-scale Openness/Intellect 
score along with scores for the Openness and Intellect aspects. The internal consistencies 
for Openness (α = 0.86) and Intellect (α = 0.79) were good within the current sample. 
Ratings of interest, pleasure, and arousal 
After viewing each picture, people rated it on a series of seven-point semantic 
differential scales. The scales assessed feelings of interest (interesting-uninteresting, 
engaging-boring), pleasure (pleasing-displeasing, enjoyable-unenjoyable), and arousal 
(calm-aroused, sluggish-excited). Most of the items have been used in past research in 
research on emotions (e.g., Day, 1967, 1968; Silvia, 2005; Turner and Silvia, 2006). The items 
were reverse-scored and averaged; high scores indicate high levels of interest, pleasure, and 
arousal. 
Results and discussion 
The analyses were conducted with Mplus 7.2 (Muthén and Muthén, Muthén and 
Muthén) using maximum likelihood with robust standard errors. For interpreting effect 
sizes, we use the common guidelines (Cumming, 2012) of r = 0.10/0.30/0.50 as 
small/medium/large. Table 3.1 reports descriptive statistics and correlations for the 
measures of personality and aesthetic experience. 
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Table 3.1.  
Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations of personality variables with 
between-person aggregated ratings. 
 M SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1.Intellect 35.08 6.43 1 .27 .13 .18 .10 
2.Openness 40.23 5.39  1 .28 .34 .39 
3.Interest 5.83 0.67   1 .84 .50 
4.Pleasure 5.52 0.74    1 .47 
5.Arousal 4.67 0.72     1 
Note: n = 53; All relationships above .18 are significant at .05 level, all those 
above .38 are significant at the .01 level, and all those above .49 are significant 
at the .001 level. 
The zero-order correlations suggest, as expected, that Openness was associated with 
stronger aesthetic engagement than Intellect: Openness had stronger relationships, medium 
in size, with all three outcomes. To examine their differences more formally, we conducted 
a multivariate regression model in which Openness and Intellect were the two predictors 
and interest, pleasure, and arousal were the outcomes. Figure 3.1 displays the model and 
results. The effects of Openness on interest, pleasure, and arousal were medium in size, and 
most were statistically significant; the effects of Intellect on interest, pleasure, and arousal, 
in contrast, were all near-zero or small in size. The Openness/Intellect aspects explained 8%, 
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12%, and 15% of the variance in interest, pleasure, and arousal respectively.  The results 
lend support to the utility of separating Openness and Intellect when evaluating individual 
differences in aesthetic states. Openness had notable relationships with the three types of 
aesthetic experience, whereas Intellect did not. Limitations of this study are the small 
sample size which we addressed in study 2, and a limited range on the Openness scale. Both 
of these limitations have a bearing on the strength of the results found in this study. Small 
sample sizes are an indication of underpowered studies, while range restrictions usually 
underestimate effect sizes. 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Effects of Openness and Intellect on ratings of interest, pleasure, and 
arousal: Study 1. n = 53. R squared for  Note that the effect of Intellect on Arousal is β < 0.01 
and hence not drawn. Standard errors are reported in brackets. ∗p < 0.05.  
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Study 2 
Study 2 sought to extend these findings in several important ways. First, we shifted 
the range of emotional states that we assessed by focusing on interest, pleasure, and 
confusion. Whereas interest and pleasure have a long history in aesthetics research, 
confusion has only recently attracted attention among emotion researchers as a response to 
events that are unfamiliar and hard to understand (Silvia, 2010). 
Second, to understand the processes underlying the Openness/Intellect-emotion 
relationships, appraisal processes were evaluated. The inclusion of appraisal processes can 
help determine why those higher in Openness/Intellect are more aesthetically sensitive—
whether they are more or less emotionally responsive to appraisals. That is, we seek to 
determine whether Openness/Intellect can explain individual differences in appraisal-
emotion relationships. As previously mentioned, Openness/Intellect moderates the 
appraisal structure of interest and relates to greater appraisals of understanding (Silvia, 
2008; Silvia et al., 2009a). The current study extends this finding in several ways. First, we 
examine the two aspects of Openness/Intellect for their unique influence on aesthetic 
experience. Second, we test whether Openness and Intellect similarly moderate the 
appraisal structure of pleasure and confusion. We expect, as in Study 1, that Openness but 
not Intellect will be the aesthetically relevant aspect. Third, we included an additional 
individual difference measure to help clarify the roles of Openness and Intellect. A possible 
explanation for the relationship between Openness/Intellect and aesthetic appreciation is 
that those higher in Openness/Intellect have greater knowledge of the arts (Silvia, 2007a), 
which in turn predicts interest in art (Silvia, 2006). Art expertise has been shown to 
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moderate the interest-appraisal relationships—experts are less reliant on understanding 
and more sensitive to novelty (Silvia, 2013)—a finding also associated with 
Openness/Intellect (Silvia et al., 2009a). This may indicate that the effects of 
Openness/Intellect on aesthetic appreciation are a function of expertise in the arts rather 
than a differences in personality. These variables have not been studied together in the 
context of aesthetic appreciation, therefore, we controlled for art expertise in the current 
study. 
Method 
Ethics Statement 
This study was approved by the Human Ethics Committees of the University of 
Sydney and the University of North Carolina at Greensboro. Written consent was obtained 
from all the participants before the experiment according to the established guidelines of 
the committees. 
Participants 
A total of 225 students from various degrees and majors (69% female) participated in 
the study for either course credit or $10 USD compensation. The students majors were 
25.3% Physical Sciences, 21.8% Arts, 14.7% Psychology, 12% Health Sciences, 10% 
Business/Economics, 6.7% Social Sciences, 4.4% were undecided, and 4.9% had majors that 
did not fit into the categories presented as they were mixtures of more than one category. 
Participants’ age was between 18 and 56 years (M = 20.56 years, SD = 4.91 years). All 
participants were proficient in English ensuring comprehension of instructions. 
Procedure 
The data were collected during a 1-h session in groups ranging from 1 to 8 
participants at a time. The study involved completion of self-report personality scales and 
   79 
 
 
ratings of 18 visual art images. We sought to include a broad scope of pieces ranging from 
traditional to contemporary art. The images were all in color and included both abstract and 
representational works. The artists were: Bacon, Blake, Goya, Hayuk, Kato, Kiefer, Magritte, 
Marc, Monroe, Pollock, Repin, Ryden, Schiele, Siqueiros, and Turner. The self-report scales 
came before and after the visual art ratings to avoid fatigue. All data was collected using 
Medialab (Jarvis, 2004) on computers. Images were presented in a random order, as were 
questions relating to the images; both controlled by the randomization algorithm within 
Medialab. 
Measures 
Openness and Intellect 
As in Study 1, Openness and Intellect were assessed using the Big Five Aspect Scales 
(DeYoung et al., 2007). Each scale has 10 items on a five-point Likert scale (1 = strongly 
disagree, 5 = strongly agree). 
Art expertise 
Art expertise was measured using the aesthetic fluency scale (Smith and Smith, 
2006), which assesses expertise by asking people how familiar they are with different figures 
and ideas from art history. The scale got participants to report their familiarity in response 
to 10 people and concepts (Mary Cassatt, Isamu Noguchi, John Singer Sargent, Alessandro 
Boticelli, Gian Lorenzo Bernini, Fauvism, Egyptian Funerary Stelae, Impressionism, Chinese 
Scrolls, Abstract Expressionism). The scale ranged from 0 (I have never heard of this artist or 
term) to 4 (I can talk intelligently about this artist or idea in art). It should be noted that the 
fluency scale assesses self-reported expertise in the arts and may be subject to 
overclaiming. However, the aesthetic fluency scale has been used widely used to assess 
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expertise and has displayed good internal and external validity (e.g., Silvia, 2007a; Silvia and 
Barona, 2009; DeWall et al., 2011; Silvia and Nusbaum, 2011; Smith, 2014). 
 
Emotions and cognitions in response to visual art 
Participants viewed 18 images of various valance and style taken from various art 
books, previous studies, and the google images database. Participants could observe the 
image for as long as they wanted, but for a minimum of 5 s. A smaller version of the image 
was also visible while reporting on their thoughts and feelings. 
For each image participants completed items assessing various emotions and 
cognitions. For emotional evaluations participants were asked: “Did you find this picture…” 
followed by items for interesting, pleasing, and confusing. Appraisal processes of novelty 
(complex-simple, unusual-common) and understanding (hard to understand-easy to 
understand, comprehensible-incomprehensible) were assessed using seven-point semantic 
differential scales. All scales had been previously used in assessments of aesthetic states 
(Silvia, 2005, 2010, 2013). In addition to the emotion items, we asked some behavior-like 
preference items, which are common in aesthetics research (e.g., Cooper and Silvia, 2009). 
For each image, participants were asked I would like more information on this image, On 
Facebook I would “like” this image, On Facebook I would share this image on my wall, and I 
would like to own a copy of this. Each item was answered with a binary NO/YES scale. The 
time taken to view each image was also recorded to evaluate whether Openness or Intellect 
were associated with longer viewing times. 
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Results and discussion 
Data reduction and analysis 
The items for the personality and aesthetic fluency scales were averaged to form 
overall scores. Internal consistencies for the BFAS Openness and Intellect scales, and the 
aesthetic fluency scale were good (see Table 3.2). 
 
Table 3.2.            
 
Descriptive statistics and correlations between personality traits, aesthetic fluency and emotions. 
 N M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1.Openness 225 39.16 5.59 (.76) .39 .53 .39 .56 -.28 
2.Intellect 225 36.23 5.51  (.80) .39 .11 .27 -.28 
3.Aesthetic Fluency 224 22.21 7.41   (.83) .36 .52 -.26 
4.Interest 224 5.21 .84    1 .67 .06 
5.Pleasure 224 3.51 .83    .52 1 -.13 
6.Confusion  224 3.98 .80    .02 -.20 1 
Note: All relationships above .13 are significant at .001 level, and all those below .13 are not 
significant; Correlations below the diagonal are within-person relationships; Cronbach’s 
alphas in parentheses.  
 
The large number of images viewed by each person allowed us to use multilevel 
models, which can estimate between-person effects, within-person effects, and their 
interactions (Silvia, 2007b; Nezlek, 2011). For the multilevel models, between-person 
predictors (Openness, Intellect, and Aesthetic Fluency) were centered at the sample’s grand 
mean and were rescaled by dividing the full scale score by the number of items in the scale. 
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Within-person predictors (appraisals of novelty-complexity and understanding) were 
centered at each person’s own mean (Enders and Tofighi, 2007). The null model was used to 
evaluate intraclass correlation coefficients (ICCs). The ICCs indicated a significant amount of 
variance for interest (19%), pleasure (11%), and confusion (13%) at the between-person 
level. 
The random slope and intercept models were tested separately for each emotion 
and are graphically depicted in Figure 3.2. The analyses were conducted with Mplus 7.2, 
using maximum likelihood with robust standard errors. All coefficients are unstandardized 
regression weights; some, where noted, are logistic effects. Estimation of power is a 
contentious topic within multilevel modeling due to the complexity of the parameters being 
estimated (Nezlek, 2011); by most standards the number of level 1 and level 2 units of 
measurement in our sample is sufficient to assume accurate estimations of the parameters 
of interest (Maas and Hox, 2005). 
 
Figure 3.2. A depiction of the multilevel models. 
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Descriptive statistics and bivariate relationships 
Openness and Intellect were both related to greater Aesthetic Fluency, pleasure, and 
lower confusion. Openness, but not Intellect, was related to greater interest (Table 2). The 
states of interest and pleasure had a strong overlap at the between and within person 
levels, and were unrelated to confusion at the between person level. Pleasure and interest 
differed from each other in their within-person relationship with confusion, interest was 
independent of confusion, but pleasure had a small negative relationship with confusion. 
Overall between-person effects of Openness and Intellect on emotions and 
preference ratings 
Our first models examined the overall effects of Openness and Intellect on emotion 
ratings (interest, pleasure, and confusion) and on preference ratings (e.g., whether people 
indicated wanting to own a copy of the image). As expected, Openness and Intellect showed 
diverging relationships with these outcomes. Openness predicted finding the images 
significantly more interesting (b = 0.61, SE = 0.11, p < 0.001), more pleasing (b = 0.77, SE = 
0.09, p < 0.001), and less confusing (b = -0.31, SE = 0.10, p = 0.003). Intellect, in contrast, 
predicted finding the images less confusing (b = -0.29, SE = 0.11, p = 0.008), but it didn’t 
significantly predict either interest (b = -0.06, SE = 0.10, p = 0.573) or pleasure (b = 0.09, SE = 
0.09, p = 0.287). 
For the preference ratings, a logistic model found that Openness significantly 
predicted the likelihood of wanting more information about the image (b = 1.65, SE = 0.32, p 
< 0.001), the likelihood of liking (b = 0.93, SE = 0.16, p < 0.001) and sharing (b = 1.09, SE = 
0.25, p < 0.001) the image on Facebook, and the likelihood of wanting to own it (b = 1.14, SE 
= 0.18, p < 0.001). Intellect, in contrast, did not significantly predict wanting to learn more (b 
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= -0.49, SE = 0.30, p = 0.101), liking (b = -0.08, SE = 0.16, p = 0.619) or sharing (b = 0.14, SE = 
0.18, p = 0.402) the image on Facebook, or wanting to own it (b = 0.02, SE = 0.22, p = 0.942). 
For view times—averaged across all stimuli—a regression model found that 
Openness significantly predicted greater viewing times (b = 206.29, SE = 62.85, p = 0.001). 
Intellect did not predict variance in view times (b = -0.39.06, SE = 63.89, p = 0.542). 
In short, Openness and Intellect diverged in their relationships with aesthetic 
experience, preference ratings, and viewing times. Openness significantly predicted all of 
them, but Intellect predicted only feeling less confused. 
Overall within-person effects of appraisals on emotions 
The results for all multilevel models are presented in Table 3.3. These models 
evaluated the within-person main effects of appraisals on emotions. As in past work, 
interest was significantly predicted by appraisals of high novelty and high comprehensibility, 
and confusion was predicted by high novelty and low comprehensibility. Pleasure, in 
contrast, was more weakly predicted by novelty but predicted by comprehensibility, 
consistent with models that emphasize ease of understanding (Reber, 2012) and achieving 
insight and knowledge (Leder et al., 2012) as a source of liking. 
Personality as predictors of emotion intercepts and moderators of appraisal-
emotion relationships 
Openness and Intellect had different main effects on aesthetic experience, but do they 
moderate how appraisals influence aesthetic experience? These models included Openness 
and Intellect as between-person predictors of emotions and appraisal-emotion slopes. If a 
between-person trait significantly predicts a slope, then the relationship between an 
appraisal and an emotion shifts across levels of the trait. Prediction of 
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Table 3.3.  
Multilevel models of within and between person predictors of aesthetic experiences.  
  Interest (DV) Pleasure (DV) Confusion (DV) 
Within-Person Predictors           
Novelty .39*** (.03) .08**    (.03) .20*** (.02) 
Understanding  .28*** (.02) .28*** (.03) -.56*** (.03) 
Between-Person 
Predictors 
 Slopes  Slopes  Slopes 
Intercept N U Intercept N U Intercept N U 
Model 1, 2, 3          
Openness .61*** (.11) .12** (.04) -.06 (.05) .77*** (.10) .16** (.05) .02 (.05) -.31** (.10) -.01 (.04) -.03 (.04) 
Intellect -.06 (.10) .12* (.05) .05 (.04) .09 (.09) .07 (.06) -.04 (.05) -.29** (.11) -.06 (.04) .01 (.05) 
Model 4, 5, 6          
Openness .45*** (.12) .11* (.05) -.04 (.05)   .57*** (.09) .13* (.06) .03 (.05) -.23* (.15) .03 (.04) <.01 (.05) 
Intellect -.09 (.10) .11* (.05) .07 (.04) -.01 (.09) .05 (.06) -.03 (.04) -.27* (.11) -.04 (.04) .03 (.05) 
Aesthetic Fluency .28** (.08) .02 (.04) -.05 (.03) .34*** (.07) .04 (.04) -.03 (.04) -.13 (.09) -.06* (.03) -.06 (.04) 
Note: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001; N=Novelty-Interest slope; U=Understanding-Interest slope; Standard errors are reported in brackets.  
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intercepts implies that the overall mean of the emotion shifts according to trait 
regardless of appraisals. Both intercepts and slopes were modeled as random in these 
models. 
Openness predicted larger intercepts for interest, pleasure, and smaller intercepts 
for confusion. Intellect predicted lower intercepts for confusion, but was not significantly 
related to interest and pleasure intercepts. 
For interest (Model 1), the effect of novelty was moderated by both Openness and 
Intellect. For people high in Openness and Intellect, novelty was more strongly coupled to 
interest. No significant moderation effects appeared for understanding. For pleasure (Model 
2), the effect of novelty was moderated by Openness but not Intellect. For people high in 
Openness, novelty was more strongly linked to pleasure. Follow up analysis on the 
difference between the novelty-pleasure slopes for Openness and Intellect indicated that 
they were not significantly different from each other (Wald test = 1.00, df = 1, p = 0.32). No 
significant moderation effects appeared for understanding. And for confusion (Model 3), in 
contrast, neither Openness nor Intellect moderated either appraisal. Neither the effect of 
novelty nor the effect of understanding on confusion varied across levels of Openness and 
Intellect. 
Considered together, these results suggest that both Openness and Intellect are 
associated with greater sensitivity to novelty in the experience of interest, but only the 
Openness aspect is associated with greater sensitivity to novelty in the experience of 
pleasure. While the slope moderations by Openness and Intellect were not found to differ 
from each other, the moderating influence of Openness was significant, while the influence 
of Intellect was not. Finally, Openness, but not Intellect, was associated with greater 
pleasure and interest overall. 
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Exploring art expertise 
Our final models explored the roles of art expertise (measured with the aesthetic 
fluency scale). To examine art expertise, we included it alongside Openness and Intellect to 
see if it reduced their effects. As we discussed earlier, such a result would suggest that the 
effects of personality are largely carried by acquired expertise about the arts. 
The inclusion of art expertise didn’t change any of the Openness and Intellect 
findings with respect to interest, confusion and pleasure. This suggests that the effects of 
Openness and Intellect are not driven by greater expertise in the arts. For interest (Model 
4), neither the effect of novelty nor the effect of understanding was moderated by art 
expertise, but expertise was related to greater intercepts in the model. For pleasure (Model 
5), neither the effect of novelty nor the effect of understanding was moderated by art 
expertise, but expertise was related to greater intercepts in the model. And for confusion 
(Model 6), art expertise moderated the effect of novelty, but not understanding; in contrast, 
neither Openness nor Intellect moderated either appraisal. This suggests that novelty is less 
related to confusion for those with greater art expertise. These results suggest that the 
novelty-interest and novelty-pleasure moderation are not influenced by art expertise but 
are rather driven by Openness. 
General discussion 
Openness/Intellect is the personality domain that best explains individual differences 
in aesthetic appreciation. However, the research linking actual art appreciation to the 
domain has several issues. First, as discussed in the introduction the focus on liking artworks 
is limited, as aesthetic experience is much broader and richer than mild feelings of pleasure 
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(Silvia, 2009). Second, there’s a risk of circularity in the relationship, given that items about 
aesthetic engagement appear on all major Openness to Experience scales. Without 
examining why this relationship exists, not much is added to our understanding of 
Openness/Intellect and aesthetics. In this research, we broadened the range of aesthetic 
emotions and examined appraisal mechanisms that could explain differences in aesthetic 
experience as a function of Openness/Intellect. Art expertise was evaluated alongside 
personality to test whether the influence of Openness and Intellect on aesthetic 
appreciation can be explained by greater art knowledge. 
As predicted, Openness/Intellect reflected individual differences in aesthetic 
experiences—both pleasure and the knowledge emotions. The strength of the relationship 
was particularly driven by Openness as opposed to Intellect, supporting the distinction in 
the aspects based on perceptual versus abstract engagement (DeYoung, 2015). Mechanisms 
for these relationships were also discovered through differences in appraisal-emotion 
relationships. The Openness/Intellect aspects predicted reactivity to novelty appraisals in 
experiences of interest. While the novelty seeking core of Openness/Intellect has previously 
been suggested (Woo et al., 2014), our study provides within-person process evidence for 
this special relationship with novelty and demonstrates that those higher in 
Openness/Intellect are reactive to novelty in their experiences with interest. Openness 
diverged from Intellect in the experience of pleasure. Intellect did not predict individual 
differences in the processes associated with pleasure, but novelty was a stronger predictor 
of pleasure for people high in Openness. Further, Openness predicted greater interest and 
pleasure regardless of how artworks were appraised, further distinguishing it from Intellect. 
Openness and Intellect were related to lower levels of confusion, but variance in appraisal-
emotion relationships was not associated with either aspect. 
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Finally, the possible confound of art expertise was evaluated as an explanation for 
the Openness-aesthetic emotions relationship. The inclusion of art expertise did not 
influence any of the Openness-aesthetic emotion relationships, suggesting that the effects 
were particular to the personality variables rather than greater expertise. Expertise did 
predict greater interest and less confusion overall, and it was related to a smaller 
relationship between novelty and confusion. 
Together these findings provide an important update for our understanding of the 
relationship between the Openness/Intellect and aesthetic emotions. Particularly, our 
findings show that Openness, as opposed to Intellect, is the aspect of the aesthetically 
engaged, and provide a process based understanding for why those higher in Openness are 
more aesthetically engaged. Finally, methodological differences between this and previous 
research on personality and aesthetics highlight the advantages of the current approach. 
Within this paper we assume rather that test a causal flow from personality to 
emotion states. That is, we assume that personality reflects biologically driven consistencies 
in emotions, cognitions, and behavior. Therefore, personality is treated as an antecedent of 
states. Similarly, appraisals are considered to be antecedents of emotions. For interest, both 
appraisals, when experimentally manipulated, have been shown to influence interest (Silvia, 
2005). Thus, within this paper, we treat appraisals as causing emotions. 
Advantages of the current method 
There are two methodological differences between the current method and most of 
the research on personality and aesthetics. First, we moved away from the predominant 
practice of evaluating liking artworks and shifted toward measuring distinct emotional 
states that have previously been implicated in the aesthetic experience. Liking is a common 
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and important aesthetic response—mild feelings of pleasure might be the most common 
everyday aesthetic experience—but it is only one of many important experiences people 
have in response to the arts (Silvia, 2009). Second, we explored both within- and between-
person effects. The integration of dispositional and situational variables has long been 
advocated (Cronbach, 1957; Underwood, 1975), but it is uncommon for aesthetics research 
to examine effects at the within-person level of analysis, which is the natural level for 
examining how appraisals influence emotional responses (see Silvia, 2007b; Nezlek, 2011). 
The how and why of Openness/Intellect and aesthetics 
Previous research has demonstrated that Openness/Intellect is related to differences 
in appraisal processes for the emotion of interest (Silvia, 2008; Silvia et al., 2009a). The 
current research builds on these findings in two important ways by: (a) evaluating the 
independent roles of Openness and Intellect in interest-appraisal processes; and (b) 
evaluating differences in pleasure-appraisal and confusion-appraisal processes. 
Openness and Intellect were both associated with reactivity to novelty in the 
experience of interest suggesting that novelty sensitivity is at the core of the domain. 
However, Intellect, as opposed to Openness, did not reflect greater interest overall. This 
suggests that being higher on Intellect is reflective of lower than average levels of interest 
when novelty is not found in an artwork, yet higher than average interest for novel 
artworks. Conversely, Openness was related to greater interest regardless of appraised 
novelty suggesting that while novelty is preferred, greater interest is experienced even in 
the absence of it. The sensitivity to novelty in the experience of interest for both Openness 
and Intellect provides a possible process explanation for part of the Openness-Fluid-
Crystallized-Intelligence (OFCI) model which proposes a developmental link between 
Openness/Intellect and fluid intelligence (Ziegler et al., 2012). Ziegler et al. (2012) propose 
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that being open increases learning opportunities, thereby increasing fluid intelligence. Our 
findings suggest that Openness/Intellect is associated with a sensitivity, through interest, to 
stimuli and situations that are appraised as novel and complex. This preferential 
engagement with challenging information could support the pathway from 
Openness/Intellect to gains in fluid and crystallized intelligence. 
While the Openness and Intellect aspects reflect quantitative differences in the 
appraisal structure of interest, qualitative differences are present in the experience of 
pleasure. Openness, but not Intellect, was associated with the presence or absence of a 
pleasure-novelty relationship. Studies have shown quantitative differences in appraisal 
structures—the appraisal structure remains constant yet the predictive strength of an 
appraisal varies as a function of a trait (Kuppens and Tong, 2010). However, few studies 
have found qualitative differences in appraisal structures. Our findings indicate that those 
higher in Openness experience pleasure as a function of novelty and understanding, while 
those lower on the aspect are only influenced by understanding. The idea that 
understandable things are pleasant is congruent with fluency based aesthetic theories 
where things that are easily understood are pleasant to the beholder (Reber, 2012). Our 
findings suggest that this may primarily be the case for people lower on Openness. For those 
higher on Openness, pleasure is also influenced by the novelty of an artwork. 
This finding has important implications for aesthetic theories. Fluency based 
accounts are at odds with interest based accounts. Interest requires novelty, whereas 
fluency-based aesthetic experiences are a function of easy processing. This distinction maps 
nicely onto interest and pleasure. Interest is experienced in the face of novelty and pleasure 
is experienced when processing requires little effort. Our research suggests that individual 
differences both complicate and clarify this distinction. It seems that the influence of fluent 
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processing in the experience of aesthetic pleasure is dependent on trait standing. Those 
higher in Openness are sensitive to novelty and complexity in their experience of pleasure. 
Conversely, pleasurable experiences for those lower on Openness are not predicted by 
stimulus novelty. 
Openness/Intellect model 
These findings add to the growing empirical consensus for the utility of studying 
Openness and Intellect as separate aspects of the broader domain. The distinction 
previously proposed—Openness as exploration through perception, and Intellect through 
learning and abstract information (DeYoung, 2015)—is supported with Openness reflecting 
greater pleasure and interest and less confusion in response to visual art. While Intellect 
was also found to play a role in the processes that facilitate interest, this role does not 
predict greater aesthetic reactions but rather reflects a preference for the novel, and a 
lesser tendency to feel confusion in response to visual art. The relationship between 
Intellect and interest in art, when controlling for Openness, is not evident at the between-
person level, but is apparent when within-person processes are considered. Future studies 
are encouraged to explore the differential influence of Openness and Intellect on interest in 
non-perceptual stimuli such as science and philosophy to gain further insights into this 
useful separation of the Openness/Intellect domain. 
Conclusion 
Henry James saw art as central to life and beauty, and this attitude, like that of many 
other creative people, was likely a function of his Openness. We aimed to extend our 
understanding of the role personality plays in common aesthetic experiences: pleasure, 
interest, and confusion. Our findings suggest that Openness, as opposed to Intellect, is the 
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personality core of aesthetic experiences, and that the relationship persists because those 
higher in Openness are more sensitive to novelty in artworks and experience greater 
engagement overall, predisposing them to feel more interest and pleasure in response to 
the arts. 
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Chapter 4: Engaged in different things or in different ways? The engagement basis of the 
distinction between Openness and Intellect. 
 
Publication:  
Under review at Journal of Research in Personality 
 
Abstract 
Openness and Intellect are proposed to differentially predict engagement depending 
on stimulus content. Engagement with sensory experiences is explained by Openness, while 
engagement with abstract information is explained by Intellect. We propose an alternative 
distinction, where Openness drives engagement in all types of content. These two positions 
are contrasted through associations of both Openness and Intellect with interest in a broad 
range of stimuli (art, science and philosophy). When modelled concurrently, only Openness 
predicts interest in all stimuli types. The influence of Openness on interest is qualified by 
appraisal processes.  The Openness-interest link shows lower reliance on understanding for 
art and greater reactivity to novelty for science and philosophy. Our findings suggest that 
Openness is the engagement aspect of Openness/Intellect. 
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Introduction 
The debate whether to call Factor V in Big Five models Openness to Experience or 
Intellect has seemingly been resolved. The fifth broad domain of personality, has been 
parsimoniously divided into two aspects—Openness and Intellect (DeYoung, Quilty, & 
Peterson, 2007)—appeasing both sides of the label and nature debate. The aspects have 
been shown to have differing relationships with cognitive abilities, and creativity (DeYoung, 
Quilty, Peterson, & Gray, 2014; Kaufman, 2013; Kaufman et al., 2010; Nusbaum & Silvia, 
2011) suggesting that they are distinct. Based on such differential associations, DeYoung 
(2014) suggested that Openness and Intellect differ in terms of the processes that facilitate 
engagement and exploration—Openness facilitates engagement with sensory and visual 
information processing, and Intellect with semantic and abstract information.  
This suggested engagement distinction in terms of content has particular 
implications for explaining important psychological phenomena associated with the 
Openness/Intellect domain. Particularly, engagement with different types of informational 
situations implies that the aspects should differentially predict the choice and enjoyment of 
different subjects in educational settings, vocational and leisure pursuits, and knowledge 
acquisition. However, the distinction proposed is primarily based on differing associations 
with cognitive and creative ability constructs, and not completely settled when considering 
Openness and Intellect associations with engagement states, and the measurement of 
Intellect.  
When considering associations with states of engagement, Openness, compared to 
Intellect, was the stronger predictor of engagement with visual stimuli (Fayn, MacCann, 
Tiliopoulos, & Silvia, 2015), and with self-reported experiences of the powerful emotion 
states of chills and absorption (Silvia & Nusbaum, 2011). Further, inspection of the item 
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content that makes up the Intellect measure (DeYoung et al., 2007) implies primarily the 
assessment of self-reported ability, rather than engagement. However, Openness and 
Intellect were found to both independently predict engagement with quotations (Fayn, 
Tiliopoulos, & MacCann, 2015). Such findings and observations indicate that the division of 
Openness and Intellect based on engagement with different types of information is not yet 
settled, and a direct test of the distinction is warranted.  
Therefore, the current study aimed to directly test the engagement differences 
between Openness and Intellect in response to a broad range of visual and abstract stimuli 
(specifically, visual art, science, and philosophy). The broad range of stimuli allowed us to 
test whether the engagement differences between Openness and Intellect are primarily 
based on the type of information that elicits engagement (a content distinction), or primarily 
a function of Openness rather than Intellect (an engagement distinction).  
Content distinction of Openness and Intellect  
The facet structure of the most popular measurement of Openness/Intellect—the 
NEO and its various versions—is organised by the situations or stimuli that people are open 
to (e.g., Openness to ideas, aesthetics, feelings, and values are separate facets). The 
distinction proposed for the aspects of Openness and Intellect is also in the type of 
information that is being processed. This distinction is primarily based on item content, and 
differential psychometric associations of the Openness and Intellect aspects with ability and 
creativity constructs. Intellect is associated with fluid and crystallised intelligence, working 
memory, and scientific creativity, whereas Openness is associated with implicit learning 
ability, and artistic creativity (DeYoung et al., 2014; Kaufman et al., 2010; Nusbaum & Silvia, 
2011). This pattern of associations, as well as the content of the items in the scales, has 
been interpreted as Openness reflecting engagement with sensory and perceptual 
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information, and Intellect reflecting engagement with abstract and semantic information 
primarily though reasoning.  
One problem with assuming such a distinction is its basis on associations with ability 
based constructs that are distinguished from personality constructs in terms of maximal 
versus typical behaviour (Cronbach, 1949). Ability constructs have traditionally been 
thought of as ‘can do’ constructs, versus the ‘will do’ constructs of personality. Therefore, 
associations between Openness and Intellect and ability based constructs suggest ‘can do’ 
capacities, rather than ‘will do’ engagement-based tendencies. For example, the association 
between Intellect and working memory tells us that those higher on Intellect will, on 
average, have greater ability to understand complex abstract information, but tells us little 
regarding their engagement with such information.  
Engagement distinction of Openness and Intellect 
An alternative position to the content distinction is that Openness primarily reflects 
engagement, whereas Intellect primarily reflects self-reported ability. When modelled 
together, Openness, was the stronger predictor of engagement in response to visual art and 
quotations (Fayn, Tiliopoulos, & MacCann, 2015; Fayn et al., in press). However, Intellect did 
independently predict interest in quotations.  
Further evidence for the engagement distinction comes from associations between 
engagement constructs and NEO based measures of Openness/Intellect. Within such 
measures, Intellect only reflects one sixth of the measure (Openness to Ideas), making 
discovered relationships more attributable to Openness, rather than Intellect. A NEO 
measure of Openness/Intellect has been the best predictor of powerful engagement states, 
both in terms of tendency to experience such states (Shiota, Keltner, & John, 2006) and in 
response to music and celestial objects (Silvia, Fayn, Nusbaum, & Beaty, 2015). 
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Direct evidence for the engagement distinction looked at the tendency to experience 
powerful emotional states, which was predicted by Openness, but not by Intellect (Silvia & 
Nusbaum, 2011). In fact, Intellect was a negative predictor of the tendency to experience 
chills, while Openness positively predicted tendencies to experience chills and absorption. 
Such findings are supportive of the dual-process distinction between Openness and Intellect 
where Openness is reflective of automatic processes associated with affect, and Intellect of 
more deliberate cognitive processes (Kaufman, 2013; Kaufman et al., 2015). In conclusion, 
while some evidence supports the content distinction between Openness and Intellect, 
other findings suggest that Openness is the engagement core of the domain.  
Engagement and its processes 
Interest is an emotion associated with learning, intrinsic motivation and engagement 
with epistemic situations (Silvia, 2006). Interest is part of a category of emotions—the 
knowledge emotions—that are felt in response to meta-cognitive beliefs regarding 
informational stimuli (Keltner, & Shiota, 2003; Silvia, 2008). An added advantage to studying 
interest is its well-researched appraisal process structure which has been replicated across 
several types of situations including art, poetry, and film (Silvia, 2005; Silvia, & Berg, 2011; 
Silvia et al., 2009).  
Appraisal accounts of emotion propose that emotions are elicited according to the 
way a person appraises a situation (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003). The appraisal structure for 
interest has considerable empirical support—situations appraised as novel and 
understandable are experienced as interesting (Silvia, 2005). The novelty appraisal facilitates 
attention to a situation for further processing. The understanding appraisal, in the case of 
interest, is akin to the coping appraisal through which understanding facilitates the 
experience of interest. Knowledge of the process structure of interest allows for tests of 
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differences between the aspects, not only in the propensity to experience interest, but also 
the processes associated with interest. 
Appraisal approach to individual differences  
The appraisal approach to studying individual differences in emotional experiences 
has allowed for greater understanding of trait-emotion relationships. Kuppens and Tong 
(2010) identified two sources of individual differences in the appraisal-emotion system: (1) 
appraisal strength (e.g., how likely someone is to make a particular appraisal); and (2) 
variability in appraisal-emotion relationships (e.g. how strongly an appraisal is coupled with 
a resulting emotion for a person). The appraisal model for interest and the influences of 
traits on the model are presented in Figure 4.1. Therefore the influence of 
Openness/Intellect on interest may be (1) novelty and/or understanding strength (1a and 1b 
in Fig. 1); and (2) novelty-interest, and understanding-interest contingencies (2a and 2b in 
Fig 1). 
 
Figure 4.1. Conceptual model of the effects of Openness/Intellect on appraisals, interest and 
appraisal-interest relationships. 
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Two studies have looked at the unique influence of Openness and Intellect on the 
processes and appraisal structure of interest. For visual art, Openness was related to greater 
interest, greater understanding of visual art (Fig.1, 1a), and a greater reactivity to novelty 
(Fayn, et al., in press). For quotations, both Openness and Intellect were associated with 
greater interest overall, but the relationship for Intellect was mediated through greater 
understanding (Fig. 1, 1a), while Openness was related to a lessened reliance on 
understanding (Fig. 1, 2b; Fayn et al., 2015). Therefore, relationships between interest and 
the Openness/Intellect aspects suggest that Openness and Intellect may be distinguished 
through their influence on the processes associated with interest.   
The current research 
The current research tested two different positions on the distinction between 
Openness and Intellect in terms of engagement by exploring interest and its processes in 
response to art, science, and philosophy. The positions were contrasted by evaluating: (1) 
the unique influences of Openness and Intellect on interest in three different categories of 
stimuli, and (2) the different ways through which Openness and Intellect influence the 
appraisal processes that generate interest. Support for the content distinction was 
evaluated through the following two hypotheses: 
H1: Openness will be best predictor of interest in visual art, while intellect will be the 
best predictor of interest in philosophy and science. 
H2: The influence of Openness on interest in visual art will be qualified by its 
influence on the appraisal processes associated with interest. The influence of Intellect on 
interest in science and philosophy will be qualified by its influence on the appraisal 
processes associated with interest.  
Support for the affective distinction was evaluated through the following two 
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hypotheses: 
H3: Openness will be associated with greater interest in response to all three stimuli 
while controlling for Intellect. Intellect will not predict additional variance in interest. Note 
that hypotheses 1 and 3 are competing hypotheses. 
H4: The influence of Openness on interest in all stimuli will be qualified by its 
influence on the appraisal processes associated with interest. Intellect will not influence the 
appraisal processes associated with interest. Note that hypothesis 4 and hypothesis 2 are 
competing hypotheses. 
Method 
Participants and design 
The sample consisted of 191 participants (148 female) from various degrees who 
took part in the study for credit (Mean age = 19.27 years, SD = 3.70). The sample included 
students with various majors: 18.1% Physical Sciences, 7.7% Arts, 22.5% Psychology, 21.4% 
Health Sciences, 9.3% Business/Economics, 3.8% Social Sciences, 10.4% were undecided, 
and 6.6% had majors that did not fit into the categories presented as they were mixtures of 
more than one category. Nine people were excluded from the final sample due to finishing 
the study too quickly to have engaged with it seriously. 
Procedure 
The study was conducted in groups ranging from one to ten participants. All stimuli 
and personality scales were presented through Medialab (Jarvis, 2004) on individual 
computer screens in research laboratories. After providing consent participants completed 
individual differences assessments, followed by viewing and rating 30 stimuli (10 visual art; 
10 science stories from an online science reporting site [SlashDot.com]; 10 philosophical 
quotations).  
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Measures 
Big Five Personality.  
The five domains of personality were assessed using the Big Five Aspects Scales 
(BFAS; DeYoung, et al., 2007) which splits each domain into two related aspects. The scale 
consists of 100 items (10 per aspect) on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = 
strongly agree).   
Art, Science, and Philosophy. 
For each participant all the stimuli were presented in a different random order. Each 
stimulus could be viewed for as long as desired, but for a minimum of five seconds for the 
art and philosophy stimuli and ten seconds for the science stimuli (due to their length). The 
stimuli consisted of ten contemporary visual art images by various artists (e.g., Kandinsky, 
Ryden, Magritte), ten philosophy quotations (e.g., “It is because human needs are 
contradictory that no human life can be perfect. That does not mean that human life is 
imperfect. It means that the idea of perfection has no meaning.”), and ten scientific stimuli 
that were short explanations of recent scientific findings in different areas of research (e.g., 
artificial intelligence, evolution, virtual reality, linguistics). All the stimuli are available in the 
supplementary materials.   
After the presentation of each stimulus, people were asked to self-report their 
interest and appraisals. For interest people were asked “Did you find this stimulus…” 
followed by items for interesting, boring (reverse coded). Each scale used a 7-point (1 = not 
at all, 7 = very much) scale. One possible issue with relying only on self-report interest is that 
those higher on Openness/Intellect may self-present as more interested due to their self-
concept as open-minded. For this reason we also asked participants if they would like more 
information for each stimulus, which was answered with a binary NO/YES scale. Appraisals 
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were assessed using 7-point bi-polar scales (Simple-Complex, Common-Unusual, Hard to 
Understand-Easy to Understand, Comprehensible-Incomprehensible).  
Results 
Data reduction and analysis 
Internal consistencies for the BFAS Openness (.82) and Intellect (.79) scales were 
good. Between-person predictors (Openness and Intellect) were both standardized and 
modelled concurrently to evaluate their unique influence on interest. The large number of 
stimuli viewed within each category by each person allowed us to use multilevel models, 
which can estimate between-person effects, within-person effects, and their interactions 
(Nezlek, 2008; Silvia, 2007). Within-person predictors (appraisals of novelty and 
comprehension) were centred at each person’s own mean and entered into the models 
simultaneously. Person centring reduces idiosyncratic response bias by using deviations 
from each person’s mean to predict interest (Enders & Tofighi, 2007). Separate multilevel 
models were analysed for each stimulus type. The analyses were conducted with Mplus 7, 
using maximum likelihood with robust standard errors. All coefficients are unstandardized 
regression weights; some, where noted, are logistic effects.  
Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations 
Given that the primary goal of this project is to test the unique influences of 
Openness and Intellect, we only report relationships with these aspects. A full table of BFAS 
correlations is available upon request from the first author. Importantly, the BFAS aspects, 
apart from Openness and Intellect, did not predict a significant amount of additional 
variance in interest in science (ΔR = .06, F = 1.48, p = .169), arts (ΔR = .07, F = 1.76, p = 
.089)), or philosophy (ΔR = .03. F = .88, p = .536) and were therefore left out from 
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subsequent modelling. The only significant predictor of interest (apart from Openness and 
Intellect) when all aspects were modelled concurrently was the Enthusiasm aspect of 
Extraversion in its prediction of interest in art. This supports previously found associations 
between Extraversion and aesthetic appreciation but also demonstrates that the effects of 
Openness and Intellect are independent of the overlap with Extraversion.  
 Bivariate relationships are reported in Table 4.1. A large relationship was found 
between Openness and Intellect, replicating previous findings (e. g. DeYoung et al., 2007). 
Openness had medium to large relationships with interest in art, science and philosophy, 
while the relationships between Intellect and interest were small (art) to medium (science 
and philosophy). Openness was positively related to appraisals of understanding for art 
(medium-large), philosophy (medium-large) and science (small). Intellect was also related to 
greater appraised understanding of art (small), science (medium) and philosophy (medium). 
Both Openness and Intellect were associated with less appraised novelty in response to art 
(small), and unrelated to novelty appraisals in response to science and philosophy.  
Table 4.1.  
Pearson’s correlations of Openness, Intellect, and aggregated interest and appraisals. 
  Art Science Philosophy 
 Int Interest U N Interest U N Interest U N 
Open .48** .37** .34** -.19*** .39** .16* 0.01 .43** .35** -0.12 
Int  .15* .21*** -.18* .30** .25** -0.1 .29** .33** -0.09 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001; N = 182; Int: Intellect; U: Aggregated Understanding Appraisals; N: 
Aggregated Novelty Appraisals; 
Between-person relationships between Openness/Intellect aspects and interest  
To test the unique influence of Openness and Intellect on interest in science, 
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philosophy, and art, the aspects were modelled concurrently along with aggregated 
interests across the three stimulus types (Figure 4.2). Openness, but not Intellect, was 
associated with greater interest in response to art, science, and philosophy, supporting the 
engagement, as opposed to the content, distinction between the aspects.  
This unique engagement role of Openness was also replicated for the information 
request questions. A logistic model found that Openness significantly predicted the 
likelihood of wanting more information about images (b = .52, SE = .17, p = .002), 
philosophical quotations (b = .43, SE = .15, p = .003) and scientific findings (b = .40, SE = .13, 
p = .004). Intellect, in contrast, did not significantly predict wanting more information about 
images (b = -.07, SE = .16, p > .05), philosophical quotations (b = .05, SE = .15, p > .05) and 
scientific findings (b = .06, SE = .15, p > .05). 
In short, Openness and Intellect diverged in their relationships with interest and 
information request ratings for all three stimuli types: Openness significantly predicted all of 
them, and Intellect predicted none. 
Between-person appraisal strength and the Openness/Intellect aspects  
Path models were used to test whether appraisal strength could explain the 
personality-interest between-person relationships (Figure 4.3). These models tested 
whether the influence of Openness or Intellect on interest were mediated by appraisal 
tendencies (See Figure 4.1, 1a and 1b). The significance of the indirect effects was assessed 
using bootstrapping procedure with unbiased estimators (Hayes, 2009). The models 
generated 5000 bootstrapped resamples with bias-corrected and adjusted confidence 
intervals. A confidence interval that does not include zero indicates a significant indirect  
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Figure 4.2. Path model representing between-person relationships between 
Openness, Intellect and interest in art, science and philosophy. *p < .001.  
For art, the relationship between Openness and interest was mediated by greater 
understanding (point estimate =.124; 95% C.I.: .051 to .197). Intellect did not predict 
significant variance in art interest through direct or indirect pathways. These findings 
support both content and affective positions as the association between Openness and 
interest in art is predicted by both.  
For science, the relationship between Openness and interest was not explained by 
an indirect effect through greater understanding, but Openness maintained a direct 
relationship with interest. A significant indirect pathway was found for the Intellect-interest 
relationship through greater understanding (point estimate =.136; 95% C.I.: .035 to .237). 
Given that Intellect shared no variance with interest independent of Openness, this 
relationship should be interpreted cautiously. The indirect relationship through 
understanding suggested that those higher in Intellect should be more interested in science 
as they are better able to understand it. However, this relationship was not significant when  
   113 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Appraisal strength mediation models of understanding on the 
relationships between Openness, Intellect and interest. *p < .001. 
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controlling for Openness. This path suggests a ‘can do’ influence of Intellect. Overall these 
results supported the engagement distinction between Openness and Intellect, as Openness 
was the only direct predictor of interest in science. 
For philosophy, both Openness (point estimate =.106; 95% C.I.: .029 to .183) and 
Intellect (point estimate =.092; 95% C.I.: .016 to .168) predicted an indirect path to interest 
through greater appraised understanding. Once again, Intellect predicted the indirect 
pathway whilst not having a significant relationship with interest when controlling for 
Openness.  
Overall, the findings for science and philosophy supported the engagement 
distinction between Openness and Intellect because, when modelled concurrently, only 
Openness explains variance in engagement. However, for both the verbal stimuli, Intellect 
predicted an indirect pathway through greater understanding, which also replicated a 
previous finding in response to quotations (Fayn, et al., 2015). This finding points to the ‘can 
do’ influence of Intellect—greater appraised understanding of abstract information. 
Within-person appraisal-emotion contingencies and Openness/Intellect aspects 
Random intercept and slope multilevel models were used to test the unique 
influences of Openness and Intellect on the within-person intercepts and appraisal-interest 
relationships (see Nezlek, 2008; Silvia, 2007, for descriptions of this approach). These 
models tested whether idiosyncratic within-person variance in appraisal-interest 
contingencies can be explained by between-person differences in Openness and Intellect. 
Intraclass correlation coefficients suggested a substantial amount of between-person 
variance for art (25%), science (22%) and philosophy (23%).  
The results for the random slopes and intercept models are presented in Table 4.2. 
At the within-person level, interest was positively predicted by novelty and understanding 
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appraisals for all three stimulus types, which replicates the previously proposed appraisal 
structure for various stimuli (e. g. Silvia, 2005), and extends them to philosophical and 
scientific stimuli. For art, the appraisals were medium sized predictors of interest. For 
science and philosophy, understanding appraisals were strong predictors of interest, while 
novelty appraisals were small-medium predictors of interest. This suggests that while 
novelty and understanding are both associated with greater interest for abstract stimuli, 
understanding is particularly important for such stimuli.  
Table 4.2.  
Multilevel random slopes and intercepts model results for art, science, and philosophy.  
  Art Science Philosophy 
Within-Person Predictors          
Understanding  .37***   .56***   .48***  
Novelty  .42***   .23***   .26***  
Between-Person Predictors Intercept N U  Intercept N U  Intercept N U  
Openness   .34*** -.01 -.08*    .27*** .07* -.06    .35*** .09* >-.01 
Intellect -.04 .04 >-.01 .12 .03 <.01 .09 .03 -.03 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001; n = 182; U: Understanding Appraisals; N: Novelty Appraisals; 
Openness was further distinguished from Intellect in that it was associated with 
different appraisal-interest contingencies for all three stimuli. Openness, but not Intellect, 
predicted larger slopes and within-person variance in appraisal-interest relationships for all 
three stimuli providing further support for the engagement distinction. Openness was 
related to a lessened reliance on the understanding appraisal in the experience of interest in 
art. Coupled with its prediction of the intercept, these findings indicated that those higher in 
Openness felt greater interest overall, and were especially more engaged in difficult to 
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understand stimuli. This finding replicates a previously discovered relationship with the 
domain of Openness/Intellect (Silvia, Henson & Templin, 2009), and suggests that this effect 
is particular to Openness rather than Intellect.  
Openness also predicted greater intercepts, and reactivity to novelty in the 
experience of interest in response to science and philosophy stimuli. Those higher in 
Openness reacted to novelty with greater interest compared to those lower on Openness. 
Intellect did not predict any of the intercepts of appraisal-interest relationships. The results 
for science and philosophy stimuli support the engagement distinction between Openness 
and Intellect, rather than the content distinction, and suggest processes that facilitate 
Openness-interest relationships1.  
Discussion 
The current study tested two positions on the engagement distinction between 
Openness and Intellect, two aspects of the broad domain of Openness/Intellect. The 
content distinction based on information type—perceptual versus abstract—predicted that 
Openness and Intellect would predict engagement with visual versus semantic stimuli. The 
engagement distinction predicted that Openness would be the primary predictor of 
engagement with all stimuli, while Intellect would be unrelated to engagement. 
Our results primarily supported the engagement distinction. When modelled 
together, Openness was the consistent predictor of engagement with all three types of 
stimuli, while Intellect did not predict any additional variance. The relationship between 
Openness and engagement for all stimuli types was qualified by the influence of Openness 
on processes associated with engagement. Openness was associated with greater reactivity 
                                                 
1 The possibility of suppression effects was also investigated by running each of the models (both path 
and multilevel) with only Openness or Intellect. No evidence of suppression effects was found. 
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to novelty for philosophy and science stimuli, and a lessened reliance of understanding in 
the experience of engagement with artistic stimuli. Intellect, while not directly related to 
engagement, was associated with greater appraised understanding of the semantic stimuli 
(science and philosophy). These findings have implications for our understanding of how the 
aspects manifest in engagement, and suggest an engagement distinction between Openness 
and Intellect.  
Openness/Intellect and processes of engagement 
Openness, as opposed to Intellect, moderated within-person appraisal processes, 
suggesting mechanisms that explain why open people experience greater engagement 
across a variety of stimuli and situations. For visual art, Openness was associated with a 
lessened reliance on understanding artworks in the experience of interest, replicating a 
findings attributed to the Openness/Intellect domain (Siliva et al., 2009). This finding 
provides process evidence for the previously discovered association between 
Openness/Intellect and appreciation of abstract visual art (Feist & Brady, 2004), and the 
attitudes held by those higher in Openness/Intellect, who believe that art does not need to 
be understood to be appreciated (McManus & Furnham, 2006). Our findings suggest that 
understanding does not play as large a role in the experience of engagement for the open. 
Finally, our findings suggest an explanation for why taste in abstract art is a lot more 
individualised than real-world images (Vessel & Rubin, 2010). When art is easily 
understood—such as representational art—interest of open versus closed people is similar, 
but when art is difficult to understand—such as abstract art—different standings on 
openness produce a greater distribution of aesthetic appreciation. 
For verbal stimuli, Openness was associated with greater reactivity to novelty in the 
experience of interest. These findings are congruent with DeYoung’s (2013) theory on the 
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role of dopamine in exploratory behaviour. He suggested that Openness/Intellect reflect 
exploratory tendencies towards information based stimuli as a function of dopaminergic 
responses to novelty. Findings on biological associations between Openness/Intellect and 
the dopaminergic systems are somewhat inconsistent, but indirect evidence presented in 
detail in DeYoung’s (2013) review suggests that this may be due to current limitations in 
biological measurement. Another possible reason is arguably due to a lack of investigations 
into activation in response to stimuli, rather than structural or ‘at rest’ designs. Our study 
suggests that variability in Openness should predict activation of the dopaminergic system 
in response to epistemic stimuli.  
Our findings may also provide a dynamic understanding for the relationship between 
Openness/Intellect and fluid and crystallised intelligence. The Openness/Intellect domain is 
the best personality predictor of both forms of intelligence and it has been suggested that 
through exposure to enriched environments, those higher on the domain may develop 
greater fluid and crystallised intelligence (Ziegler, Danay, Heene, Asendorpf, & Bühner, 
2012). The sensitivity to novelty—associated with Openness—may predispose those higher 
on Openness to be particularly engaged with stimuli and situations that are appraised as 
novel and complex. This novelty sensitivity provides a process based explanation for the 
consistent relationship between the Openness/Intellect domain and cognitive abilities—
both fluid and crystalized.  
Engagement distinction between Openness and Intellect 
Our results clearly implicate Openness as the aspect that best explains individual 
differences in engagement in response to both visual and abstract stimuli. This is contrary to 
the current thinking about the distinction between the aspects—thought to reflect 
engagement with different types of stimuli—and suggests that Openness is the engagement 
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core of Openness/Intellect. DeYoung’s (2014) theory of Openness/Intellect describes 
behaviour beyond just engagement, labelled broadly as exploration—which includes 
understanding. If we extend our findings to exploration, then there is some support for its 
relationship with Intellect. In the current study, understanding of philosophy and science 
was facilitated by higher Intellect, even though it was in the absence of predicting 
engagement when Openness was controlled for.  
Our findings extend the growing consensus that Openness/Intellect is another 
domain—apart from Extraversion and Neuroticism—that reflects individual differences in 
the propensity to experience emotions (Shiota, Keltner, & John, 2006; Silvia et al., 2015). 
While Extraversion and Neuroticism are the best personality predictors of positive and 
negative affect, Openness/Intellect appears to reflect emotional engagement with epistemic 
situations and therefore the experience of the knowledge emotions. As suggested by 
McCrae and Costa (1997), “open people are not only able to grasp new ideas, they enjoy 
doing so” (p. 832). 
While, DeYoung proposed that Openness/Intellect is primarily a cognitive personality 
domain (DeYoung et al., 2005; DeYoung, 2015), the evidence used for this assertion (Pytlik 
Zillig, Hemenover, & Dienstbier, 2002) can be interpreted differently. Pytlik Zillig and 
colleagues (2002) evaluated whether NEO facet items measured cognitive, emotional, or 
behavioural tendencies. Although, they found that some of the NEO facets measured 
primarily cognition, rather than emotion or behaviour, when they considered the facets that 
underlie Openness, it was evident that aesthetics and feelings primarily assessed emotions. 
Another study that assessed the affective, cognitive, behavioural, and desire content of 
personality questionnaires found that the NEO based measure of the domain included a 
substantial amount of affective content, especially compared to the abridged Big-Five 
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circumplex measure of the domain (Wilt & Revelle, 2015). Within the context of our 
findings, the cognitive versus emotional aspect distinction makes sense since the facets 
associated with the Openness aspect are primarily NEO facets, while the Intellect aspect is 
best represented by facets from the Abridged Big-Five Circumplex (DeYoung et al., 2007).  
The lack of association between Intellect and engagement with science and 
philosophy warranted further exploration. The current study was part of a broader project 
that included other individual difference measures that included the short version of the 
curiosity facet from a recently developed measure of Openness/Intellect (Woo, 
Chernyshenko, Longley, Zhang, Chiu, & Stark, 2014). Therefore, we tested whether another 
measure of intellectual engagement would predict additional variance in interest. It should 
be noted that the internal consistency of the short measure was rather low (.60), therefore 
interpretations of the results are to be treated cautiously. Simple slope and intercept 
models that included Openness, Intellect, and curiosity were analysed to see if curiosity 
predicted interest in science and philosophy. Curiosity was associated with greater 
intercepts for science (b = .28, SE = .07, p < .001), and philosophy (b = .14, SE = .07, p = .04), 
but not art (b = .10, SE = .06, p = .10), while controlling for the Openness and Intellect 
aspects. None of the appraisal-interests moderation findings associated with Openness 
changed as a result of including Curiosity in the models. These additional post hoc findings 
suggest that another intellectual engagement variable explains variance in interest in 
abstract information, while Intellect does not. Coupled with the rest of the findings within 
this paper, we wonder, has Intellect lost its curiosity? 
While theoretically tied with other measures of intellectual engagement (DeYoung, 
2015), the measurement of Intellect is radically different from measures that assess similar 
constructs such as the Curiosity and Exploration Inventory (Kashdan et al., 2009), Typical 
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Intellectual Engagement (Goff & Ackerman, 1992), and another conceptualization of 
Intellect (Mussel, 2013). All the other measures explicitly avoid items that assess self-
reported ability, while the Intellect measure is primarily made up of items that do. By 
casting a wide net, the Intellect measure seems to have gone away from assessing an 
intellectual engagement construct, and towards a self-assessed measure of intelligence. 
While not problematic in itself, our findings suggests that the current conceptualisation of 
Intellect as explaining individual differences in engagement with abstract information may 
need revision.   
Conclusion 
 We sought to test the engagement basis of Openness and Intellect in 
response to a broad range of visual and abstract stimuli. While the distinction between 
Openness and Intellect has been proposed as engagement in different situations, we found 
that only Openness was related to engagement. This study adds to the growing consensus 
that when studying Openness/Intellect, it is best to consider the aspects of Openness and 
Intellect separately as they often predict distinct psychological phenomena. Our findings 
suggest that the distinction between Openness and Intellect may not be that of content, but 
rather of engagement—those higher in Openness were more emotionally engaged with a 
broad range of epistemic situations, while those higher in Intellect were better able to 
understand abstract and semantic situations without reflecting greater engagement. 
Therefore, we propose Openness to be the emotional aspect of the Openness/Intellect 
domain, reflecting a propensity to experience the knowledge emotions such as interest, 
fascination, and awe. The Intellect aspect appears to mainly reflect an ability to understand 
   122 
 
 
abstract stimuli, and, through the inclusion of primarily ability items, may have drifted away 
from properly assessing intellectual engagement.  
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Chapter 5: General discussion 
“…to boldly go where no man[uscript] has gone before.” 
Star Trek  
The four studies described within this thesis demonstrated that the Openness and 
Intellect aspects differentially relate to interest in varied types of informational stimuli, both 
in terms of interest in different types of stimuli, and their impact on the processes 
associated with engagement. In the paragraphs below, I briefly summarise the empirical 
chapters within the thesis, and discuss the implications of the results in terms of the 
appraisal account of individual differences in interest, the emotional nature of the Openness 
aspect, the lack of Intellect-Interest associations, and the future directions for research into 
Openness and Intellect.   
The new theoretical and measurement model of Openness/Intellect promised to 
resolve an old debate regarding the nature and structure of the domain by separating it into 
the two aspects of Openness and Intellect (DeYoung et al., 2007). The separation of the 
domain has proved fruitful, as the aspects have been shown to play different roles in 
emotions, cognitions and behaviours (Chapter 1). The BFAS model of the Openness/Intellect 
domain proposed that Openness and Intellect both reflect individual differences in cognitive 
exploration, but are distinguished in the processes that facilitate exploration. Openness was 
proposed to describe engagement with perceptual and sensory processes, while Intellect 
was theorised to reflect engagement with semantic and abstract situations (DeYoung, 
2015b).  
Given that the engagement distinction between the aspects had never been tested, I 
sought to explore the differences between the aspects, both in terms of their associations 
with engagement in different types of stimuli, and in their influence on the antecedent 
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processes associated with engagement. Across the three papers within this thesis, Openness 
was found to be a consistent unique predictor of interest in art, quotations, philosophical 
quotations, and scientific findings. Intellect was not consistent in its relationship with 
interest when Openness was controlled for.  The social-cognitive model proposed at the end 
of chapter 1 (Figure 5.1) proved useful; both in differentiating Openness from Intellect, and 
in providing explanatory evidence for Openness/Intellect-interest relationships. 
 
Figure 5.1. Social-Cognitive model of Openness/Intellect and engagement with Information. 
Openness was unique in that it consistently predicted differences in appraisal 
processes associated with engagement. That is, the Openness-engagement relationship was 
qualified by either reactivity to novelty (pathway 4), or a lessened reliance on understanding 
(pathway 4). One study, found a similar role for Intellect (Chapter 3), but this finding did not 
replicate (Chapter 4). Both Openness and Intellect were associated with differences in 
appraisal strength (pathway 3). Intellect was associated with greater understanding of 
semantic (quotations, philosophy and science), but not artistic stimuli. Openness was 
associated with greater understanding of artistic and philosophical stimuli. Overall, the 
influences of the Openness and Intellect aspects on engagement were relatively consistent 
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across all the studies within this thesis. The consistency on the findings within this thesis 
warrants mention, particularly at a time when replication in psychological sciences has 
proved challenging ((Open Science Collaboration, 2015).  
Overview of Empirical Results  
The following sections provide a brief summary of the findings and discussion points 
presented in the empirical chapters of this thesis. 
Chapter 2:  Do Openness and Intellect differ in terms of Interest? 
Chapter 2 (Fayn, Tiliopoulos, & MacCann, 2015) was the first study that tested the 
differences between Openness and Intellect in terms of interest and its appraisal processes. 
Both Openness and Intellect predicted unique variance in interest, but via different 
appraisal processes: (a) the relationship between interest and Intellect was mediated by 
greater appraised understanding, but (b) the relationship between interest and Openness 
showed was facilitated by a lessened reliance on understanding. These findings established 
that Openness and Intellect, while both related to engagement, were distinct in the 
processes that facilitated engagement.  
The mediation associated with Intellect replicated a previous finding associated with 
curiosity where understanding was found to mediate the relationship between curiosity and 
interest (Silvia, 2008a). Likewise, the understanding-interest moderation related to 
Openness replicated a previous study (Silvia et al., 2009), and was discussed in terms of the 
previously found relationship between Openness/Intellect and an attitude that art does not 
have to be necessarily understood to be appreciated (McManus & Furnham, 2006)McManus 
& Furnham, 2006). Thus, those higher in Openness were less reliant on understanding in 
their experience of interest.  
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A possible limitation of this study was a somewhat underpowered design. Estimation 
of power is a contentious topic within multilevel modelling due to the complexity of the 
parameters being estimated (Nezlek, 2011); by most standards the number of level 1 and 
level 2 units of measurement in our sample is sufficient to assume accurate estimations of 
the parameters of interest (Maas and Hox, 2005). However, the sample size at level 1 was 
small by these standards. The next two studies therefore included larger level 1 sample 
sizes. Overall, the idea that Openness and Intellect reflect different ways of engagement 
with information was supported providing evidence for the distinction between Openness 
and Intellect in terms of engagement facilitated by different processes. The appraisal 
account of individual differences in emotional experiences (Kuppens & Tong, 2010) was 
useful in explaining the differences between the aspects. Differences that at the bivariate 
level would appear non-existent were illuminated via appraisal processes. However, the 
prediction that Openness and Intellect are associated with engagement with different kinds 
of stimuli was not supported as both of the aspects were related to interest in quotations. 
For a more detailed discussion please refer to the discussion section of chapter 2.  
Chapter 3: Aesthetic states and aesthetic people 
Chapter 3 (Fayn, MacCann, Tiliopoulos, & Silvia, 2015) explored the influence of 
Openness and Intellect on three emotional states (and associated processes) in response to 
visual art. This was the first study investigating the personality-aesthetics relationship that 
distinguished between multiple states, rather than just looking at preference or liking. 
Across two studies, it was found that only Openness was related to greater interest, 
pleasure and arousal in response to art, and that both Openness and Intellect predicted less 
confusion. Openness and Intellect were both related to greater reactivity to appraised 
novelty for interest, but only Openness was related to greater novelty-pleasure 
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relationships, and greater levels of interest and pleasure overall. Additionally, the possible 
confound of expertise in the arts was explored which was previously found to moderate 
appraisal-interest relationships (Silvia, 2013). We found that expertise did not change any of 
the findings related to Openness and Intellect suggesting that the personality aspects are 
driving differences in appraisal-emotion variability. Finally, we explored the influence of 
Openness and Intellect on viewing time, information requests, desire to own, and the 
likelihood of liking and sharing the artworks on Facebook. Openness, but not Intellect, was 
positively related to all these variables.  
The sensitivity to novelty associated with Openness and Intellect was discussed with 
reference to a theory on the relationships between Openness/Intellect and cognitive 
abilities. A sensitivity to novelty suggested greater engagement with complex stimuli and 
situations. This process based finding fits with the Openness–Fluid–Crystallized-Intelligence 
(OFCI) model which aims to explain the longitudinal influence of Openness on fluid and 
crystallised intelligence (Ziegler et al., 2012). The sensitivity to novelty may explain why 
open people are more likely to be interested in complex and challenging situations which 
could facilitate longitudinal increases in cognitive ability.  
A unique finding that arose from this chapter was variance in novelty-pleasure 
relationships associated with Openness. The finding is unique because pleasure has 
previously been found to be predicted by ease of processing, with novelty being a negative 
predictor of the state. I found that novelty was a weak positive predictor of pleasure, but 
that this relationship got stronger with higher Openness standing. Generally, the novelty-
pleasure relationship—which is contrary to previous research—could have resulted from 
our particular sample which, on average, scored high in Openness. It would appear that the 
novelty-pleasure relationship is contingent on level of Openness, in that for those lower in 
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Openness, novelty does not predict pleasure, but is a part of the pleasure experience for 
those higher on the trait. The finding is rare, because qualitative differences in appraisal 
structures for emotions are not common. For a more detailed discussion please refer to the 
discussion section of Chapter 3. 
Chapter 4: Engaged in different things or in different ways? 
Chapter 3 (Fayn, Silvia, MacCann, and Tiliopoulos, under review) tested two 
perspectives on the engagement differences between Openness and Intellect. This study 
was the strongest test of the Openness versus Intellect distinction because it included 
stimuli that could not be broadly categorised as aesthetic: science and philosophy. The 
current conceptualisation of the aspects suggests that Openness should be related to 
perceptual and sensory engagement, while Intellect should be related to engagement with 
abstract and semantic stimuli and situations. An alternative position is that Openness is the 
engagement aspect of the domain and Intellect is the self-assessed ability aspect.  
We found substantial evidence for the engagement, rather than situational 
distinction. Openness was related to greater interest in all three sets of stimuli, while 
Intellect was not uniquely related to engagement. Openness also predicted requesting 
further information regarding all three types of stimuli. Appraisal processes, like in previous 
studies, qualified the influence of Openness on interest. Openness was associated with 
greater reactivity to novelty in response to science and philosophy, and smaller 
understanding-interest relationships in response to art. Openness was also related to 
greater appraised understanding of art and philosophy, while Intellect was related to 
greater appraised understanding of science and philosophy stimuli. These paths—through 
understanding to interest—were all significant mediations, however, Intellect did not 
predict variance in interest directly, when Openness was controlled for. 
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Overall, this study casts doubt on Intellect as an engagement construct in the 
presence of Openness as a covariate. Openness, but not Intellect, appears to be the aspect 
that predicts emotional reactions in response to various epistemic situations. While 
Openness is not generally considered an emotion trait, recent evidence, and the findings of 
this thesis indicate that Openness may be the knowledge emotion core of the Big Five. The 
discussion in chapter 3 unpacks the particular connections to current thinking and theory on 
the Openness and Intellect aspects. 
Connections, implications and future directions 
The findings of each of the empirical chapters have previously been discussed within 
the manuscripts, and briefly summarised above. The goal of research, generally, is to answer 
questions and I will attempt to do so in what is to come. As is often the case, questions 
answered have the propensity to lead to more questions that remain unanswered; these 
too will be discussed.  
This is a good time to revisit the broad aim of this thesis. I sought to explore the 
distinction between Openness and Intellect in terms of engagement with various 
informational stimuli in order to test the validity of their conceptualisation. Further, by 
combining social-cognitive and trait approaches to personality, I sought a dynamic 
understanding of how these aspects manifest in engagement situations. The research within 
this thesis has provided some answers that coincide with those aims. Broadly, the findings 
update our understanding of the Openness and Intellect constructs in two ways: (1) process 
evidence provides a dynamic understanding of the aspects as they pertain to engagement; 
(2) the current theory on the engagement distinction between Openness and Intellect is not 
supported by the data and a slightly different distinction will be proposed below.  
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Social-Cognitive model of Openness/Intellect and engagement with information 
“We all boil at different degrees.” 
—Ralph Waldo Emerson 
The social-cognitive model for the engagement basis of Openness and Intellect was 
facilitated by the appraisal account of individual differences in emotional experiences 
(Kuppens & Tong, 2010; Kuppens et al., 2008). This model was previously described in 
Chapter 1 and is reproduced above (Figure 5.1). The model suggests that individual 
differences in emotional experiences may be explained by appraisal strength and appraisal-
emotion contingencies. Every study within this thesis found evidence for the validity and 
utility of the model. While there was considerable consistency in the findings, some results 
varied between studies. We will begin by resolving some of the inconsistencies and then 
move onto the Openness/Intellect engagement model.  
All three studies found that Openness moderated appraisal-emotion relationships, 
but not consistently the same appraisal. Openness moderated the novelty-interest 
relationships in Study 2 (art), and Study 3 (science and philosophy), and the understanding-
interest relationships in Study 1 (quotations) and Study 3 (art). This inconsistency may be, in 
part, due to overlap between the appraisals of novelty and understanding—stimuli 
appraised as more novel tend to be appraised as less understandable as the appraisals are 
consistently correlated (e.g. Fayn et al., 2015; Silvia, 2005b). Therefore, when Openness is 
found to moderate understanding-interest relationships, this may also indicate a 
moderation of the novelty-interest relationships. Given that the appraisals were modelled 
together, it is possible that Openness moderates both appraisals, but not in the presence of 
the other as the shared variance between the appraisals is partialed out. This was previously 
observed when interest and appraisal data was cluster analysed to indicate two types of 
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interest—one that was driven by high novelty and low understanding, and the other by low 
novelty and high understanding (Silvia et al., 2009).    
 Follow up analyses partially confirmed this hypothesis, when the understanding 
appraisal was not modelled, Openness moderated the novelty-interest relationships in 
response to quotations (Study 1; b = .117, SE = .06, p = .035), but not for art (Study 3; b = 
.06, SE = .04, p = .13). However, the broad domain of Openness/Intellect, as opposed to 
either aspect, did moderate the novelty-interest relationship for art (b = .10, SE = .03, 
p<.001). Therefore, reactivity to novelty was mostly supported across all studies suggesting 
that those higher in Openness were more reactive to novelty—in terms of interest—in 
response to all stimuli. Having partially resolved the inconsistencies, I next describe the 
appraisals based role of Openness and Intellect in engagement with informational stimuli.  
In terms of appraisal strength, those higher on the domain of Openness/Intellect 
tended to appraise events as more understandable. This association was previously 
observed for those higher in curiosity (a trait with strong links to Openness/Intellect; Silvia, 
2008a). Differences between Openness and Intellect in terms of appraisal strength were 
observed according to differences in stimuli. Openness was associated with greater 
understanding of artistic and philosophical stimuli, and Intellect was related to greater 
understanding of science and quotations. Generally, these findings could be explained by 
the overlap between Openness/Intellect and cognitive abilities. For artistic stimuli, part of 
the measurement of the Openness aspect assesses aesthetic engagement which in turn is 
associated with knowledge about the arts. This was found in Chapter 3, where Openness 
had a strong relationship with Aesthetic fluency. For semantic stimuli, Openness and 
Intellect have been shown to independently predict greater verbal ability (Deyoung et al., 
2014) which would facilitate greater understanding of semantic stimuli. Intellect is 
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independently related to fluid intelligence which could facilitate greater ability to 
understand complex abstract information. An intelligence-interest relationship has been 
observed, in response to images and poems, and greater understanding was suggested as a 
possible explanation of the effect (Silvia & Sanders, 2010). Thus, Openness/Intellect, 
possibly through associations with knowledge and abilities, facilitates greater interest for 
those higher on the domain as a result of greater understanding.  
Critically, the appraisal strength findings should be interpreted with caution because 
the constructs under investigation share method, and for Intellect, item content variance. 
Since the Intellect scale includes items that primarily assess ability (e.g. “I am quick to 
understand things), circularity is inherent in the Intellect-understanding relationships. 
Participants that say they are good and quick at thinking and understanding, report greater 
understanding of complex stimuli. Therefore, the Intellect-understanding relationships are 
somewhat dubious. While the findings associated with Openness are difficult to explain 
away in this manner (as they do not include items that assess ability to understand), those 
with Intellect are of a circular nature. 
Perhaps the more novel and interesting finding of this thesis is the moderating role 
that Openness plays on novelty-interest relationships. This consistent finding suggests that 
those higher in Openness are more reactive to novelty. Because appraisal ratings were 
person centred in all the models, the novelty-interest relationships indicate variation in 
idiosyncratic deviations from a person’s mean. The appraisal model of interest indicates that 
every person (regardless of Openness standing) is likely to experience greater interest for 
stimuli that are appraised as more novel, as opposed to less novel. The moderating 
influence of Openness on this relationship indicates that those higher in Openness are likely 
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to be more sensitive or reactive in terms of interest according to differences in how novel 
they appraise a stimulus in their experience of interest.  
For example, imagine we have two individuals with different levels of Openness. One 
is a highly open person and the other scores quite low on the aspect. They both have the 
same average novelty and comprehension appraisal tendencies—that is their person-
centred mean is the same. When exposed to the same informational stimulus they appraise 
it—in exactly the same way—as above their own average on novelty and about average on 
comprehensibility. According to our findings, the person higher on Openness is likely to 
experience the stimulus as more interesting than the person lower on Openness because 
they are more reactive to novelty. Therefore, two people see exactly the same stimulus, 
appraise it in exactly the same way, but one feels more interest than the other. 
The appraisal account of individual differences in emotional experiences aims to 
explain individual differences in emotions based on appraisal processes (Kuppens & Tong, 
2010). The findings within this thesis contribute to just such an understanding for the 
relationship between the Openness/Intellect aspects and the emotion of interest. Those 
higher in Openness/Intellect tend to exhibit greater understanding of epistemic situations 
and stimuli, thereby allowing them to experience interest in more complex situations. 
Additionally, the relationship between Openness and interest is qualified by a special 
relationship with novelty. Those higher on the Openness aspect are particularly reactive to 
novelty and complexity and are therefore more likely to experience interest in response to 
novel and complex epistemic stimuli and situations.  
The Openness novelty-reactivity mechanism: Connections and implications 
Novelty-seeking is not something that is exclusively open. There is a rich and varied 
literature that examines the tendency of animals (including humans) to seek novelty—at 
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times at the cost of more tangible rewards (Kidd & Hayden, 2015). Such preferences suggest 
that information-seeking is inherently shared by many living organisms and has the function 
of gathering information to reduce uncertainty and increase future choices. Recent 
biological evidence suggests that information-seeking activates dopaminergic networks 
suggesting that it is rewarding (Gruber et al., 2014; Kang et al., 2009). Therefore, acquiring 
information is adaptive, rewarding, and something that is observed across many different 
species.  
From an interest perspective, novelty appraisals are a consistent predictor of interest 
for most, if not all, people (Silvia, 2008a). The novelty-interest relationship is indicative of 
the general tendency for information seeking that facilitates exploration of the novel and 
complex. Variation in this relationship according to level of Openness suggests a mechanism 
for relationships between Openness and learning, knowledge development, and ability 
development. The following section will discuss the implications of novelty-reactivity for 
models that evaluate the overlap between Openness/Intellect and the development of 
knowledge and ability constructs.  
Novelty-Reactivity and Biological Reactivity  
In their thorough theoretical and empirical review of appraisal-emotion 
contingencies, Kuppens and Tong (2010) connect appraisal-emotion variation with several 
theoretical positions that suggest individual differences in reactivity. One such example is 
the Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (RST; Gray, 1991; Smillie, Pickering, & Jackson, 2006) 
which proposed biological systems that influence individual differences in reactions to 
rewards and punishments. Current conceptualisations of Extraversion—the domain mostly 
synonymous with the Behavioural Activation System proposed by Gray—suggest that 
extraverts experience greater positive affect because they are more reactive in response to 
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positive stimuli or situations (Gross, Sutton, & Ketelaar, 1998). This affective-reactivity 
hypothesis was further clarified by contrasting activated reward seeking versus pleasant low 
activation manipulations (Smillie, Cooper, Wilt, & Revelle, 2012). Smillie and colleagues 
demonstrated Extraverts, relative to introverts, experienced more activated positive affect 
(also called reward-related affect or approach-motivated affect), in response to rewarding 
or appetitive stimuli or situations.  
The finding that Openness moderates the within-person novelty-interest association 
suggests a similar reactivity for Openness, which can be linked to recent biological and 
functional perspectives on the Openness/Intellect domain. Based on a more nuanced 
understanding of the dopaminergic system, DeYoung (2013) suggested a link between 
Openness/Intellect and the dopaminergic function in exploratory behaviour. The broad 
function of the dopaminergic system has been identified as ‘exploration’, which is defined as 
“any behaviour or cognition motivated by the incentive reward value of uncertainty” 
(DeYoung, 2013. p. 1). While the dopaminergic system has traditionally been shown to code 
for the probability of reward, recent developments suggest that part of its function also 
responds to information (Bromberg-Martin, Matsumoto, & Hikosaka, 2010). These two 
functions reflect different networks within the dopaminergic system, known as the value 
and salience coding systems. The value coding system is associated with the traditional 
function of dopamine—coding for the probability of reward. DeYoung (2013) proposed that 
“the salience system is designed to potentiate cognitive exploration for information” (p. 5) 
and should therefore be related to Openness/Intellect. I propose the novelty-reactivity 
associated with Openness provides appraisal based process support for this hypothesis.  
A key feature of DeYoung’s (2013) dopaminergic theory of exploration is that the 
salience coding system is responsive to increases in informational entropy. A basic definition 
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of entropy is the amount of uncertainty and unpredictability in a given system. Psychological 
entropy refers to the uncertainty that arises as a function of goals, current states, and 
strategies that are active, present, and available for an individual at any given time 
(DeYoung, 2013, 2015a). I propose that the appraisals of novelty and complexity are 
associated with the psychological entropy discussed by DeYoung. This overlap is not perfect, 
as DeYoung refers to entropy within the context of goal pursuit; however, the novelty 
appraisal is reflective of informational entropy encountered in epistemic situations.  
Thus, the novelty-reactivity findings are congruent with DeYoung’s theory as those 
higher on Openness are more reactive—in terms of interest—in response to novelty and 
complexity. My findings suggest that Openness, rather than Intellect, may be particularly 
associated with the reactivity of the salience coding system. This is contrary to DeYoung’s 
hypothesis that Intellect is the aspect more likely to be associated with the salience coding 
system. Direct research connecting the Openness and Intellect aspects to dopaminergic 
function is in its infancy and no strong conclusions are ready to be drawn. In trying to 
ascertain biological reactivity—that I have linked to the novelty-reactivity findings—
investigations should look for associations with functional activation in response to 
informational stimuli. Given the findings within this thesis, it appears that Openness is the 
aspect that is sensitive to the novelty in information. 
Novelty-Reactivity and the development of knowledge and ability  
The novelty-reactivity findings also have implications for models and theories that 
describe the relationships among personality, ability, knowledge, and educational 
outcomes. The most prominent model that combines these variables is Ackerman’s PPIK 
model (Ackerman, 1996). Within this model Openness/Intellect is considered as an 
investment trait that facilitates the investment of resources towards the development of 
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interests and knowledge (von Stumm & Ackerman, 2013). In particular, investment traits are 
considered to influence the transition from intelligence as process (fluid intelligence) to 
intelligence as knowledge (crystallised intelligence). Within this framework, investment 
traits are defined as “stable individual differences in the tendency to seek out, engage in, 
enjoy, and continuously pursue opportunities for effortful cognitive activity” (von Stumm, 
Chamorro-Premuzic, & Ackerman, 2011, p. 225). Therefore these models propose that 
Openness/Intellect plays a role in knowledge acquisition due to greater engagement with 
information. There is a plethora of support for this model based on the associations 
between investment traits and measures of general knowledge and educational outcomes 
(e.g. Ackerman, Bowen, Beier, & Kanfer, 2001; Chamorro-Premuzic, Furnham, & Ackerman, 
2006; Poropat, 2009, 2014; von Stumm, Hell, & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2011). Process based 
explanations for these relationships are still lacking.  
Another model that extends the PPIK model—the Openness–Fluid–Crystallized-
Intelligence (OFCI) model—posits that Openness/Intellect affects the development of fluid 
intelligence due to greater exposure to new and challenging environments—the 
environment enrichment hypothesis (Ziegler et al., 2012). This hypothesis was supported via 
a longitudinal study in which parent-rated Openness/Intellect at 17 years of age predicted 
an increase in fluid intelligence from the ages of 17 to 23 (Ziegler et al., 2012). This finding 
updates the PPIK model by suggesting that Openness/Intellect not only influences 
knowledge development, but may also contribute to increases in fluid intelligence. 
Both the PPIK and the OFCI models propose that Openness/Intellect play a role in 
developing cognitive capacities, both crystallised and fluid. The findings within this thesis 
provide evidence for a process based understanding of how Openness/Intellect may 
influence increases in cognitive abilities (both fluid and crystallised). The link between 
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Openness and felt interest in response to our broad range of stimuli suggests that those 
higher in the domain are more engaged with information which in turn facilitates 
knowledge acquisition—this is proposed by both the PPIK and OFCI models. Critically, the 
greater interest reported by those higher in Openness, could be a reflection of the self-
concept possibly held by the open-minded. This is less likely to be true for the association 
between Openness and requests for further information and greater time spend engaging 
with stimuli (Chapters 3 and 4). Even more relevant to the PPIK and OFCI models are the 
novelty-reactivity findings associated with Openness.  
The particular bias—of being more reactive to novelty in terms of interest—should 
lead to greater interest in particularly complex situations. Such interest should lead to 
greater exploration and intrinsic motivation to resolve the complexity. This should then lead 
to greater knowledge, and practice at resolving and understanding complex situations. Such 
intrinsically motivated engagement with complexity and the resolution of complexity may 
be one of the mechanisms that contribute to fluid intelligence change. This assertion is 
supported by cognitive training literature which suggests intrinsic motivation to be a 
possible explanation for differences in fluid intelligence gains as a result of training (Au et 
al., 2015). In a sense, having greater reactivity to novel and complex situations through life is 
a type of lifelong cognitive training. By experiencing greater rewards from complex 
informational situations, in the form of interest, those higher in Openness are likely to 
spend more time learning, solving, engaging, and dwelling and reflecting on complex stimuli 
and situations.  
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Updating the distinction between Openness and Intellect 
Openness and Intellect are thought to facilitate different processes that predispose 
individuals towards cognitive exploration and engagement (DeYoung, 2015b). Openness is 
suggested to reflect individual differences in sensory and perceptual exploration, while 
Intellect reflects individual differences in abstract and semantic exploration. Importantly, 
the theory regarding the distinction is not strictly one of engagement, but rather 
exploration—though engagement is part of definitions within most papers that discuss the 
distinction (Deyoung et al., 2012; DeYoung, 2013, 2015a, 2015b; Kaufman et al., 2010, 
2014). So, are our findings consistent with the theory distinguishing Openness and Intellect 
in terms of cognitive exploration? My research has primarily evaluated engagement and not 
exploration per se, however the distinction between exploration and engagement as 
discussed by DeYoung is rather hazy. In order to properly consider how my findings extend 
our understanding of Openness and Intellect, it is important to unpack the distinction 
between exploration and engagement. 
DeYoung's (2015) definition of the Openness/Intellect domain is as the personality 
domain that describes “individual differences in cognitive exploration, the tendency to seek, 
detect, appreciate, understand, and utilize both sensory and abstract information” (p. 44). 
Therefore exploration is seen as the combination of seeking, detecting, appreciating, 
understanding and utilising informational stimuli and situations. Where Openness and 
Intellect diverge, according to DeYoung’s perspective, is in exploration of sensory versus 
abstract information. The emotion of interest was the main dependent variable across all 
my studies and on face value it may seem to only relate to the appreciating aspect of the 
exploration definition above. However, when considered together with the antecedents of 
interest, as well as other variables measured, several features of exploration were assessed: 
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(1) appreciating was measured as interest is the state that best describes engagement with 
information, (2) seeking was reflected in interest—considered a motivational state that 
facilitates approach—as well as further information requests and time spent engaging with 
stimuli, and (3) understanding was measured as appraised understanding. Thus, our findings 
provide information on some aspects of cognitive exploration, but not others—detecting 
and utilising.  
Another aspect of cognitive exploration that is not part of the definition of cognitive 
exploration, but is implied in conceptualisations of Openness/Intellect, is sensitivity to novel 
and complex information. This is synonymous with novelty-interest contingencies (as was 
discussed above). The findings of all the studies as they pertain to the definition unpacked 
above are summarised in Figure 5.2. Seeking for quotations was not measured in the first 
study, but a hypothesised relationship with Openness is represented by a dotted line.  
The influence of Openness on most measured aspects of exploration was clearly 
evident as the aspect predicted seeking, appreciating, reactivity to novelty and, for some 
stimuli, understanding. Contrary to the proposed distinction, the influence of Openness on 
cognitive exploration was evident for both perceptual and abstract stimuli. Intellect was 
associated with greater appraised understanding of all abstract stimuli, but had almost no 
influence on the other aspects of exploration (apart from independently predicting interest 
in quotations).  
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Figure 5.2. Summary of found associations between Openness, Intellect and 
cognitive explorations. Note: seeking was not measured for quotations.  
These findings indicate that the distinction suggested by DeYoung may not be the 
best way of considering the differences between Openness and Intellect. Rather, it appears 
that Openness is the engagement core of Openness/Intellect and that Intellect is associated 
with a greater appraised ability to understand semantic stimuli. The ability to understand 
abstract stimuli could facilitate utilising information, which is an aspect of exploration not 
measured within this thesis. It is possible for example that understanding leads to greater 
memory retention and as such this stored information can be utilised at a later date. 
Critically, associations with understanding could arguably be better explained by ability 
constructs.  
This summary of our findings suggests that at least in these studies the distinction 
based on type of information is not supported. Instead, the aspects appear to reflect 
different ways of processing and engaging with information, regardless of whether it is 
sensory or abstract. The following sections will discuss (1) Openness as the knowledge 
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emotion aspect of Openness/Intellect, and (2) whether the conceptualisation of Intellect has 
bitten off more than it can chew by attempting to assess an engagement with information 
construct with what appear to be self-reported ability items.  
Openness: The knowledge emotion aspect 
“The most beautiful thing we can experience is the mysterious. It is the source of all 
true art and all science. He to whom this emotion is a stranger, who can no longer pause to 
wonder and stand rapt in awe, is as good as dead: his eyes are closed.” 
Albert Einstein 
In the discussion of chapter 4, I went so far as to say that Openness could be 
considered as another emotion trait. Was this too bold an assertion? Or was emotion always 
a big part of the Openness/Intellect domain? The answers to these questions are not 
straight forward, but if forced to answer them, parsimoniously, I would say: “No” and “Sort 
of”. Thankfully, parsimony is not the main goal of this discussion and I have the chance to 
unpack these ideas.  
Starting broadly, the fields of personality and emotions are inextricably linked. 
Extraversion reflects the tendency to experience positive affect and neuroticism is 
associated with negative affectivity (Steel, Schmidt, & Shultz, 2008). This is not the place or 
time to unpack the plethora of findings that relate these domains, and positive and negative 
affect, rather, the reference above is a meta-analysis that indicates stable and large 
relationships between the constructs. There is a growing body of literature that connects 
Openness/intellect to another group of emotions that are referred to as epistemic or 
knowledge emotions (Keltner & Shiota, 2003; Silvia, 2008b).  
The knowledge emotions are states experienced as a result of “what is happening in 
the inner world of thought” (Silvia, 2012, p. 265). They include the emotions of interest, 
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awe, beauty2, confusion, and surprise—states associated with beliefs about thoughts and 
knowledge. They stem from epistemic goals, and arise from metacognitive processes 
associated with integration of new knowledge into existing schemas. They are distinct from 
pleasure—though they may co-occur. Historically, sparse attention was paid to such states 
as they were considered “too cognitive” to be emotions (Ellsworth, 2003). Since the strict 
lines between emotions and cognitions have proven non-existent (Pessoa, 2008), research 
into knowledge emotions has been influential in aesthetic and education disciplines (Pekrun 
& Linnenbrink-Garcia, 2014; Silvia, 2010). See Chapter 1 for a more detailed discussion.  
I argue that the domain of Openness/Intellect (particularly the Openness aspect 
within the BFAS) is the personality construct that explains individual differences in 
knowledge emotions and should be considered the knowledge emotion domain of the Big 
Five. While this section is about the Openness aspect, there aren’t enough studies that have 
looked at the aspects separately to restrict my argument to such. Therefore, evidence 
presented below will stray into evaluating associations with Openness to Experience 
measures (NEO) and, where possible, its facets. Generally, NEO measures of the domain are 
skewed towards Openness (DeYoung et al., 2007) and I will therefore, cautiously, report 
findings with the domain to be more reflective of Openness, rather than Intellect. Where 
possible, these will be supported by findings that highlight the unique importance of 
Openness. 
McCrae and Costa proposed Openness to Experience as, in part, a motivational 
construct. They stated that “Open people are not only able to grasp new ideas, they enjoy 
doing so” (McCrae & Costa, 2007, p. 832). In line with the quote above, I propose that the 
                                                 
2 Here “Beauty” is used to reflect the construct of beauty put forth by Armstrong and Detweiler-Bedell 
(2008) which is defined as “the exhilarating prospect of mastering a challenging world” (p. 305), rather than the 
colloquial meaning of the word.  
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emotional world of the open manifests in the knowledge emotions. DeYoung (2015) spoke 
to emotional associations with the Openness/Intellect domain but suggested that “the 
mechanisms of interpretation associated with Openness/Intellect are primarily those that 
are descriptive of the world, rather than evaluative” and that “the evaluations of emotional 
significance that form a core part of our interpretations of the world are likely to be 
determined primarily by basic affective processes associated with Extraversion, Neuroticism, 
and Agreeableness and by relevance to individuals’ idiosyncratic goals (i.e., characteristic 
adaptations), as they interact with the mechanisms of interpretation underlying 
Openness/Intellect” (p.13). I will argue that evidence is accumulating for the unique role of 
the Openness/intellect domain in explaining individual differences in a class of affective 
states associated with engagement with information. 
The best pancultural marker of the NEO Openness to Experience measure is the item 
that states: “Sometimes when I am reading poetry or looking at a work of art, I feel a chill or 
wave of excitement” (McCrae, 2007). Indeed the experience of chills and other powerful 
emotional states such as fascination and awe have empirical links to Openness to 
Experience. Individual differences in powerful emotional reactions to celestial and musical 
stimuli were found to be strongly related to Openness to Experience, but small and mostly 
non-significant relationships with Extraversion and other Big Five domains (Silvia et al., 
2015). Openness to Experience was also the strongest personality predictor of the 
propensity to experience awe (Shiota, Keltner, & John, 2006). There is also direct evidence 
that Openness, rather than Intellect is reflective of knowledge emotion states. Silvia and 
Nusbaum (2011) found that Openness, but not Intellect, predicted powerful aesthetic states 
of chills and absorption, while Intellect was negatively related to experiencing chills. Further, 
Openness, but not Intellect, was independently related to powerful aesthetic emotions, and 
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found to moderate the relationship between interest and such states in response to visual 
art (Fayn, Tiliopoulos, & Silvia, 2014). For those higher in Openness, self-reported interest 
converges with describing something as profound, exceptional and awe inspiring, compared 
to those lower on the aspect. Combined, the findings reviewed above suggest that 
Openness, and not Extraversion (or any other personality domain), is the best predictor of 
the knowledge emotions.  
As discussed in Chapter 4, another line of research that suggests that Openness 
reflects emotional experiences is found in studies that have analysed item content with 
respect to whether they measure affect, cognition, behaviour, and desire. One study found 
that facets of the NEO associated with Openness—aesthetics and feelings—were primarily 
assessing emotional phenomena, as opposed to cognitive or behavioural (Pytlik Zillig, 
Hemenover, & Dienstbier, 2002). Another study found that a NEO Openness measure had a 
substantial proportion of affective content in its items, but the AB5C measure did not (Wilt 
& Revelle, 20153). This difference between the two measurement models could be an 
indication of the differences between BFAS Openness and Intellect as most of the items for 
the Openness scale came from NEO based assessments, and most of the Intellect items 
were from the AB5C (DeYoung et al., 2007).  
The study from Chapter 2 included a measure of need for affect which is defined as a 
general motivational tendency to approach or avoid situations that may illicit emotional 
reactions (Maio & Esses, 2001). Openness and Intellect predicted variance in need for affect 
in opposite directions. Openness was positively, and Intellect negatively, associated with 
motivation to approach emotional situations. These relationships remained consistent when 
                                                 
3 At the time of submission the Wilt and Revelle (2015) reports the difference mentioned above for 
Agreeableness. However, the figures indicate the difference is for Openness/Intellect. This was clarified through 
personal communication with the first author on the 12th of August 2015. 
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Extraversion aspects were controlled for (Figure 5.3). Finally, as previously discussed, 
findings within this thesis clearly suggest that Openness, as opposed to Intellect, is the 
interested aspect of the domain. This relationship is consistent across various stimuli, and is 
qualified by novelty sensitivity of the open. This is further supported by associations with 
information requests and time spent engaging with stimuli.  
  
Figure 5.3. Path model testing the influence of Openness/Intellect and Extraversion 
aspect on Need for Affect. Note: N=99; *p<.05. 
Considering all these findings together, the case for Openness being the personality 
trait that reflects individual differences in the knowledge emotions becomes convincing. To 
me, the idea that Openness is associated with emotions that are felt in response to 
information is implicit, but I imagine this view will be met with some doubt. Perhaps it is the 
reluctance of many researchers to view the knowledge emotions as belonging in the 
exclusive club of emotions, but I think that time has passed.  
Intellect: Has the curiosity gone? 
The observation that intellect failed to consistently predict interest in abstract 
stimuli was initially surprising given that it is proposed to be a construct purportedly reflects 
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cognitive engagement with abstract and semantic information (Deyoung et al., 2012; 
DeYoung, 2013, 2015a, 2015b; Kaufman et al., 2010, 2014). Within this thesis, Intellect was 
not consistently associated with engagement in semantic and abstract information which 
can, arguably, be explained by how the measurement of the construct was developed and 
therefore the content of the items in the scale.   
The lack of association between Intellect and engagement becomes less surprising 
when the items that assess it are closely examined. The items don’t stray far from assessing 
self-reported ability. Three items can be thought to reflect intellectual engagement, but all 
three may also reflect ability (Table 5.1). In the first, ‘like’ implies an engagement or 
enjoyment, but ‘solving complex problems’ requires the ability to do so. The other two 
items could be considered to assess engagement as the opposite of ‘avoid’ is to approach. 
However, avoiding philosophical discussions and difficult reading material could just as 
easily result from a lack the intellectual capacity as from a lack of engagement with such 
pursuits. Therefore, judging on face validity, the Intellect meas ure falls short of 
assessing intellectual engagement.  
The item content of the Intellect scale was chosen for empirical reasons. The goal of 
creating the Big Five Aspect Scales was to enable measurement of two distinct aspects for 
each of the Big Five domains (DeYoung et al., 2007). One piece of evidence that initially 
implied a two aspects per factor solution was that two genetic factors were found to best 
represent covariance of facets within the NEO-PI-R (Jang et al., 2002). DeYoung et al.  (2007) 
criticised the narrow nature of the NEO-PI-R facets used in Jang et al’s study, and his factor 
analytic approach included the AB5C model to broaden the construct. Items for the final 
BFAS scales were then selected to best represent two distinct aspects of each domain. 
Therefore, items that cross loaded on both aspects (within each domain) were not included 
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Table 5.1.  
Face validity of Intellect items reflecting ability and engagement.  
Intellect Items Ability Engagement 
I am quick to understand things.   
I have difficulty understanding abstract ideas.   
I can handle a lot of information.   
I like to solve complex problems.   
I avoid philosophical discussions.   
I avoid difficult reading material.   
I have a rich vocabulary.   
I think quickly.   
I learn things slowly.   
I formulate ideas clearly.   
 
in the final measure. As a result, the item content of the Intellect scale was primarily 
made up of items that assess self-perceived ability. Importantly, such items were not 
present in the assessments that implied a two aspect per factor solution (Jang et al., 2002).  
Evidence for self-assessed intelligence overlap with actual abilities is limited, and 
where present, the overlap is quite low (Paulhus, Lysy, & Yik, 1998). It is about the same as 
the overlap between Intellect and abilities. DeYoung's (2015) stance on the merger of ability 
and personality constructs is that every domain of personality already implies some abilities 
(for example agreeableness encompasses the ability to empathise), therefore there is no 
issue with inclusion of ability items in the Intellect scale. The idea that abilities are part of 
what differs between individuals and are therefore part of what makes up personality—if 
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viewed broadly as individual differences—is not radical. However, assessing abilities by 
asking people to self-report them is problematic. Self-report measures of abilities tend to 
suffer from the ‘better than average’ phenomenon (Krueger & Mueller, 2002). That is, 
people tend to overestimate their abilities and rate themselves as higher than their actual 
standing in the distribution of measured intelligence. An example of an attempt to measure 
abilities with self-report measures that has been deemed problematic is trait-assessments 
of Emotional Intelligence (Joseph & Newman, 2010). Within Emotional Intelligence 
literature trait-like measures are thought to assess self-efficacy rather than ability.  
A problem with assessing a construct that purports to measure engagement almost 
exclusively with ability items is the assumptions one has to make: a) a perfect correlation 
between engagement and abilities, and b) that abilities and engagement constructs are 
associated with the same processes that influence behavioural outcomes. The first 
assumption seems premature as although intelligent people tend to be curious (von Stumm 
& Ackerman, 2013), the correlation is not sufficient to conclude that these constructs are 
synonymous. Thus, the Intellect scale as it stands today will underestimate the curiosity of 
people who don’t see themselves as, or are not particularly gifted. There is a rich history and 
continuing work on assessing intellectual engagement which is conceptualised as explicitly 
distinct from ability, and playing a distinct role in educational outcomes and the 
development of knowledge.  
Intellectual engagement has been proposed to be the third pillar of educational 
success (after intelligence and conscientiousness; von Stumm et al., 2011), with promising 
new theoretical and measurement conceptualisations receiving attention and empirical 
support (Mussel, 2013). Many constructs fall under the broad umbrella of intellectual 
engagement and include Typical Intellectual Engagement (TIE), Need for Cognition (NFC), 
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and a plethora of curiosity assessments (see von Stumm et al., 2011 for a review). Mussel 
(2010) demonstrated that most of these constructs (NFC, TIE, Openness to Ideas, and 
several curiosity measurements) lack discriminant validity and therefore largely assess 
similar constructs. Intellect, too, is proposed to measure intellectual engagement and is 
suggested to be similar to the constructs of TIE and NFC (DeYoung, 2015b), but does so, 
through what appear to be radically different items.  
Other constructs developed to assess intellectual engagement have almost 
exclusively avoided items that measure self-assesses ability. Indeed, they are conceptualised 
as distinct from abilities. For example NFC is defined as an intrinsic motivation for effortful 
cognitive endeavours (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996), TIE has facets that reflect 
interest and pleasure in thinking for its own sake (Ackerman & Goff, 1994), and the Curiosity 
and Exploration Inventory measures seeking and embracing information (Kashdan et al., 
2009). Mussel's (2013) theoretical model integrates many of the different 
conceptualisations of intellectual engagement into one model which has been shown to 
detect subtle differences between these various constructs. This model divides intellectual 
engagement into the processes of seeking and conquering, and operations of thinking, 
creating and learning. Mussel (2013) didn’t include the BFAS measure of Intellect in his 
model because of its inclusion of ability items, compared to other conceptualisations (TIE, 
NFC, and curiosity measures).  Thus, the main goal of most intellectual engagement 
assessments is to measure ‘will do’—as opposed to ‘can do’—constructs that reflects 
engagement with information. The distinction between Intellect and other constructs that 
assess intellectual engagement is obvious in their measurement—Intellect is empirically 
constructed and is assumed to measure engagement, while the rest of the constructs are 
operationalised to do so.     
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An empirical rather than conceptual test of whether Intellect assesses the 
intellectual engagement aspect of Openness/Intellect would be to test the relationships the 
aspects have with intellectual engagement assessments. The expectation would be that 
Intellect should have stronger associations with such measures than Openness. An example 
of such a finding is that Openness to Ideas shares substantially more variance with 
intellectual engagement measures than the rest of the Openness to Experience scale 
(Mussel, 2010). However, Openness to Ideas is an intellectual engagement scale that does 
not include ability based items, as is the case for Intellect. As all of the studies within this 
thesis were part of broader projects that included some measures of curiosity, this test was 
possible. 
Across all studies within this thesis, Openness and Intellect had very similar 
relationships with curiosity measures, which is contrary to what has been suggested as 
distinguishing the aspects (Table 5.2). Across all studies, Openness and Intellect shared 
roughly equivalent variance with curiosity measures indicating that both aspects assess 
intellectual engagement equally. Therefore, engagement, seeking, and embracing 
information seem to be in equal part Openness and Intellect. In one sense, this data 
suggests that Intellect certainly assesses curiosity in part, however the correlations are not 
indicative of Intellect being the intellectual engagement aspect of the Openness/Intellect 
model. It seems that intellectual engagement is equally represented by both aspects, which 
does not align with how Intellect is conceptualized, or how the aspects are distinguished 
from each other.  
     
  
   157 
 
 
 
Table 5.2.  
Bivariate and partial correlations between Openness/Intellect aspects and curiosity measures.  
  Study 1 (N = 101) Study 2 (N = 214) Study 3 (N = 182) 
 ECS-Interest ECS-Depravation CEI-Stretching CEI-Embracing  Curiosity Depth 
Intellect .56*** (.47***) .25* (.22*) .44*** (.33***) .21** (.11) .50*** (.35***) .31*** (.02) 
Openness .48*** (.35***) .13 (.04) .42*** (.29***) .27*** (.21**) .48*** (.32***) .62*** (.57***) 
Partial correlations in brackets;  
 
An important issue with conflating intellectual engagement with ability comes from 
evidence suggesting these distinct constructs interact with each other in predicting 
educational outcomes (Zhang & Ziegler, 2015; Ziegler et al., 2012). Two studies have found 
that Openness/Intellect buffers the effect of lower cognitive abilities on educational 
outcomes. That is, the effect of Openness/Intellect on educational outcomes is marginal for 
high cognitive ability individuals, but is substantial for those lower on cognitive ability. Thus, 
ability and engagement have a complex relationship which would not be found using 
measurement that lumps them together. One way that this interactional relationship could 
be interpreted is that ability facilitates learning because less effort has to be invested in 
understanding educational materials. Thus, for those high in ability, extra engagement 
associated with Openness/Intellect does not contribute to greater educational outcomes.  
However for those lower on ability, greater engagement facilitates greater investment, 
which in turn facilitates learning. Therefore Openness/Intellect plays an important role for 
such individuals. These findings point to the validity and importance of separating cognitive 
abilities from intellectual engagement—something the Intellect scale is unlikely to achieve 
given its item content (Table 5.1).  
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Another issue with items assessing self-reported intelligence is that they tend to be 
endorsed by those higher in Conscientiousness, as pointed out by McCrae (1994) and 
Trapnell (1994). Both researchers observed that items that assess ability tend to have high 
loadings on the Conscientiousness domain. This seems to be the case with the Intellect scale 
as it shares equivalent, and sometimes greater, variance with the Industriousness aspect of 
Conscientiousness as with the Openness aspect (e. g. Ashton, Lee, Goldberg, & de Vries, 
2009; DeYoung et al., 2007). Factor purity is not the be all and end all of personality 
assessments, but loadings on other domains should be secondary, not equivalent or greater 
than the domain under assessment.  
Returning to how these issues relate to my findings, it seems that the Intellect scale 
does not uniquely assess engagement with abstract information, and what is missing, is the 
curiosity content from its items. Some evidence from chapter 4 suggests that this is indeed 
the case. A construct assessing curiosity was shown to predict variance in interest in both 
science and philosophy over and above the influence of Openness and in the presence of 
Intellect. Such a finding is exactly what would be expected of Intellect if the construct 
measured engagement with abstract information. This finding suggests that an intellectual 
engagement construct predicts unique variance in engagement with abstract information, 
while Intellect does not.  
It should be noted that some studies have found larger correlations between 
Intellect and intellectual engagement constructs than observed in the samples within this 
thesis. For example,  Kaufman et al. (2010) found a high correlation of .71 between Intellect 
and Openness to Ideas. Another study (Deyoung et al., 2012) found a large relationship 
between Intellect and TIE (r=.65), as opposed to a medium relationship to Openness (r = 
.30). These associations indicate that the Intellect measure is certainly capturing a healthy 
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amount of intellectual engagement, however according to the data within this thesis, 
Intellect does not consistently predict engagement with abstract and semantic information, 
while another measure of intellectual engagement and the Openness aspects do. 
 In summary, (1) the intellect scale (due to the way it was constructed) may primarily 
assesses self-rated intelligence, (2) self-rated intelligence is not a strong indicator of actual 
intelligence, (3) while self-rated intelligence is associated with intellectual engagement 
constructs, it seems to be a broader construct which also assesses Conscientiousness, (4) 
the measurement of Intellect is different construct to measures of intellectual engagement , 
(5) Intellect shares equivalent variance with intellectual engagement constructs compared 
to Openness, (6) there is a complex relationship between ability and intellectual 
engagement variables making their conflation problematic, and (7) Intellect does not predict 
engagement with information like curiosity does. For these reasons I argue that Intellect as 
measured by the BFAS has some validity issues. It attempts to measure engagement and 
ability, fails to properly measure either, and in so doing has lost some of its curiosity.  
Limitations and future directions 
The research within this thesis—just like research generally—is not without 
limitations. All of the studies were made up of student samples who are considered WEIRD 
(people from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic cultures; Jones, 
2010). This likely results in restrictions of range for both Openness and Intellect as university 
students are on average more intelligent and more open than the average person. There is 
also a restriction in age and therefore maturity, as has been observed by anyone who has 
worked with first year student participants. A very important future direction would involve 
replicating the results in older and more representative populations. Having said that, even 
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if the findings don’t replicate in older populations, they are still of importance for the field. 
University students are at university to learn and develop. Therefore, greater understanding 
about engagement with epistemic situations is of interest even within this narrow 
population.  
Another issue with my research is that it is cross sectional. This may seem especially 
problematic as, at times, my language in describing the findings is causal. The causal 
language is present due to theoretical and empirical reasons, rather as an indication of an 
experimental design. I operated under the theoretical assumption that personality reflects 
biologically driven consistencies in emotions, cognitions and behaviour. Therefore I assume 
that personality is an antecedent of states and processes. For interest, both of the 
appraisals, when experimentally manipulated, have been shown to influence interest (Silvia, 
2005b). The individual difference approach to psychology is at its most powerful when cross 
sectional findings are combined with experimental manipulations (Eysenck, 1997; Revelle, 
2007). This is an important next step for solidifying our understanding of the 
Openness/Intellect-engagement relationship. The most consistent and, in my opinion, 
interesting finding within this thesis is the novelty-interest moderation and this should be 
tested via experimental methods by future research.  
Another important extension of the work within this thesis is integrating extra 
variables to further clarify the current findings. Both the measurement and influence of 
interest could be more rigorously investigated. For example, eye tracking and information 
retention could be used to test whether those higher on Openness/Intellect are utilising 
their greater interest, and whether self-reported interest is not just part of the self-concept 
of the open-minded. Evidence for differential eye-gaze behaviour associated with curiosity 
measures has already started to emerge (Baranes, Oudeyer, & Gottlieb, 2015).  Our findings 
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regarding further information requests (Chapters 2 and 3) and time spent viewing art 
(Chapter 2) indicate that what is assessed via self-reported interest is not just self-concept. 
Further, activation of the dopaminergic system associated with interest was observed in 
conjunction with self-reported interest which suggests validity in such assessments (Gruber 
et al., 2014; Kang et al., 2009). While being interested in a broad range of stimuli seems to 
be a feature of the open, it is important to see if open people are utilising this interest, for 
example in the retention of information. There is some evidence that supports such a 
relationship. Greater retention of information (both relevant and irrelevant to the task) was 
related to activation of the dopaminergic system associated with ratings of interest (Kang et 
al., 2009). This suggests that self-reported interest has validity as a variable that predicts 
learning.  
One interesting avenue for future studies involves placing Openness and Intellect 
within Mussel’s theoretical framework of constructs related to intellectual achievements 
(2013). In one sense the Openness/Intellect domain is a broader construct than the Intellect 
construct proposed by Mussel—only the facet of Openness to Ideas was suggested as part 
of the framework—thus, perhaps it is Mussel’s Intellect that needs to be placed within the 
Openness/Intellect domain. No measures were found to occupy the create operation of the 
model, all of a sudden making the omission of Openness seemingly stark. Afterall, Openness 
is a strong predictor of creative achievement in the arts (Kaufman et al., 2014). Given the 
results of this thesis Openness broadly fits within the seek process as it was related to 
information requests, more time spent engaging with artistic stimuli, and interest in 
information. Intellect, based on its associations with understanding, would fit within the 
learning operation. Intellect may also be associated with the conquering process as it was 
related to curiosity as a sense of deprivation.  
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Finally, I argue that it is crucial to further investigate the unique influence of other 
investment traits on interest in abstract informational stimuli. Intellect does not seem to be 
capturing greater intellectual engagement. Perhaps variables that do not conflate ability 
with engagement constructs may play an important and unique role in explaining 
engagement with abstract information. For example, the complex relationships between 
Openness/Intellect and abilities—both in affecting each other longitudinally and interacting 
with each other in predicting educational outcomes (Zhang & Ziegler, 2015; Ziegler et al., 
2012)—are encouraging, and future studies should continue the work of disentangling these 
constructs.   
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Conclusions 
“There is a fifth dimension, beyond that which is known to man. It is a dimension as 
vast as space and as timeless as infinity. It is the middle ground between light and shadow, 
between science and superstition; and it lies between the pit of man’s fears and the summit 
of his knowledge. This is the dimension of imagination” 
Rod Serling 
This thesis represents an important update to how we understand the 
Openness/Intellect domain in terms of engagement with informational stimuli and 
situations. Particularly, Openness is proposed to be the aspect of the domain that explains 
individual differences in engagement with such stimuli, and is proposed to be the 
knowledge emotion core within the Big Five. A mechanism for this relationship is proposed 
to be reactivity to novelty. Intellect on the other hand, was mainly related to greater self-
assessed understanding of semantic stimuli, failing to consistently predict engagement with 
information.  The appraisal based process evidence—the novelty-reactivity of the open—
connects to biological accounts of novelty and information seeking, and provides a 
mechanism for how Openness/Intellect manifests in lifelong learning and ability 
development as has been proposed for investment traits.  
In stretching out the domain of Openness/Intellect the BFAS scales aimed to resolve 
the debate between lexical and questionnaire conceptualisations of the domain. The 
empirical method of separating the aspects has, in my opinion, gone too far and stretched 
the Intellect aspect away from assessing a pure engagement construct. In seeking to 
empirically resolve the feisty debate as to who’s fifth dimensions was really “as vast as 
space and as timeless as infinity” (Sterling, 1959), the model may have lost its curiosity. 
While Openness is well represented—a construct that measures emotional engagement in 
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response to information—Intellect may have some face and predictive validity issues. While 
ability adjectives were present in the lexical measures of Intellect, they reflected a small 
portion of the overall scales (Goldberg, 1993), and the construct was broad enough to share 
substantial variance with Openness to Experience (Johnson, 1994; Saucier, 1994). In seeking 
to find two distinct aspects of the elusive Openness/Intellect domain, what materialised is 
an aspect that conflates personality assessment with ability, and fails to properly represent 
a crucial part of the fifth dimension—the intellectual curiosity that predisposes people to 
engage with abstract information, regardless of their abilities.  
Saucier (1992, 1994) suggested that the distinction between Openness to Experience 
and Intellect models was “much ado about nothing” in that they represented peripheral 
aspects of the same domain linked by imagination, and similarly Johnson (1994) concluded 
that Openness and Intellect were reflective of interests in beauty versus truth. Given both 
the evidence presented in this thesis and reviewed above, I am sceptical regarding the 
interested nature of those scoring high on Intellect. The distinction between Openness and 
Intellect as it is conceptualised—rather than measured—seems a viable division of the 
domain. Several studies have demonstrated such a divide which indeed seems to reflect two 
different ways of engaging with information, one facilitated by perceptual and sensory 
processes and the other as engagement with abstract information (Jang et al., 2002; 
Johnson, 1994; Mussel, Winter, Gelléri, & Schuler, 2011; Trapnell, 1992). Critically, these 
findings did not include measurements that included self-assessed intelligence. Such 
findings reflect that non-ability based assessments of the domain can be split to reflect two 
types of engagement with information. The BFAS measurement model of Openness and 
Intellect—according to my findings—does not seem to represent such a distinction. Future 
updates to the Openness/Intellect measurement model should try to get its curiosity back.   
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Appendices 
Appendix A – Stimuli used in studies 
Study 1 
Quotations 
"The moment of winning is much too short to live for that and nothing else. “` 
"Curiously enough, one cannot read a book: one can only reread it. A good reader, a major 
reader, an active and creative reader is a rereader. " 
 
"In the darkness ... the sound of a man Breathing, testing his faith 
On emptiness, nailing his questions 
One by one to an untenanted cross." 
 
"Do not go gentle into that good night, Old age should burn and rave at close of day. 
Rage, rage against the dying of the light." 
 
"A stand can be made against invasion by an army; no stand can be made against invasion 
by an idea." 
 
"The mind is its own place, and in itself can make a heaven of hell, a hell of heaven." 
 
"We have a beautiful mother 
Her green lap 
Immense 
Her brown embrace 
Eternal 
Her blue body 
Everything 
we know." 
  
   182 
 
 
 
 
Study 2  
(a) 
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(b) 
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Study 3 
 
Voyager 1 Officially Exits Our Solar System 
"A new study released today indicates that the Voyager 1 spacecraft has become the 
first man-made object to exit our solar system. Instrumentation data sent back to NASA 
indicate the historic event likely occurred on August 25, 2012, evidenced by drastic changes 
in radiation levels as the craft ventured past the heliopause. What remains to be seen, 
however, is whether Voyager 1 has actually made it to true interstellar space, or whether it 
has entered a separate, undefined region beyond our solar system. Either way, the 
achievement is truly monumental. 'It's outside the normal heliosphere, I would say that. 
We're in a new region,' said Bill Webber, professor emeritus of astronomy at New Mexico 
State University in Las Cruces. 'And everything we're measuring is different and exciting.'" 
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Vegetative State Man 'Talks' By Brain Scan 
 
"'Severely brain-injured Scott Routley hasn't spoken in 12 years. None of his physical 
assessments since then have shown any sign of awareness, or ability to communicate, thus 
being diagnosed as vegetative (vegetative patients emerge from a coma into a condition 
where they have periods awake, with their eyes open, but have no perception of themselves 
or the outside world).' Scott Routley was asked questions while having his brain activity 
scanned in an fMRI machine. British neuroscientist Prof Adrian Owen said Mr Routley was 
clearly not vegetative. 'Scott has been able to show he has a conscious, thinking mind. We 
have scanned him several times and his pattern of brain activity shows he is clearly choosing 
to answer our questions. We believe he knows who and where he is.' As a consequence, 
medical textbooks would need to be updated to include Prof Owen's techniques, because 
only observational assessments (as opposed to using mind-readers) of Mr. Routley have 
continued to suggest he is vegetative. Functional MRI machines are expensive (up to $2 
million), but it's quite possible that a portable high-end EEG machine, costing about 
$75,000, can be used at a patient's bedside. Phillip K. Dick's world is one step closer." 
 
Quantum Teleportation Sends Information 143 Kilometers 
"Scientists from around the world have collaborated to achieve quantum 
teleportation over 143 kilometers in free space. Quantum information was sent between 
the Canary Islands of La Palma and Tenerife. Quantum teleportation is not how it is made 
out in Star Trek, though. Instead of sending an object (in this case a photon) from one 
location to another; the information of its quantum state is sent, making a photon on the 
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other end look identical to the original. 'Teleportation across 143 kilometres is a crucial 
milestone in this research, since that is roughly the minimum distance between the ground 
and orbiting satellites.' It is the hope of the research team that this experiment will lead to 
commercial use of quantum teleportation to interact with satellites and ground stations. 
This will increase the efficiency of satellite communication and help with the expansion of 
quantum internet usage.” 
Analyzing Tweets To Identify Psychopaths 
"Researchers presenting at Defcon next week have developed a psychopathy 
prediction model for Twitter. It analyzes linguistic tells to rate users' levels of narcissism, 
machiavellianism and other similarities to Patrick Bateman. 'The FBI could use this to flag 
potential wrongdoers, but I think it's much more compelling for psychologists to use to 
understand large communities of people,' says Chris Sumner of the Online Privacy 
Foundation. Some of the Twitter clues: Curse words. Angry responses to other people, 
including swearing and use of the word "hate." Using the word "we." Using periods. Using 
filler words such as 'blah' and 'I mean' and 'um.' So, um, yeah." 
Researchers Tweak Mouse Neurons To Activate Specific Memories 
"According to new study published in Nature, MIT researchers have figured out how 
to trigger specific memories in rats by hitting certain neurons with a pulse of light. From the 
article: 'The researchers first identified a specific set of brain cells in the hippocampus that 
were active only when a mouse was learning about a new environment. They determined 
which genes were activated in those cells, and coupled them with the gene for 
channelrhodopsin-2 (ChR2), a light-activated protein used in optogenetics. The light-
activated protein would only be expressed in the neurons involved in experiential learning 
— an ingenious way to allow for labeling of the physical network of neurons associated with 
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a specific memory engram for a specific experience. Finally, the mice entered an 
environment and, after a few minutes of exploration, received a mild foot shock, learning to 
fear the particular environment in which the shock occurred. The brain cells activated during 
this fear conditioning became tagged with ChR2. Later, when exposed to triggering pulses of 
light in a completely different environment, the neurons involved in the fear memory 
switched on — and the mice quickly entered a defensive, immobile crouch.'" 
If You're Fat, Broke, and Smoking, Blame Language 
"A Yale researcher says that culture differences how much money we save, how well 
we take care of ourselves, and other behavior indicative of taking the long view, are all 
based on language. His study argues that the way a language's syntax refers to the future 
affects how its speakers perceive the future. For example, English and Greek make strong 
distinctions between the present and the future, while German doesn't, while English and 
Greek speakers are statistically poorer and in worse health than Germans. " 
Moore's Law and the Origin of Life 265 
"MIT Technology Review is running a story about an arXiv paper in which geneticists 
Alexei A. Sharov and Richard Gordon propose that life as we know it originated 9.7 billion 
years ago. The researchers estimated the genetic complexity of phyla in the paleontological 
record by counting the number of non-redundant functional nucleotides in typical genomes 
of modern day descendants of each phylum. When plotting genetic complexity against time, 
the researchers found that genetic complexity increases exponentially, just as with Moore's 
law, but with a doubling rate of about once every 376 million years. Extrapolating 
backwards, the researchers estimate that life began about 4 billion years after the universe 
formed and evolved the first bacteria just before the Earth was formed. One might image 
that the supernova debris that formed the early solar system could have included bacteria-
   190 
 
 
bearing chunks of rock from doomed planets circling supernova progenitor stars. If true, this 
retro-prediction has some interesting consequences in partly resolving the Fermi Paradox. 
Another interesting consequence for those attempting to recreate life's origins in a lab: 
bacteria may have evolved under conditions very different from those on earth." 
 
Living In a Virtual World Requires Less Brain Power 
"If you were a rat living in a completely virtual world like in the movie The Matrix, 
could you tell? Maybe not, but scientists studying your brain might be able to. Today, 
researchers report that certain cells in rat brains work differently when the animals are in 
virtual reality than when they are in the real world. In the experiment, rats anchored to the 
top of a ball ran in place as movie-like images around them changed, creating the 
impression that they were running along a track. Their sense of place relied on visual cues 
from the projections and their self-motion cues, but they had to do without proximal cues 
like sound and smell. The rodents used half as many neurons to navigate the virtual world as 
they did the real one." 
 
Manga Girls Beware: Extra Large Eyes Caused Neanderthal's Demise 
"The BBC reports on a new study of prehistoric skulls which suggests that 
Neanderthals became extinct because they had larger eyes than our species. As a 
consequence of having extra sized eyes, an average 6 millimetres larger in radius, more of 
their backside brain volume was devoted to seeing, at the expense of frontal lobe high-level 
processing of information and emotions. This difference affected their ability to innovate 
and socialize the way we, modern people (Homo Sapiens Sapiens) do. When the last Ice Age 
set on 28,000 years ago, Neanderthals had no sewn clothes and no large organized groups 
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to rely on each other, hastening their fall. Yet, they were not stupid, brutish creatures as 
portrayed in Hollywood films, they were very, very smart, but not quite in the same league 
as the Homo Sapiens of Cromagnon." 
 
The New AI: Where Neuroscience and Artificial Intelligence Meet 
"We're seeing a new revolution in artificial intelligence known as deep learning: 
algorithms modeled after the brain have made amazing strides and have been consistently 
winning both industrial and academic data competitions with minimal effort. 'Basically, it 
involves building neural networks — networks that mimic the behavior of the human brain. 
Much like the brain, these multi-layered computer networks can gather information and 
react to it. They can build up an understanding of what objects look or sound like. In an 
effort to recreate human vision, for example, you might build a basic layer of artificial 
neurons that can detect simple things like the edges of a particular shape. The next layer 
could then piece together these edges to identify the larger shape, and then the shapes 
could be strung together to understand an object. The key here is that the software does all 
this on its own — a big advantage over older AI models, which required engineers to 
massage the visual or auditory data so that it could be digested by the machine-learning 
algorithm.' Are we ready to blur the line between hardware and wetware?" 
 
Philosophy stimuli 
We have already gone beyond whatever we have words for. In all talk there is a grain of 
contempt. 
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Written words differ from spoken words in being material structures. A spoken word is a 
process in the physical world, having an essential time-order; a written word is a series of 
pieces of matter, having an essential space-order. 
 
There is no logical impossibility in the hypothesis that the world sprang into being five 
minutes ago, exactly as it then was, with a population that "remembered" a wholly unreal 
past. There is no logically necessary connection between events at different times; 
therefore nothing that is happening now or will happen in the future can disprove the 
hypothesis that the world began five minutes ago. 
 
The foot feels the foot when it feels the ground. 
Beyond a critical point within a finite space, freedom diminishes as numbers increase. The 
human question is not how many can possibly survive within the system, but what kind of 
existence is possible for those who do survive. 
 
It is because human needs are contradictory that no human life can be perfect. That does 
not mean that human life is imperfect. It means that the idea of perfection has no meaning. 
 
It may be true that "Thou canst not stir a flower without troubling a star", but in computing 
the motion of stars and planets, the effects of flowers do not loom large. It is the 
disregarding of the effect of flowers on stars that allows progress in astronomy. Appropriate 
abstraction is critical to progress in science. 
 
Power is everywhere: not that it engulfs everything, but that it comes from everywhere. 
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Mathematics takes us still further from what is human, into the region of absolute necessity, 
to which not only the world, but every possible world, must conform.  
 
History is not like some individual person, which uses men to achieve its ends. History is 
nothing but the actions of men in pursuit of their ends. 
 
Images 
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Appendix B - Questions and scales 
Study 1 
Big Five Aspect Scales (BFAS) 
 
Reference:  DeYoung, C. G., Quilty, L. C., & Peterson, J. B. (2007). Between facets and 
domains: 10 Aspects of the Big Five. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93, 880-
896. 
 
Instructions: Here are a number of characteristics that may or may not describe you.  
For example, do you agree that you seldom feel blue?  Please fill in the number that best 
indicates the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement listed below.  Be as 
honest as possible, but rely on your initial feeling and do not think too much about each 
item. 
 
Use the following scale: 
 1 - - - - - - - - 2 - - - - - - - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - 4 - - - - - - - - 5 
      Strongly                            Neither Agree                          Strongly 
      Disagree                            Nor Disagree                             Agree    
1. ___ Seldom feel blue. 
2. ___ Am not interested in other people's problems. 
3. ___ Carry out my plans. 
4. ___ Make friends easily. 
5. ___ Am quick to understand things. 
6. ___ Get angry easily. 
7. ___ Respect authority. 
8. ___ Leave my belongings around. 
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9. ___ Take charge. 
10. ___ Enjoy the beauty of nature. 
11. ___ Am filled with doubts about things. 
12. ___ Feel others' emotions. 
13. ___ Waste my time. 
14. ___ Am hard to get to know. 
15. ___ Have difficulty understanding abstract ideas. 
16. ___ Rarely get irritated. 
17. ___ Believe that I am better than others. 
18. ___ Like order. 
19. ___ Have a strong personality. 
20. ___ Believe in the importance of art. 
21. ___ Feel comfortable with myself. 
22. ___ Inquire about others' well-being. 
23. ___ Find it difficult to get down to work. 
24. ___ Keep others at a distance. 
25. ___ Can handle a lot of information. 
26. ___ Get upset easily. 
27. ___ Hate to seem pushy. 
28. ___ Keep things tidy. 
29. ___ Lack the talent for influencing people. 
30. ___ Love to reflect on things. 
31. ___ Feel threatened easily. 
32. ___ Can't be bothered with other's needs. 
33. ___ Mess things up. 
34. ___ Reveal little about myself. 
35. ___ Like to solve complex problems. 
36. ___ Keep my emotions under control. 
37. ___ Take advantage of others. 
38. ___ Follow a schedule. 
39. ___ Know how to captivate people. 
40. ___ Get deeply immersed in music. 
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41. ___ Rarely feel depressed. 
42. ___ Sympathize with others' feelings. 
43. ___ Finish what I start. 
44. ___ Warm up quickly to others. 
45. ___ Avoid philosophical discussions. 
46. ___ Change my mood a lot. 
47. ___ Avoid imposing my will on others. 
48. ___ Am not bothered by messy people. 
49. ___ Wait for others to lead the way. 
50. ___ Do not like poetry. 
51. ___ Worry about things. 
52. ___ Am indifferent to the feelings of others. 
53. ___ Don't put my mind on the task at hand. 
54. ___ Rarely get caught up in the excitement. 
55. ___ Avoid difficult reading material. 
56. ___ Rarely lose my composure. 
57. ___ Rarely put people under pressure. 
58. ___ Want everything to be “just right.” 
59. ___ See myself as a good leader. 
60. ___ Seldom notice the emotional aspects of paintings and pictures. 
61. ___ Am easily discouraged. 
62. ___ Take no time for others. 
63. ___ Get things done quickly. 
64. ___ Am not a very enthusiastic person. 
65. ___ Have a rich vocabulary. 
66. ___ Am a person whose moods go up and down easily. 
67. ___ Insult people. 
68. ___ Am not bothered by disorder. 
69. ___ Can talk others into doing things. 
70. ___ Need a creative outlet. 
71. ___ Am not embarrassed easily. 
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72. ___ Take an interest in other people's lives. 
73. ___ Always know what I am doing. 
74. ___ Show my feelings when I'm happy. 
75. ___ Think quickly. 
76. ___ Am not easily annoyed. 
77. ___ Seek conflict. 
78. ___ Dislike routine. 
79. ___ Hold back my opinions. 
80. ___ Seldom get lost in thought. 
81. ___ Become overwhelmed by events. 
82. ___ Don't have a soft side. 
83. ___ Postpone decisions. 
84. ___ Have a lot of fun. 
85. ___ Learn things slowly. 
86. ___ Get easily agitated. 
87. ___ Love a good fight. 
88. ___ See that rules are observed. 
89. ___ Am the first to act. 
90. ___ Seldom daydream. 
91. ___ Am afraid of many things. 
92. ___ Like to do things for others. 
93. ___ Am easily distracted. 
94. ___ Laugh a lot. 
95. ___ Formulate ideas clearly. 
96. ___ Can be stirred up easily. 
97. ___ Am out for my own personal gain. 
98. ___ Want every detail taken care of. 
99. ___ Do not have an assertive personality. 
100. ___ See beauty in things that others might not notice 
 
Image associated Questions 
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This stimulus is: 
Simple ---Complex 
Familiar--Unfamiliar 
Easy to understand---Hard to understand 
Comprehensible----Incomprehensible 
According to your impressions to what extent do you find this stimulus (Strongly 
agree to strongly disagree): 
 Interesting 
 Boring 
 
Study 2 
The Gratitude Questionnaire–6 (GQ-6) 
Using the scale below as a guide, write a number beside each statement 
to indicate how much you agree with it. 
1  strongly disagree 
2  disagree 
3  slightly disagree 
4  neutral 
5  slightly agree 
6  agree 
7  strongly agree 
____1. I have so much in life to be thankful for. 
____2. If I had to list everything that I felt grateful for, it would be a very long list. 
____3. When I look at the world, I don’t see much to be grateful for. 
____4. I am grateful to a wide variety of people. 
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____5. As I get older I find myself more able to appreciate the people, events, and 
situations that have been part of my life history. 
____6. Long amounts of time can go by before I feel grateful to something or 
someone. Items 3 and 6 are reverse scored. 
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GRAT Scale 
Please provide your honest feelings and beliefs about the following statements which relate to you.  
There are no right or wrong answers to these statements.  We would like to know how much you feel these 
statements are true or not true of you.  Please try to indicate your true feelings and beliefs, as opposed to 
what you would like to believe.  Respond to the following statements by circling the number that best 
represents your real feelings.  Please use the scale provided below, and please choose one number for each 
statement (i.e. don't circle the space between two numbers), and record your choice in the blank preceding 
each statement.   
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
I 
strongly 
disagree 
 I 
disagree 
somewhat 
 I 
feel neutral 
about the 
statement 
 I 
mostly 
agree with 
the 
statement 
 I 
strongly 
agree with 
the 
statement 
 
_____  1.    I couldn't have gotten where I am today without the help of 
many people. 
 
_____  2.   Life has been good to me. 
 
_____  3.   There never seems to be enough to go around and I never seem to get my 
share. 
 
_____  4.   Oftentimes I have been overwhelmed at the beauty of nature. 
 
_____  5.   Although I think it's important to feel good about your accomplishments, I 
think that it's also important to remember how others have contributed to 
my accomplishments. 
 
_____  6.   I really don't think that I've gotten all the good things that I deserve 
in life. 
 
_____  7.   Every Fall I really enjoy watching the leaves change colors. 
 
_____  8.  Although I'm basically in control of my life, I can't help but think about all 
those who have supported me and helped me along the way. 
 
_____  9.   I think that it's important to "Stop and smell the roses." 
 
_____  10.   More bad things have happened to me in my life than I deserve. 
 
_____  11.   Because of what I've gone through in my life, I really feel like the world owes 
me something. 
 
_____  12.   I think that it's important to pause often to "count my blessings." 
 
_____  13.   I think it's important to enjoy the simple things in life. 
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_____  14.   I feel deeply appreciative for the things others have done for me in 
my life. 
 
_____  15.   For some reason I don’t seem to get the advantages that others get. 
 
_____  16.   I think it's important to appreciate each day that you are alive. 
 
The curiosity and exploration inventory-II 
(strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, strongly agree) 
1. I actively seek as much information as I can in new situations. 
2. I am the type of person who really enjoys the uncertainty of everyday life. 
3. I am at my best when doing something that is complex or challenging. 
4. Everywhere I go, I am out looking for new things or experiences. 
5. I view challenging situations as an opportunity to grow and learn. 
6. I like to do things that are a little frightening. 
7. I am always looking for experiences that challenge how I think about myself and the world. 
8. I prefer jobs that are excitingly unpredictable. 
9. I frequently seek out opportunities to challenge myself and grow as a person. 
10. I am the kind of person who embraces unfamiliar people, events, and places. 
Instructions: rate the statements below for how accurately they reflect the way you generally feel and behave. 
Do not rate what you think you should do, or wish you do, or things you no longer do. Please be as honest as 
possible. 
Items 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 reflect stretching. 
Items 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 reflect embracing. Items are anchored on the following scale: 1= very slightly or not at 
all; 2 = a little; 3 = moderately; 4 = quite a bit; 5 = extremely. 
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Promotion prevention scale  
Using the scale below, please indicate your level of agreement with the following 
statements 
(strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, strongly agree) 
1. In general, I am focused on preventing negative events in my life. 
2. I am anxious that I will fall short of my responsibilities and obligations. 
3. I frequently imagine how I will achieve my hopes and aspirations. 
4. I often think about the person I am afraid I might become in the future. 
5. I often think about the person I would ideally like to be in the future. 
6. I typically focus on the success I hope to achieve in the future. 
7. I often worry that I will fail to accomplish my academic goals. 
8. I often think about how I will achieve academic success. 
9. I often imagine myself experiencing bad things that I fear might happen to me. 
10. I frequently think about how I can prevent failures in my life. 
11. I am more oriented toward preventing losses than I am toward achieving gains. 
12. My major goal in school right now is to achieve my academic ambitions. 
13. My major goal in school right now is to avoid becoming an academic failure. 
14. I see myself as someone who is primarily striving to reach my “ideal self ”—to 
fulfil my hopes, wishes, and aspirations. 
15. I see myself as someone who is primarily striving to become the self I “ought” to 
be—to fulfil my duties, responsibilities, and obligations. 
16. In general, I am focused on achieving positive outcomes in my life. 
17. I often imagine myself experiencing good things that I hope will happen to me. 
18. Overall, I am more oriented toward achieving success than preventing failure. 
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BFAS Openness and Intellect Scale 
 
  
Openness/Intellect  
 Combine Intellect and Openness for 20-item scale  
  
Intellect  
 5-item scale (Strongly agree to strongly disagree) 
+ keyed Am quick to understand things. 
 Can handle a lot of information. 
 Like to solve complex problems. 
 Have a rich vocabulary. 
 Think quickly. 
 Formulate ideas clearly. 
  
– keyed Have difficulty understanding abstract ideas. 
 Avoid philosophical discussions. 
 Avoid difficult reading material. 
 Learn things slowly. 
  
Openness  
 5-item scale (Strongly agree to strongly disagree) 
+ keyed Enjoy the beauty of nature. 
 Believe in the importance of art. 
 Love to reflect on things. 
 Get deeply immersed in music. 
 See beauty in things that others might not notice. 
 Need a creative outlet. 
  
– keyed Do not like poetry. 
 Seldom get lost in thought. 
 Seldom daydream. 
 Seldom notice the emotional aspects of paintings and pictures. 
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NEO-FFI 
 
This questionnaire contains a number of statements. For each statement, please 
write the number that best represents your opinion, using the following scale: 
 
strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, strongly agree 
 
_____ 1. I am not a worrier. 
_____ 2. I like to have a lot of people around me. 
_____ 3. I don’t like to waste my time daydreaming. 
_____ 4. I try to be courteous to everyone I meet. 
_____ 5. I keep my belongings neat and clean. 
 
_____ 6. I often feel inferior to others. 
_____ 7. I laugh easily. 
_____ 8. Once I find the right way to do something, I stick to it. 
_____ 9. I often get into arguments with my family and co-workers. 
_____ 10. I’m pretty good about pacing myself so as to get things done on time. 
 
_____ 11. When I’m under a great deal of stress, sometimes I feel like I’m going to 
pieces. 
_____ 12. I don’t consider myself especially “light-hearted.” 
_____ 13. I am intrigued by the patterns I find in art and nature. 
_____ 14. Some people think I’m selfish and egotistical. 
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_____ 15. I am not a very methodical person. 
 
_____ 16. I rarely feel alone or blue. 
_____ 17. I really enjoy talking to people. 
_____ 18. I believe letting students hear controversial speakers can only confuse and 
mislead them. 
_____ 19. I would rather cooperate with others than compete with them. 
_____ 20. I try to perform all the tasks assigned to me conscientiously. 
_____ 21. I often feel tense and jittery. 
_____ 22. I like to be where the action is. 
_____ 23. Poetry has little or no effect on me. 
_____ 24. I tend to be cynical and skeptical of others’ intentions. 
_____ 25. I have a clear set of goals and work toward them in an orderly fashion. 
 
_____ 26. Sometimes I feel completely worthless. 
_____ 27. I usually prefer to do things alone. 
_____ 28. I often try new and foreign foods. 
_____ 29. I believe most people will take advantage of you if you let them. 
_____ 30. I waste a lot of time before settling down to work. 
 
_____ 31. I rarely feel fearful or anxious. 
_____ 32. I often feel as if I’m bursting with energy. 
_____ 33. I seldom notice the moods or feelings that different environments 
produce. 
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_____ 34. Most people I know like me. 
_____ 35. I work hard to accomplish my goals. 
 
_____ 36. I often get angry at the way people treat me. 
_____ 37. I am a cheerful, high-spirited person. 
_____ 38. I believe we should look to our religious authorities for decisions on moral 
issues. 
_____ 39. Some people think of me as cold and calculating. 
_____ 40. When I make a commitment, I can always be counted on to follow 
through. 
 
_____ 41. Too often, when things go wrong, I get discouraged and feel like giving up. 
_____ 42. I am not a cheerful optimist. 
_____ 43. Sometimes when I am reading poetry or looking at a work of art, I feel a 
chill or wave of excitement. 
_____ 44. I’m hard-headed and tough-minded in my attitudes 
_____ 45. Sometimes I’m not as dependable or reliable as I should be. 
 
_____ 46. I am seldom sad or depressed. 
_____ 47. My life is fast-paced. 
_____ 48. I have little interest in speculating on the nature of the universe or the 
human condition. 
_____ 49. I generally try to be thoughtful and considerate. 
_____ 50. I am a productive person who always gets the job done. 
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_____ 51. I often feel helpless and want someone else to solve my problems. 
_____ 52. I am a very active person. 
_____ 53. I have a lot of intellectual curiosity. 
_____ 54. If I don’t like people, I let them know it. 
_____ 55. I never seem to be able to get organized. 
 
_____ 56. At times I have been so ashamed I just wanted to hide. 
_____ 57. I would rather go my own way than be a leader of others. 
_____ 58. I often enjoy playing with theories or abstract ideas.. 
_____ 59. If necessary, I am willing to manipulate people to get what I want. 
_____ 60. I strive for excellence in everything I do. 
 
Image associated Questions 
This image made me introspective. (Strongly agree to strongly disagree) 
This image made me reflective. (Strongly agree to strongly disagree) 
This image is thought provoking. (Strongly agree to strongly disagree) 
This is the kind of art that I usually enjoy. (Strongly agree to strongly disagree) 
This image fits with my outlook on life. (Strongly agree to strongly disagree) 
This image fits with my values. (Strongly agree to strongly disagree) 
I would like more information on this image (YES/NO) 
On Facebook I would like this image (YES/NO) 
On Facebook I would share this image on my wall. (YES/NO) 
I would like to own a copy of this. (YES/NO) 
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This image is: 
Simple ---Complex 
Familiar--Unfamiliar 
Easy to understand---Hard to understand 
Comprehensible----Incomprehensible 
According to your impressions to what extent do you find this image (Strongly agree 
to strongly disagree): 
 Interesting 
 Confusing 
 Exceptional  
 Fascinating 
 Profound 
 Awe Inspiring 
 Moving 
 Gives me goose bumps/chills 
 Lovely 
 Beautiful 
 Pleasing 
 Enjoyable 
 Scary 
 Disgusting 
 Disturbing  
 Haunting  
 Upsetting 
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Study 3 
 
Aesthetic fluency scale 
Reference: Smith, L. F., & Smith, J. K. (2006). The nature and growth of aesthetic 
ﬂuency. In P. Locher, C. Martindale, & L. Dorfman (Eds.), New directions in aesthetics, 
creativity, and the arts (pp. 47–58). Amityville, NY: Baywood. 
 
Please rate each of these concepts on the following 5-point scale: 
0: I have never heard of this artist or term 
1: I have heard of this but don’t really know anything about it 
2: I have a vague idea of what this is 
3: I understand this artist or idea when it is discussed 
4: I can talk intelligently about this artist or idea in art 
 
______ Mary Cassatt 
______ Isamu Noguchi 
______ John Singer Sargent 
______ Alessandro Boticelli 
______ Gian Lorenzo Bernini 
______ Fauvism 
______ Egyptian Funerary Stelae 
______ Impressionism 
______ Chinese Scrolls 
______ Abstract Expressionism 
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The curiosity and exploration inventory-II 
Reference: Kashdan, T. B., Gallagher, M. W., Silvia, P. J., Winterstein, B. P., 
Breen, W. E., Terhar, D., et al. (2009). The Curiosity and Exploration Inventory-II: 
Development, factor structure, and initial psychometrics. Journal of Research in 
Personality, 43, 987–998. 
 
Instructions: rate the statements below for how accurately they reflect the way you 
generally feel and behave. Do not rate what you think you should do, or wish you do, or 
things you no longer do. Please be as honest as possible. 
Items are anchored on the following scale: 1= very slightly or not at all; 2 = a little; 3 
= moderately; 4 = quite a bit; 5 = extremely. 
 
1. I actively seek as much information as I can in new situations. 
2. I am the type of person who really enjoys the uncertainty of everyday life. 
3. I am at my best when doing something that is complex or challenging. 
4. Everywhere I go, I am out looking for new things or experiences. 
5. I view challenging situations as an opportunity to grow and learn. 
6. I like to do things that are a little frightening. 
7. I am always looking for experiences that challenge how I think about myself and 
the world. 
8. I prefer jobs that are excitingly unpredictable. 
9. I frequently seek out opportunities to challenge myself and grow as a person. 
10. I am the kind of person who embraces unfamiliar people, events, and places. 
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Promotion prevention scale  
 
Reference: Summerville, A., & Roese, N. J. (2008). Self-report measures of individual 
differences in regulatory focus: A cautionary note. Journal of Research in Personality, 
42, 247–254. 
1. In general, I am focused on preventing negative events in my life. 
2. I am anxious that I will fall short of my responsibilities and obligations. 
3. I frequently imagine how I will achieve my hopes and aspirations. 
4. I often think about the person I am afraid I might become in the future. 
5. I often think about the person I would ideally like to be in the future. 
6. I typically focus on the success I hope to achieve in the future. 
7. I often worry that I will fail to accomplish my academic goals. 
8. I often think about how I will achieve academic success. 
9. I often imagine myself experiencing bad things that I fear might happen to me. 
10. I frequently think about how I can prevent failures in my life. 
11. I am more oriented toward preventing losses than I am toward achieving gains. 
12. My major goal in school right now is to achieve my academic ambitions. 
13. My major goal in school right now is to avoid becoming an academic failure. 
14. I see myself as someone who is primarily striving to reach my “ideal self ”—to 
fulfill my hopes, wishes, and aspirations. 
15. I see myself as someone who is primarily striving to become the self I “ought” to 
be—to fulfill my duties, responsibilities, and obligations. 
16. In general, I am focused on achieving positive outcomes in my life. 
17. I often imagine myself experiencing good things that I hope will happen to me. 
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18. Overall, I am more oriented toward achieving success than preventing failure. 
 
Big Five Aspect Scales (BFAS) 
 
Reference:  DeYoung, C. G., Quilty, L. C., & Peterson, J. B. (2007). Between facets and 
domains: 10 Aspects of the Big Five. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93, 880-
896. 
 
Instructions: Here are a number of characteristics that may or may not describe you.  
For example, do you agree that you seldom feel blue?  Please fill in the number that best 
indicates the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement listed below.  Be as 
honest as possible, but rely on your initial feeling and do not think too much about each 
item. 
 
Use the following scale: 
 1 - - - - - - - - 2 - - - - - - - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - 4 - - - - - - - - 5 
      Strongly                            Neither Agree                          Strongly 
      Disagree                            Nor Disagree                             Agree    
1. ___ Seldom feel blue. 
2. ___ Am not interested in other people's problems. 
3. ___ Carry out my plans. 
4. ___ Make friends easily. 
5. ___ Am quick to understand things. 
6. ___ Get angry easily. 
7. ___ Respect authority. 
8. ___ Leave my belongings around. 
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9. ___ Take charge. 
10. ___ Enjoy the beauty of nature. 
11. ___ Am filled with doubts about things. 
12. ___ Feel others' emotions. 
13. ___ Waste my time. 
14. ___ Am hard to get to know. 
15. ___ Have difficulty understanding abstract ideas. 
16. ___ Rarely get irritated. 
17. ___ Believe that I am better than others. 
18. ___ Like order. 
19. ___ Have a strong personality. 
20. ___ Believe in the importance of art. 
21. ___ Feel comfortable with myself. 
22. ___ Inquire about others' well-being. 
23. ___ Find it difficult to get down to work. 
24. ___ Keep others at a distance. 
25. ___ Can handle a lot of information. 
26. ___ Get upset easily. 
27. ___ Hate to seem pushy. 
28. ___ Keep things tidy. 
29. ___ Lack the talent for influencing people. 
30. ___ Love to reflect on things. 
31. ___ Feel threatened easily. 
32. ___ Can't be bothered with other's needs. 
33. ___ Mess things up. 
34. ___ Reveal little about myself. 
35. ___ Like to solve complex problems. 
36. ___ Keep my emotions under control. 
37. ___ Take advantage of others. 
38. ___ Follow a schedule. 
39. ___ Know how to captivate people. 
40. ___ Get deeply immersed in music. 
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41. ___ Rarely feel depressed. 
42. ___ Sympathize with others' feelings. 
43. ___ Finish what I start. 
44. ___ Warm up quickly to others. 
45. ___ Avoid philosophical discussions. 
46. ___ Change my mood a lot. 
47. ___ Avoid imposing my will on others. 
48. ___ Am not bothered by messy people. 
49. ___ Wait for others to lead the way. 
50. ___ Do not like poetry. 
51. ___ Worry about things. 
52. ___ Am indifferent to the feelings of others. 
53. ___ Don't put my mind on the task at hand. 
54. ___ Rarely get caught up in the excitement. 
55. ___ Avoid difficult reading material. 
56. ___ Rarely lose my composure. 
57. ___ Rarely put people under pressure. 
58. ___ Want everything to be “just right.” 
59. ___ See myself as a good leader. 
60. ___ Seldom notice the emotional aspects of paintings and pictures. 
61. ___ Am easily discouraged. 
62. ___ Take no time for others. 
63. ___ Get things done quickly. 
64. ___ Am not a very enthusiastic person. 
65. ___ Have a rich vocabulary. 
66. ___ Am a person whose moods go up and down easily. 
67. ___ Insult people. 
68. ___ Am not bothered by disorder. 
69. ___ Can talk others into doing things. 
70. ___ Need a creative outlet. 
71. ___ Am not embarrassed easily. 
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72. ___ Take an interest in other people's lives. 
73. ___ Always know what I am doing. 
74. ___ Show my feelings when I'm happy. 
75. ___ Think quickly. 
76. ___ Am not easily annoyed. 
77. ___ Seek conflict. 
78. ___ Dislike routine. 
79. ___ Hold back my opinions. 
80. ___ Seldom get lost in thought. 
81. ___ Become overwhelmed by events. 
82. ___ Don't have a soft side. 
83. ___ Postpone decisions. 
84. ___ Have a lot of fun. 
85. ___ Learn things slowly. 
86. ___ Get easily agitated. 
87. ___ Love a good fight. 
88. ___ See that rules are observed. 
89. ___ Am the first to act. 
90. ___ Seldom daydream. 
91. ___ Am afraid of many things. 
92. ___ Like to do things for others. 
93. ___ Am easily distracted. 
94. ___ Laugh a lot. 
95. ___ Formulate ideas clearly. 
96. ___ Can be stirred up easily. 
97. ___ Am out for my own personal gain. 
98. ___ Want every detail taken care of. 
99. ___ Do not have an assertive personality. 
100. ___ See beauty in things that others might not notice 
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The Gratitude, Resentment, and Appreciation Test (GRAT) 
 
Reference: Watkins, P. C., Woodward, K. Stone, T., & Kolts, R. L. (2003). Gratitude and happiness: Development of a measure of 
gratitude, and relationships with subjective well-being. Social Behavior and Personality, 31, 431-452. 
 
Instructions: Please provide your honest feelings and beliefs about the following statements which relate to you.  There are no 
right or wrong answers to these statements.  We would like to know how much you feel these statements are true or not true of you.  
Please try to indicate your true feelings and beliefs, as opposed to what you would like to believe.  Respond to the following statements by 
filling in the number that best represents your real feelings in the blank provided next to each statement using the scale provided below. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
I 
strongly 
disagree 
 I 
disagree 
somewhat 
 I 
feel neutral 
about the 
statement 
 I 
mostly agree 
with the 
statement 
 I 
strongly 
agree with 
the 
statement 
1.  ___ I couldn't have gotten where I am today without 
the help of many people. 
23.  ___ One of my favorite times of the year is 
Thanksgiving. 
2.  ___ I think that life has been unfair to me. 24.  ___ I believe that I am a very fortunate person. 
3.  ___ It sure seems like others get a lot more benefits in 
life than I do. 
25.  ___ I think that it's important to "Stop and smell 
the roses." 
4.  ___ I never seem to get the breaks or chances that 
other people do. 
26.  ___ More bad things have happened to me in my 
life than I deserve. 
5.  ___ Often I'm just amazed at how beautiful the 
sunsets are. 
27.  ___ I really enjoy the changing seasons. 
6.  ___ Life has been good to me. 28.  ___ Because of what I've gone through in my life, I 
really feel like the world owes me something. 
7.  ___ There never seems to be enough to go around and 
I never seem to get my share. 
29.  ___ I believe that the things in life that are really 
enjoyable are just as available to me as they are to the very rich. 
8.  ___ Often I think, "What a privilege it is to be alive." 30.  ___ I love to sit and watch the snow fall. 
9.  ___ Oftentimes I have been overwhelmed at the 
beauty of nature. 
31.  ___ I believe that I've had more than my share of 
bad things come my way. 
10.  ___ I feel grateful for the education I have received. 32.  ___ Although I think that I'm morally better than 
most, I haven't gotten my just reward in life. 
11.  ___ Many people have given me valuable wisdom 
throughout my life that has been important to my success. 
33.  ___ After eating I often pause and think, "What a 
wonderful meal." 
12.  ___ It seems like people have frequently tried to 
impede my progress. 
34.  ___ Every spring, I really enjoy seeing the flowers 
bloom. 
13.  ___ Although I think it's important to feel good about 
your accomplishments, I think that it's also important to remember 
how others have contributed to my success. 
35.  ___ I think that it's important to pause often to 
"count my blessings." 
14.  ___ I really don't think that I've gotten all the good 
things that I deserve in life. 
36.  ___ I think it's important to enjoy the simple things 
in life. 
15.  ___ Every Fall I really enjoy watching the leaves 
change colors. 
37.  ___ I basically feel like life has ripped me off. 
 
16.  ___ Although I'm basically in control of my life, I can't 
help but think about all those who have supported me and helped 
me along the way. 
38.  ___ I feel deeply appreciative for the things others 
have done for me in my life. 
17.  ___ Part of really enjoying something good is being 
thankful for that thing. 
39.  ___ I feel that God, or fate, or destiny, doesn’t like 
me very well. 
18.  ___ Sometimes I find myself overwhelmed by the 
beauty of a musical piece. 
40.  ___ The simple pleasures of life are the best 
pleasures of life. 
19.  ___ I'm basically very thankful for the parenting that 
was provided to me. 
41.  ___ I love the green of spring. 
20.  ___ I've gotten where I am today because of my own 
hard work, despite the lack of any help or support. 
42.  ___ For some reason I never seem to get the 
advantages that others get. 
21.  ___ Over the December holidays, the presents I get 
aren’t as good or as many as others seem to get. 
43.  ___ I think it's important to appreciate each day 
that you are alive. 
22.  ___ Sometimes I think, "Why am I so fortunate so as 
to be born into the family and culture I was born into?" 
44.  ___ I'm really thankful for friends and family. 
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